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Abstract 
In Mind and World, John McDowell argues for a picture of perceptual experience that sees 
experience as both richly contentful and propositionally structured. His thought is that by picturing 
our conceptual capacities as passively drawn into operation we can do justice to the independence 
of the world while also being able to account for the rational role of perceptual experience. 
Recently, however, this account has come under attack by Charles Travis, who has suggested that 
this conceptualist picture involves both an appeal to an illegitimate notion of looks and a confusion 
of facts and things, leaving us unable to understand how the world is able to bear on thought. 
Indeed, Travis’s critique has led McDowell to rewrite much of his original account, dropping both 
the claim that perceptual experience is propositionally contentful and the claim that it contains 
everything that it allows the subject to know non-inferentially. 
This thesis argues that McDowell is wrong to make these concessions to Travis, and instead 
argues in favour of a richly contentful picture of perceptual experience. In particular, it is argued 
that perceptual experience should be seen as constituted by rational capacities for recognition. This 
helps to mitigate Travis’s concern, since for a conceptual capacity to be realised in perceptual 
experience on this account simply is for some particular to be (ostensibly) recognised as falling 
under a generality. In fact, by drawing on Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the first 
version of the Deduction, it will be shown that recognition in terms of empirical concepts is a 
condition of the possibility of perceptual experience. It is only because we are able to recognise an 
object as in some sense ‘the same’ over time that any visual awareness is possible, and this 
recognition is only possible in terms of concepts. 
The second half of the thesis will then defend this account against potential objections. Chief 
among these is the so-called ‘bootstrap problem’, namely the apparent paradox that emerges from 
holding that empirical concepts are necessary for and yet originate from perpetual experience. It 
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will be argued that this problem can be solved by reference to what Andrea Kern calls ‘acts of 
learning’, where a subject is able to obtain their initial conceptual capacities via a relation to another 
subject who already has command of the capacities in question.  
The final chapter will then respond to two external ‘phenomenological’ objections: the 
argument from fineness of grain and Dreyfus’s suggestion that conceptualists like McDowell ignore 
the phenomenology of ‘absorbed coping’. Dreyfus bases his account on a reading of Heidegger in a 
way that could seem to set the latter’s picture in opposition to the account offered in this thesis. 
Instead, it will be suggested that, to the extent that they both take empirical meaning to be a priori, 
McDowell and Heidegger are in agreement. The difference is that Heidegger is not interested in 
giving us a therapeutic account of how the world is able to bear rationally on thought, but rather in 
asking after the conditions of such meaningful presence. Nonetheless, it will be argued that the 
account of rational capacities put forward by this thesis can be helpful in answering this 
transcendental question. Our self-conscious awareness of the fallibility of our recognitional 
capacities is that which produces the logical gap between recognition and judgment. It will be 
suggested that it is this gap that Heidegger calls die Lichtung or ‘the clearing’.  
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Introduction 
The question that this thesis is attempting to answer is what Charles Travis refers to as the 
‘fundamental question of perception’, namely “how can perceptual experience make the world bear 
(rationally) for the perceiver on what he is to think or do” (Travis 2013, 3)? How we go about 
answering this question will depend on what we interpret it as asking. A straightforward answer 
might be thought to involve a description of the way our visual system functions. If we focus on 
visual perception, a satisfactory answer along these lines might be something like this: ‘The world 
is able to bear on what we are to think because the rods and cones at the back of our eyes are 
responsive to the light that reflects off of the objects that surround us. Via the optic nerve, these 
cells are able to send information to the brain, which is where the neural phenomenon that we refer 
to as thought occurs’. Such a physical account is clearly part of the story about how perception is 
able to bear on what we are to think and do. If we did not have these physical, biological structures 
(or at least some equivalent) perception would not be possible at all. 
This, however, is not the kind of account that will be given here. That there are material 
conditions for perception to be possible is taken for granted. The issue is rather how the objects that 
we are made aware of in our perceptual experience – thanks in part to our physiological make up – 
are able to bear rationally on what we are to think and do. That is, the objects that surround us are 
not only something that we are physically responsive to, in the way a piece of iron is to water, but 
things that can provide us with reasons for belief or action. My seeing a cardinal at the end of the 
garden is not only something that I have a physical connection with via the reflection of photons, 
but something that I can refer to when asked to justify my belief, for example, that there are 
cardinals in the area (‘Why do you think that?’ ‘Well I saw one earlier; it was sitting on the fence’). 
Perceiving the cardinal, in other words, gives me reason to think that it is right to believe that there 
is a cardinal at the end of the garden – that other people in the same position would be correct in 
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judging things to be this way. It is this normative role of perceptual experience that Travis’s 
fundamental question seeks to address.  
Of course, it is clearly not enough for it to merely seem to me that that something is the case 
for it actually to be right to believe a proposition. If the cardinal at the end of the garden turns out to 
be a carefully disguised budgie rather than a real cardinal, then it is not right to hold that there is a 
cardinal at the end of the garden, regardless of how things appear. If the world is going to bear on 
what we are to think and do, the relevant standard for the normativity involved in perceptual 
judgment is how things are. As McDowell writes, the intentionality of belief and judgment turns on 
this fact: 
To make sense of the idea of a mental state’s or episode’s being directed toward the world, in 
the way in which… a belief or judgment is, we need to put the state or episode in a 
normative context. A belief or judgment to the effect that things are thus and so… must be a 
posture or stance that is correctly or incorrectly adopted according to whether things are 
indeed thus and so.  
(McDowell 1996, xi) 
Judgment must be ‘answerable to the world’ in this way if we are to make sense of it being about 
anything at all. If perception is to provide us with reasons for belief, then it must be able to put us in 
contact with the way the world is. It is for this reason that, as Rödl suggests, “there is no philosophy 
of human perception that is not epistemology” (2007, 163n). Perception must enable us to know, if 
there is to be a positive answer to Travis’s question.  
2. Conceptualism 
The suggestion that this thesis aims to defend is that in order for it to enable us to know, perceptual 
experience must be conceptually structured. This idea, although present in some form or other 
throughout the history of philosophy, is most famously argued for in contemporary literature by 
McDowell in Mind and World (1996). The argument is essentially that in order for what we 
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perceive to rationally bear on what we are to think and do, perceptual experience itself must show 
up in a form – i.e. as manifesting a content – that a subject can refer to as a justification for her 
belief. Only conceptually structured, propositional contents are able to play this role, as only they 
can entail something, and so transfer positive epistemic status on to other beliefs that we may hold. 
This much McDowell holds in common with Sellars (1997), Davidson (1986), and Rorty (1979), 
among others. The distinctive feature of McDowell’s account, however, is that this content is 
‘always already’ passively at play in perceptual experience. To perceive, in other words, is to have 
one’s conceptual capacities passively drawn into operation. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant 
refers to this process as the schematism of our conceptual capacities; in what follows I will refer to 
it as a process of recognition, i.e. a product of our rational capacity to recognise things in the 
environment before us. As we will see, unlike the account given by Rorty, where external impacts 
on our senses generate a belief in the subject, on this model no judgment has yet been made on the 
contents that we are presented with. 
Thus, for perception to provide us with reasons for belief, rather than merely generating the 
beliefs themselves, there must be an intentional distance between the moment of perception and the 
moment of judgment. This need not be a temporal gap, as if upon seeing the cardinal I must first 
weigh the evidence before issuing a judgment. Clearly not: when I see the cardinal (assuming I take 
myself to be in fairly standard conditions) my judging and my perceptual recognition need not come 
apart – I know that what I am faced with is a cardinal. The acknowledgement of the truth of the 
content of what I recognise accompanies the recognition. The point is, however, that the two 
elements, the ground (my passively recognising that there is a cardinal at the end of the garden) and 
the judgment (my assenting to the content and so accepting that my recognitional capacity has 
functioned correctly) are logically distinct. In other words, although they need not be, they can be at 
odds with each other. For example, if I know my neighbour likes placing decoy birds around the 
neighbourhood, the fact that I appear to recognise a cardinal at the end of the garden may not be 
Sam Matthews  of 10 200 19 September 2019
enough for me to assent to the truth of that content. So although what I am ostensibly perceiving 
appears to be a cardinal, I suspend judgment until I can get closer (or until it flies off). Equally I can 
reject the content outright, as I do in the case of Müller-Lyer illusion. I may seem to recognise one 
line as being longer than the other, but I certainly do not believe it to be the case.  
It will be argued that if there were no gap between recognition and judgment in this way, 
between the passive and active moments of our relationship to the world, then such rational 
responsiveness would not be possible. Indeed, it is this spontaneous acceptance or rejection of 
perceptual grounds that makes us accountable for what we believe, in a way that makes normative 
evaluation make sense. If I state that there is a cardinal at the end of the garden, that statement not 
only has a truth value according to the way the world is, but it is also something that I am held 
responsible for. If there is no cardinal to be found, I will be held to have judged wrongly. I could 
have done better, investigated further, held off making the judgment until I had got a bit closer. It is 
incumbent on the subject to recognise when things are not as they appear to be. It is this 
characteristic that distinguishes what Sellars calls the logical space of reasons from the law-bound 
space of natural science, where such responsibility has no role to play. For instance, there is no 
sense in which an electron acts correctly in triggering a certain set of neurones, it simply (re)acts as 
it does. That is not to say that there are not material conditions for our capacity for rational thought 
–  for instance it seems clear that having a sufficiently complex brain is such a condition (certainly 
humans without brains are not going to be able to think). The point is rather that the law-bound 
mode of description of natural science cannot capture what makes our rational capacities rational – 
how they can be applied correctly or incorrectly, and so how one thing can justify another. 
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3. Relationalism 
In a series of essays Charles Travis has advanced two influential objections to this conceptualist 
picture. The first of these suggests that the conceptualist is using an illegitimate notion of looks 
when speaking of perceptual experience having content. Travis distinguishes here between visual 
looks and thinkable looks, and suggests that neither are able to play the dual role that is required of 
them (i.e. being both passive and representational). The suggestion in the first case is that while 
visual looks are able to capture the passivity that is required, they are not able to provide a vehicle 
for representational content, as they underdetermine the number of ways that things could be said to 
be. Thinkable looks, by contrast, are able to capture the representational content of the perceptual 
experience that the conceptualist account needs, but they are not able to capture the passivity 
required, since they already express a judgment on the part of the subject. Thus, the argument is that 
there is no way to account for visual perception in a way that captures both conditions 
simultaneously, and so perceptual experience must be without representational content. 
As stated, Travis’s argument appears to beg the question against the conceptualist position. 
As we saw above, the argument is that in order to make sense of the idea of perceptual experience 
providing reasons for belief, we need to explain how the subject can come to reject the way things 
appear such that we can make sense of the spontaneity of belief formation. That is, we need a way 
of elucidating the subject’s self-consciousness of the fallibility of her perceptual capacity. It seems 
that without a gap between recognition and judgment, the subject would be forced to accept 
whatever it is she recognises, which would not only make nonsense of the idea of perception being 
able to provide justification for what we believe, but would mischaracterise the nature of belief (i.e. 
a proposition that is freely accepted by the subject as right to hold). Against this, Travis’s argument 
that there is no available notion of looks seems to miss the point, failing to consider that there could 
be any such distinction between the two moments. 
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As we will see, part of the reason for this is that Travis thinks that he has strong ontological 
grounds for rejecting the idea that concepts could be at play in perceptual experience. This second 
objection focuses on the fact that conceptual generalities are not something out there in the world, 
but rather that which worldly particulars fall under. To say that perceptual experience is 
conceptually structured, on his view, is to make a category mistake – it is to put generalities where 
only particulars will fit. Instead Travis thinks that we should characterise perception as a contentless 
relationship to the environment. On this account the only way to account for recognition is as 
judgment, as a bringing of a historical particular under a generality. The intentional distance 
between recognition (the passive drawing into operation of our conceptual capacities in perceptual 
experience) and judgment (the acknowledgement or rejection of the truth of that content), that 
seemed to be essential to understanding the perceptual relation as rational, vanishes. 
The problem is that this still does not explain Travis’s failure to see the possibility of a 
distinction between recognition and judgment. The conceptualist position, at least as presented here, 
does not entail taking the concept of cardinal as the object of perception, but rather the object of my 
perceptual experience is the cardinal itself, the historical particular I recognise as falling under the 
generality in the environment before me. A passive capacity for recognition, distinct from judgment 
proper, does not infringe on the metaphysical distinction between generalities and particulars. As 
will be shown, the root of the confusion here is a divergence in how rationality is understood in 
each case. For Travis, rationality is pictured in what Boyle calls an additive way (2016, 527). That 
is, it is something that is ‘added on top’ of the more basic functions and forms of awareness that we 
share with non-rational animals. Since perception is one of these forms of awareness, anything 
conceptual must be over and above this mere responsiveness to our environment. On the account I 
am advocating here, by contrast, rationality is transformative: rational perception is different in kind 
to non-rational perception. That is, recognition, on this account, is not only something that 
perception enables as per Travis’s account, but is constitutive of that experience itself. Perception 
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for a rational animal simply is recognising objects as falling under a particular generality. No sense 
can be made of perceptual experience for rational subjects outside of this ‘taking as’ something or 
other. 
4. The Synthetic Unity of Perception 
The second chapter will defend this suggestion, arguing in favour of the transformative picture of 
rationality, by using Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A edition of the Deduction to 
show that perceptual experience manifests what Kern calls the ‘unity of a rational capacity’ (2017, 
7). What Kant’s argument reveals is that each moment of perceptual experience needs to be 
connected to the next in order for the very idea of perceptual experience to be coherent. In essence 
the argument is that one’s awareness that the object being perceived now is the same as a moment 
before requires the recognition that they belong to the same whole, gathering each moment together 
under some general concept (or group of concepts) that links them together. In the absence of this 
unity made possible by the threefold synthesis, perceptual ‘experience’ would not be experience at 
all, since there would be no awareness of anything, let alone a potential object of judgment. This is 
not because we would otherwise be left to the ‘chaos of impressions’ as is often suggested (since 
that implies content to organise), but simply because perceptual experience has a temporal form. 
What our sensible faculties relate us to are not isolated moments of sensory data, but objects that 
persist through time. But recognising an object as an object in this sense (i.e. as ‘the same’) requires 
bringing these disparate – though sequential – moments together under a generality. Indeed, even 
recognising the moments as sequential requires this gathering together. 
The unity involved here is a synthetic, or constitutive, unity, where each element is logically 
dependent on the whole. This particular moment of recognition of the cardinal as a cardinal would 
not make sense as the moment of recognition that it is were it not connected to all the subsequent 
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moments of my perceptual experience of it. This contrasts with the analytic unity of concept 
subordination in judgment, for example, where each element of what is united is independent of 
every other element. That is, the concept ‘cardinal’ unities our familiar cardinal with all other 
cardinals to the extent that they all fall under the same concept. But our cardinal would still fall 
under the concept of cardinal even if he was the only one left (it would still make sense to say that 
what I am looking at is in fact a cardinal). He is in that sense independent of the other elements of 
the analytic unity.  
As it will turn out, it is the former synthetic mode of the use of concepts that makes the latter, 
analytic use possible. The suggestion will be that it is only because objects are synthetically unified 
in recognition in this way that there are, as Longuenesse puts it, “empirical objects representable as 
substitutional instances for the [variable] ‘x’ in the logical forms of our judgments” (1998, 396). 
Take the following judgment: To everything x, to which the concept ‘male cardinal’ belongs, 
belongs also the property of redness.  For this to even make sense, we have to have an 1
understanding of what it means for something to be an x, some particular empirical object or other, 
as a potential object of empirical experience. But the awareness of any particular object depends 
upon the threefold synthesis. In other words, perception must be constituted by a rational capacity 
of recognition if judgment about the world is going to be possible. 
5. Perceptual Minimalism 
The third chapter will show that there are two possible ways to account for this process of 
recognition. The first way – the one that this thesis wants to defend – can be called a ‘content-rich’ 
approach to perceptual experience. In Mind and World McDowell puts this idea in terms of the 
 i.e. ‘All male cardinals are red’. The specific form of the judgment given here can be ignored (as can the 1
question of analyticity) since the point is dependent only on the idea of concepts having an extension. The 
form here, which is Kant’s formulation, serves only to make the point explicit.
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content of perceptual experience containing everything that it allows the subject to know non-
inferentially. That is, if the subject knows a cardinal when she sees one (i.e. she has the capacity to 
recognise cardinals), and what she sees is in fact a cardinal, then part of the content of that 
experience can be expressed by a proposition such as ‘There’s a cardinal’. On this account, the 
perceptual experience of the subject, as a rational animal, is constituted by what the subject is able 
to recognise. 
The second way is a ‘content-poor’ approach, which could be thought of as perceptual 
minimalism. The idea here is that perceptual experience for rational subjects is not constituted by 
what we are able to recognise, but rather what we see of what we are able to recognise. That is, 
what I see when I see the cardinal is, for example, a ‘red object of a certain shape and size’. This 
base level of contents is what supposedly constitutes perceptual experience proper. Although the 
position that I am defending takes its starting point from McDowell’s account in Mind and World, 
McDowell himself in more recent essays comes to think that answering Travis’s criticisms requires 
moving to this sort of perceptual minimalist picture. He now argues that what we are presented with 
in perceptual experience are ‘merely categorically unified’ intuitional contents, that are nonetheless 
conceptual as they are discursive ‘in potentia’. This new stance roughly lines up with a position in 
Kant scholarship that I will call ‘categorical minimalism’ (see e.g. Griffith 2010, Connolly 2014), 
where the suggestion is that on Kant’s account only the categories are necessary for perception as 
such, and that empirical concepts are applied only after this initial conceptualisation, or schematism.  
As will become apparent, however, the problem with this kind of categorical minimalist 
account is that it is impossible to identify an independent base layer of content in what we perceive. 
Although similar arguments can be found for any supposedly foundational layer of perceptual 
content, below I will focus mainly on McDowell’s example of colour to make the point, drawing on 
Cassirer’s account of the relative nature of colour constancy in the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. 
As we will see, the key problem is that just what colour we recognise an object as manifesting will 
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depend in part on what object it is we (ostensibly) recognise. Kant makes a similar point when he 
suggests that the schema produces the image (1996, A142/B181). What we see of what we see is 
dependent on the latter part of the formulation (i.e. on what we recognise (or appear to)) – there is 
no independent visual image to be found. 
The categories cannot do the necessary work here either, for how the categories are 
schematised in perceptual experience will depend in part on just what is recognised in the perceived 
environment. For instance, whether we think that the branch is shaking because of the cardinal 
landing on it, or that the decoy cardinal is moving because the branch is blowing in the wind, will 
depend in part on whether we recognise it as a real bird or decoy. The schematisation of the 
category of causality does not select between these options, it simply says that – as per Kant’s 
second analogy – that “all changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect” 
(ibid, B232), but just what is connected and how it cannot say. 
6. Avoiding the Bootstrap Problem 
A rich picture of perceptual content, however, leaves us with what I will call the ‘bootstrap 
problem’. For if empirical concepts are a condition of the possibility for perceptual experience, and 
yet new empirical concepts can only be obtained by means of that very same experience, then how 
do things get off the ground in the first place? As Wolff writes in Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity: 
“it would appear that empirical concepts are ingredients in the very mental activity (unification of 
consciousness) whereby they first become possible. They both provide and depend upon 
consciousness” (Wolff 1963, 117-118; also cited in Allison 1968, 180n). There seems to be a 
paradox here, and one that Allison argues is ‘devastating’ for the account that I am advocating (ibid, 
180n). 
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There seem to be two options: we either give up the claim that empirical concepts are 
necessary for perceptual experience, or the claim that all empirical concepts must be obtained on the 
basis of such experience. In a series of essays Ginsborg has suggested that we should take the 
former route (e.g. 1997; 2006b; 2006c). Instead of seeing perceptual experience as constituted by 
rational capacities for recognition, she suggests that we see it in terms of the psychological activity 
of the imagination. Concepts are then formed through our taking this activity to be ‘primitively 
normative’. As we will see, however, the difficulty with this approach is that it misses the main 
point of Kant’s argument in the A Deduction, by failing to explain how it is that the subject is able 
to recognise this psychological activity as in some way ‘the same’ over time. For if the subject 
herself lacks any conceptual capacities, there does not seem to be anything ‘in terms of which’ she 
can recognise this bit of psychological activity as resembling the one that came before.  
Instead, this thesis will argue that we take the second route and reject the idea that our initial 
conceptual capacities must be drawn from perceptual experience. This could seem to imply that we 
need a set of innate conceptual capacities; however the suggestion here will be that our initial 
conceptual capacities arise through a rational transformation of the dispositions that we acquire as 
children to conform to a shared linguistic practice. Since these dispositions are acquired prior to the 
emergence of perceptual experience proper, it is possible to hold onto the claim that empirical 
concepts are necessary for perceptual experience while avoiding the paradox.  
7. Avoiding the Accusation of Conceptual Reductionism 
However, even if this solution to the bootstrap problem is accepted, the conceptualist picture I am 
defending may still appear to be reductive, at best restricted to particular moments of perceptual 
experience rather than constitutive of it. Such accusations of reductionism can be put into two broad 
groups that will be the topic of the final chapter. The first group argue that we are aware of far more 
Sam Matthews  of 18 200 19 September 2019
content in perceptual experience than a conceptualist reading can allow for; that we risk reducing 
the infinite complexity of the particular to simplistic general terms. An obvious proponent of this 
sort of criticism is Nietzsche in ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’, where he suggests that 
concepts are unavoidably distorting of the actual flux of experience. As he writes: 
As a ‘rational’ being, [the perceiver] places his behaviour under the control of abstractions. 
He will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. First he 
universalises all these impressions into less colourful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrust 
the guidance of his life and conduct to them. Everything which distinguishes man from the 
animals depends upon this ability to volatilise perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to 
dissolve an image into a concept. 
(2006, 146) 
But this gets things exactly the wrong way around: the schema produces the image. It is only 
because we recognise things that there is an image to be had. The idea of a schema distorting the 
flux of experience implies that there is something already there to be (mis)shaped – and as Kant’s 
threefold synthesis shows, that suggestion makes no sense. 
Nonetheless, we are still left with the question of how to account for the complexity of what 
we see. Indeed, there is something fairly intuitive about the idea that the actual experience of the 
cardinal transcends the content of the proposition ‘There’s a cardinal’. It will be suggested that this 
concern stems from a picture of the operation of conceptual capacities that is itself reductive, 
viewing concepts as merely disjunctive classifications rather than as complex interrelated functions, 
where each alteration in an aspect of the perceived environment potentially has ramifications for 
every other. On the account being advocated here “every beat strikes a thousand connections,” as 
Cassirer puts it (1957, 203). It is precisely this complexity that allows for spontaneous 
configurations of sense, enabling the emergence of new insight. 
The second group, by contrast, argue that we are (generally) aware of far less content in 
perceptual experience than a conceptualist reading would suggest. In the contemporary debate, the 
most ardent proponent of this sort of view is Dreyfus. He suggests, following what he takes to be 
Heidegger’s position, that for the majority of the time we are merely pragmatically coping with the 
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environment and not reflectively aware of what we are doing until things go wrong. On this account 
the conceptualist position is reductive as it tries to assimilate all perceptual experience to what is in 
fact only a partial and derivative element of our everyday experience. 
I will show that this criticism is wrong on two counts. Firstly, it works on a picture of 
judgment that is essentially detached and contemplative, but as was mentioned above, that is not the 
picture being advocated here. Secondly, it mischaracterises Heidegger’s position as ‘non-
conceptualist’ when Heidegger is clear that “we do not say what we see, we see what one says about 
the matter” (1985, 56). Perception, as he says, is inherently determinate, we are always taking 
things as things. When things go wrong we do not suddenly awake from a pragmatic slumber, 
surprised to be faced with concrete objects that were previously mere potentialities for action, but 
rather made aware of what was the case all along (i.e. the break down of tools functions as a 
phenomenological reduction for Heidegger).  
In fact, I will suggest that the ‘intentional distance’ or gap between recognition and judgment 
is precisely what Heidegger is referring to when he talks about ‘the clearing’ (die Lichtung). Indeed, 
the word captures the dual sense of a gap between the moments (in the sense of a clearing among 
the trees) as well as the way in which it is the space between the two that makes the experience of 
an image possible in the first place (as per its root, Licht). As we have seen, it is this gap that makes 
a rational relation to the objects that surround us possible, makes possible our experience of them as 
something or other. The ‘intentional distance’ that we started with, in other words, will be shown to 
be what Heidegger refers to as the origin of the intelligibility of being – that which makes possible 
our experience of the presence of things. 
Sam Matthews  of 20 200 19 September 2019
1. Does Perceptual Experience have Content? 
McDowell, Travis, and the Grounds of Judgment 
In Mind and World McDowell diagnoses what he calls an ‘intolerable oscillation’ between two 
philosophically unsatisfactory positions: On the one hand a foundationalism that posits a perceptual 
given that is unable to play the foundational role assigned to it, and on the other a coherentism that 
sees no role for experience in our justificatory practices whatsoever, bringing into question the 
degree to which we can see our beliefs as about anything at all. In order to bring an end to this 
constant shifting between these two positions, McDowell proposes that we see our conceptual 
capacities as passively drawn into operation in perceptual experience. His thought is that this can do 
justice to the independence of the world (since just what conceptual capacities are passively drawn 
into operation is not up to us) while still being able to explain how it is that the world can provide 
us with reasons for belief and action (since experience has a conceptual structure).  
Recently this account has come under attack from Charles Travis, who argues that 
McDowell’s picture fails to respect the distinction between concepts and the historical particulars 
that fall under them. By making concepts constitutive of perceptual experience, Travis thinks that 
McDowell prevents it from playing a role in explaining how it is that the world is able to bear on 
what we are to think and do. Instead, he suggests that perception is a contentless relation to the 
environment, which enables the recognition of objects as falling under a particular generality.  
This chapter will argue that, in order to respond to Travis’s critique and better serve 
McDowell’s therapeutic ambitions, we should reformulate his picture of ‘conceptual capacities 
being passively drawn into operation’ in terms of rational capacities for recognition. This shift in 
terminology has two key functions. Firstly, it makes clear that when McDowell talks about 
perceptual experience having a conceptual structure, he is not suggesting that the objects of 
perceptual experience are concepts. Rather, all he is arguing is that perceptual experience (at least 
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for rational animals such as ourselves) is constituted by a capacity to recognise objects in the 
environment as falling under a particular concept. Secondly, by appropriating Travis’s terminology 
– he calls recognition the ‘fundamental relation’ to which all conceptual relations can be reduced – 
speaking in terms of capacities for recognition makes the points of comparison with Travis’s own 
position much clearer. In particular, it will emerge that the fundamental difference between the two 
positions is that for Travis recognition and judgment do not come apart, while for McDowell there 
is always the possibility of rejecting the way that we ostensibly recognise things as being. 
The following chapter will be split into five sections. The first will focus on the motivation 
for McDowell’s account in Mind and World and discuss its therapeutic ambitions. The particular 
focus will be Rorty’s account of the untenability of the two central tenets of analytic philosophy: the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic truths and the distinction between scheme and content. It 
is Rorty’s response to the failure of the second of these that drives McDowell’s account in Mind and 
World, and it is his resulting coherentist picture that is the focus of section two. Rorty argues that 
since the only available account of perceptual experience is one described exclusively in law-bound 
terms, we should stop expecting it to provide a justificatory restraint on thought. It is the 
recalcitrance of this expectation, however, that drives the oscillation that McDowell identifies. 
Section three will then look at the therapeutic account given in Mind and World, where conceptual 
capacities are held to be passively at play in perceptual experience. This allows McDowell to 
combine the independence of the world (the source of the desire for a perceptual given) with the 
thought that only something of propositional form can stand as a justification for belief (the chief 
insight of the coherentist picture).  
Section four will then present Travis’s two main criticisms of McDowell’s conceptualist 
account. The first of these is a phenomenological objection, that focuses on the question of whether 
there is an account of perceptual ‘looks’ that can play both the passive and representational roles 
that McDowell requires of it. Travis argues that we are stuck either with a picture of visual looks 
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that is undetermined with respect to the way things can be said to be, or a picture of thinkable looks 
that cannot be separated from judgment, neither of which are able to fulfil both roles at once. The 
second of Travis’s criticisms is the ontological objection that was mentioned above; namely that by 
suggesting that experience is conceptually structured, McDowell makes it impossible to understand 
how a world made up of historical particulars is able to bear on thought. The fifth section will then 
address these concerns by recasting McDowell’s account in Mind and World in terms of rational 
capacities for recognition as suggested above. This helps avoid the idealist picture that seems to be 
implied by McDowell’s description of conceptual capacities being passively pulled into operation as 
‘shapings of sensory consciousness’, and so better achieves his therapeutic aim. 
1. An Intolerable Oscillation  
In Mind and World, McDowell argues that it is only if concepts are already at play in experience 
that we will be able to answer what Travis later calls the ‘fundamental question of perception’, 
namely how it is that the world is able to bear rationally on what we are to think and do. Although 
this could sound like an ambitious project of philosophical system building along the lines of Kant’s 
Critique (indeed McDowell cites Kant frequently in Mind and World), McDowell’s aims are far 
more modest. What he wants to do is present a ‘therapeutic’ account that can show a way out of 
what he calls a ‘philosophical malaise’: an intolerable oscillation in the literature between 
foundationalism and holism. His approach can be seen as an example of Wittgensteinian quietism, 
where the aim is not to create a philosophical system to compete with alternative accounts, “the 
kind of move that would bring with it an obligation to try to convince everyone of its 
truth”  (McDowell 1997, 181), but rather show us a way of looking at the problem such that it no 
longer seems pressing – “[t]o show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” as Wittgenstein puts it 
(2009, §309; also approvingly quoted by McDowell in op cit.). Only in this way can the account be 
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therapeutic: to present a constructive account would validate the idea that there was a genuine 
question to answer. 
The malaise that McDowell identifies in part emerges from the response to the critique of 
analytic philosophy given by Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979).  Rorty suggests 2
that two of the central tenets of the analytic school’s picture of philosophy as epistemology have 
been shown to be incoherent, with the result that “[t]he analytic movement in philosophy (like any 
movement in any discipline) [can be said to have] worked out the dialectical consequences of a set 
of assumptions, and now has little more to do” (Rorty 1979, 173). The first of these tenets is the 
supposed distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, or propositions that are true in virtue of 
meaning alone and so necessary (e.g. ‘all bachelors are unmarried’) and those that are true because 
of the way the world is and so contingent (e.g. ‘Paul is a bachelor’). This distinction allowed 
philosophers to picture themselves as having a distinct methodology – the analysis of concepts – 
that made available a particular kind of truth (viz. necessary propositions). The problem with this 
distinction, as Quine argues in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1963), is that there is no way of 
making it that does not already presuppose that we can make sense of what we mean by analytic 
(i.e. true in virtue of meaning alone). Quine shows that the only grounds for the distinction that we 
have available appear to be the contingent fact of contemporary usage or mere stipulation, but in 
either case the idea that there is a special kind of necessary truth to be found vanishes, with the 
result that philosophy is deprived of one of its vocations. Conceptual truths become – like the 
formulas of natural science – just another contingent set of beliefs that may need to be revised under 
the right circumstances. 
The second distinction is between conceptual scheme and empirical ‘content’, and it is 
Rorty’s response to the rejection of this picture that is the focus of McDowell’s account in Mind and 
 McDowell says in the preface to Mind and World that the account he gives “is an attempt to get under 2
control my usual excited reading of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” (1996, ix).
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World.  One way of thinking of this division is in terms of the contribution to knowledge that is 3
made by the world and the contribution that is made by us. As Quine suggests, it seems “obvious 
that truth in general depends on both language and extra-linguistic fact” (1963, 36). If we take the 
statement ‘there is a cardinal at the end of the garden’ as an example, it seems clear that the truth of 
that statement in part depends on what the words mean (what counts as a cardinal) and in part on 
whether the state of affairs actually obtains (whether there is an instance of something so counting). 
It is thus easy to think of language as the merely ‘subjective’ element and the extra-linguistic fact as 
a separable ‘objective’ component. For while it seems there can be a plurality of conceptual 
schemes that divide up the world in numerous ways, just what is being so organised seems to be 
shared between schemes nonetheless. The only alternative appears to be that the world itself was 
altered by the conceptual scheme that is doing the organising, a suggestion that seems to flout the 
independence of the world and so lead directly to a subjective idealism (and so scepticism about our 
claims to know the external world). Thus the aim within some parts of analytic philosophy (most 
famously with Carnap and the logical positivists) was to identify this independent, worldly element 
(that which is being organised by our conceptual capacities) and separate it from our own 
contribution (the organising) in order to discover the foundation for knowledge, the ultimate court 
of appeal for our claims to know.  
If there is such an element to be found, it must be something that the subject is both passive 
towards (if it is to properly register the independence of the world) and something purely receptive 
(if we are going to be able separate it from the organising). What we appear to need, in other words, 
is something given to us. Part of the problem here is that even such objective sounding concepts as 
Although the rejection of the analytic synthetic distinction forms a somewhat separate strand in Rorty’s 3
account, McDowell suggests that Quine’s argument is dependent on his accepting the distinction between 
conceptual scheme and perceptual given. What Quine wants to show is that there is no such thing as analytic 
truths where these are understood as constitutive elements of a conceptual scheme set over and against the 
empirical data of the senses. McDowell’s thought is that if we reject this dualism “we can [perhaps] 
rehabilitate the idea of statements that are true in virtue of meaning” (1996, 157). Once analytic truths are 
liberated from the metaphysical burden of being constitutive of a particular scheme, there is nothing to stop 
us from understanding the idea as a matter of convention (see Grice & Strawson 1956, 152-3). It is thus 
Rorty’s response to the loss of this second distinction that is the chief concern of Mind and World. 
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‘shape’ and ‘object’ appear to be on the subjective side of the divide (a way of organising rather 
than what is organised), so it seems that whatever is so given must be something even more 
fundamental than this.  Since our relation to the world is made possible by our sensory faculties, 4
one of the most obvious candidates for this role is so-called ‘sense data’. The idea here is that 
perceptual experience is able to provide us with a base layer of content that is produced by the 
impacts of the external world on our sensible faculties. So for example, the suggestion would be 
that the reflection of the photons off the cardinal at the end of the garden into my retinas produces 
within me a bit of sense data that can then form the basis for a judgment about the way things are 
(e.g. when I recognise it to be red and cardinal shaped). This sort of data would form a non-
inferential foundation for knowledge, the purely objective element in our justificatory practices that 
would be able to resist the fall into subjective idealism and scepticism. 
It is clear how such an account maintains the independence of the world, not only because 
we have no choice over what data is produced, but because they are independent of our conceptual 
capacities (they are a direct product of impacts on our sensible faculties and so prior to any 
synthetic activity of the mind). As Rorty suggests, the problem here is instead articulating how such 
data are to fulfil the justificatory role they need to if they are to explain how the world can bear on 
thought, an argument most famously made within analytic philosophy by Wilfrid Sellars in 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. The issue is that, as DeVries suggests, “[i]f there were 
items of immediate and independent knowledge that were unable to support other knowledge, they 
would be epistemic dead ends of no real significance in our broader empirical knowledge” (2005, 
99). Yet the only sort of thing that can transfer positive epistemic status to (i.e. justify) other beliefs 
about the world in this way is something with conceptual content, i.e. a proposition. Only 
something of this form can entail anything else (whether deductively or inductively), and so stand 
as the ground for a judgment. That there is a cardinal at the end of the garden entails that there is a 
 On this point see Berkeley’s criticism of Locke’s primary/secondary distinction in Principles (1996, §9-15).4
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bird at the end of the garden. A non-conceptual, sensed ‘x’ entails nothing, and so cannot explain 
how the world bears on thought (see Sellars 1997, §3). 
One way around this is to say that this data from outside the scope of our conceptual 
capacities is nonetheless subsequently conceptualised by them, thus explaining how it is that they 
can provide a non-inferential foundation for our beliefs. In Mind and World McDowell suggests that 
Evans attempts something along these lines. On Evans’ account the elements of the given 
serve as input to the concept-exercising and reasoning system. Judgments are then based 
upon (reliably caused by) these internal states; when this is the case we can speak of the 
information being ‘accessible’ to the subject, and, indeed, of the existence of conscious 
experience. The informational states which a subject acquires through perception are non-
conceptual, or non-conceptualised. Judgments based upon such states necessarily involve 
conceptualisation. 
(Evans 1982, 227)  
The idea here is fairly clear. Although it is true that the non-conceptual contents of perception are 
not something directly accessible to the subject, they become so after a process of 
conceptualisation. In that sense the conceptual contents of the beliefs so formed can be said to be 
based upon (or caused by) the non-conceptual contents of perceptual experience.  
The problem with such an approach is that it thus fails to provide the subject with 
justification for the beliefs that are generated by this process of conceptualisation. The ‘judgments’ 
are merely generated in a dispositional way in the subject’s mind (as indicated by Evan’s ‘reliably 
caused by’). But if that is the case, then the subject herself will have no access to the grounds for 
her belief (be they the non-conceptual given or the triggered mechanism). The best she will be able 
to say is that the belief that there was a cardinal at the end of the garden was involuntarily produced 
in her when she looked out of the window. But that is not to provide a justification for why she 
believes it – why it is something right to believe, why others should judge the same way. As 
Davidson writes, “there is no sense in saying a disposition is in error - one cannot fail to ‘follow’ a 
disposition” (2000, 71). To describe a disposition is no different to describing any other law bound 
physical system: it can be no more correct or in error than a stone is by being warmed by the sun. 
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There is no ‘ought’ to be found in such a description and so citing it as a reason for why it is right to 
believe whatever belief it generates makes no sense: “the best [such impingements] can yield is that 
we cannot be blamed for believing whatever they leave us to believe, not that we are justified in 
believing it” (McDowell 1996, 13).   5
As McDowell writes, our “rational perceptual capacity is a capacity not only to know certain 
kinds of thing about the environment, but… to know that is how one knows it” (2011, 41). The fact 
that this awareness must have a conceptual form constitutes the fundamental problem with any 
notion of the given: there does not seem to be any way of giving an account of it that allows it to 
play its justificatory role, rendering it incapable of explaining how perceptual experience can make 
the world bear rationally on what we are to think and do. The idea of a law bound, justificatory 
given, in other words, is a myth.  
2. Coherentism 
If we accept a fairly standard description of the world as a law bound space of which we and our 
sense organs are merely a part, a consequence of this critique of the given appears to be that 
perceptual experience is simply unable to play any justificatory role in our epistemic practices at all. 
There is simply no way for such a law bound interaction to supply us with anything that can form 
the basis for a judgment (i.e. reasons for belief) – a conclusion that Rorty embraces. Brandom sums 
up the situation in the following passage: 
Once beliefs have been causally occasioned in us, they can stand in evidential and other 
rational relations to one another. But notions of authority and responsibility don’t get a grip 
until we are already in the conceptual space opened up by the applicability of a vocabulary. 
Our relations to our environment are… purely causal ones, not relations of being responsible 
 It is thus hard to see how on this account that any beliefs so generated can even fit the definition of belief, 5
(i.e. as a proposition that the subject holds as right to believe). Beliefs here are seen as ‘merely’ held, but this 
fails to distinguish them from other propositional attitudes.
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for the correctness of our claims to how things really are, or how things really are having 
authority over the correctness of our beliefs. 
(2000, xiv) 
Since the world is incapable of providing rational constraint on what we are to think, we seem to be 
forced into a coherentist position: the best we can strive for is the greatest degree of coherence 
between those beliefs (some of which are dispositionally caused by impacts on our sensory 
faculties), rather than hoping to prove that those beliefs correspond to the way the world is. As 
Davidson says “we can’t get outside our skins to find out the cause of the internal happenings of 
which we are aware” (1986, 312). When combined with Quine’s attack on the distinction between 
necessary and contingent propositions, Rorty suggests that this leaves us with a situation where 
“justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, but of 
conversation, of social practice,” a position he refers to as ‘epistemological behaviourism’ (1979, 
170). Rather than having an external standard against which to measure our claims to know, 
justification becomes “what our peers will, ceteris paribus, let us get away with saying” (ibid, 176). 
Thus epistemology becomes a description of human behaviour (of our contingent practices of 
reason giving) rather than a search for epistemic foundations or necessary truths  
Although this may seem an unhappy conclusion for the analytic philosophers invested in the 
traditional epistemological project (see e.g. the contemporary reviews of Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature: Kim 1980; Hacking 1980), Rorty argues that we should see this as a progressive 
development, freeing us from an external authority in much the same way that the enlightenment 
freed us from the authority of the church (2002). From this perspective, any account that attempts to 
maintain a role for the independence of the world “looks like regression to the Platonist idea that we 
have responsibilities not only to our fellow humans, but to something non-human” (ibid). 
Objectivity simply takes over where religion left off – a mythical final court of appeal that attempts 
to establish one set of practices as the only valid way to understand the world. Freed from this 
constraint, we no longer need to be concerned with the degree to which our epistemic practices are 
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‘accurate to’ or ‘mirror’ the way the world is independently of those practices, and instead are able 
to focus on the practices themselves, on the building of consensus in what Brandom calls ‘the game 
of giving and asking for reasons’ (1994, passim). Rather than talking about epistemic achievement 
in terms of ‘correspondence’ or ‘objective truth’ we can instead aim for “a rhetoric of social 
solidarity, a rhetoric which romanticises the pursuit of inter-subjective, unforced agreement among 
larger and larger groups of interlocutors” (Rorty 1995, 299). 
Much like McDowell, Rorty views this account as ‘therapeutic’ to the extent that it is 
“designed to make the reader question his own motives for philosophising” rather than building a 
constructive account that needs defending against competing positions (1979, 5-6). The pragmatist 
take on therapy that Rorty is offering, however, is of a different kind to that offered by McDowell. 
Rather than attempting to accommodate the desire for a non-inferential foundation for knowledge, 
Rorty wants to show that the desire itself is based on a historical confusion between explanation 
(i.e. a description of the law bound systems that make perception possible) and justification (i.e. 
what we cite to defend our beliefs). This mistake, one that emerges most clearly with Locke but is 
then passed down to subsequent generations, is what convinces generations of philosophers that 
certain epistemic states stand in a privileged relation to the world, (i.e. those that are caused by law 
bound impingements) (ibid, 182). Rorty’s thought is that once we are presented with this 
genealogical account that exposes our philosophical worries as the result of this error, the fact that 
Quine’s and Sellars’ arguments show the search for epistemic foundations to be untenable will seem 
less like an intellectual crisis – one that questions the very possibility of our having knowledge – 
and more like a historical curiosity. He takes this presentation of the contingency of the desire for 
epistemic foundations to warrant a dismissive approach to the ‘common-sense intuitions’ it appeals 
to. As he writes, the fact that the pragmatist account of justification seems counterintuitive is 
irrelevant: “so much the worse for your old intuitions; start working up some new ones” (1997, 
177). That perceptual experience is unable to make the world bear rationally on what we are to 
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think and do is not something that should leave us feeling disconnected from the world, but rather 
something that reveals that thinking of our relation to it in terms of confrontation and restraint 
mischaracterises it from the beginning. 
It is this dismissal of the assumed need for the world to provide some restraint on what we 
are to think and do that McDowell finds problematic from a therapeutic perspective. The issue, he 
thinks, is that while Rorty’s account shows that no solution to the problem is possible when it is cast 
in traditional terms (and shows why those traditional terms came to seem like a sensible solution to 
the problem) such a position leaves the philosophical worries that generate the desire for the given 
in place. We want to think that a claim like there being a cardinal at the end of the garden has “a 
warrant, a justifiedness, that consists not in one's being able to get away with it among certain 
conversational partners” but rather in simply perceiving how things are (McDowell 2000, 117). It is 
very difficult to think of this as merely the result of a historical confusion, even if the way that 
analytic philosophers have approached it has been mistaken for that reason. The problem, in other 
words, is that the apparent philosophical validity of the account Rorty presents does not seem 
convincing when made to push back against the common sense conviction that perception puts us in 
contact with the way the world is. Yet this is precisely what a therapeutic account is supposed to 
give us, framing the issue such that a reader can “break off philosophising when [she] want[s] to” as 
Wittgenstein says, to present things in a way “that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring itself in question” (1986, §133).  
Indeed, it is this recalcitrant demand for some sort of receptivity in our picture of the relation 
between mind and world that McDowell suggests encourages a movement back to an account that 
aims to find the mythical ‘given’ that Sellars has shown to be unobtainable. For without such 
restraint from the outside it can seem that we are left, as McDowell puts it, “spinning in a void,” 
trapped in a conceptual web of our own making, and so at risk of falling into the (inter-)subjective 
idealism that the analytic movement sought to overcome (1996, 66). So while Rorty may be right 
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that the given is an epistemological dead end, the fact that his account does not attempt to 
accommodate the demand for friction between mind and world simply encourages those 
philosophers troubled by the problem to redouble their efforts to find a foundation for knowledge. 
This generates what McDowell calls ‘an intolerable oscillation’ between a coherentism that puts the 
stress on the need for justification to have a conceptual form (at the expense of the idea of the 
world’s bearing on thought) and a foundationalism that emphasises the need for the world to be 
independent (at the expense of failing to explain how what we thus receive in perceptual experience 
can provide reasons for believing anything). Both positions are thus unsatisfactory for opposite 
reasons, causing a constant shifting from one to the other.  6
3. Conceptualism 
In Mind and World McDowell seeks to offer an alternative picture that can bring an end to this 
oscillation by showing how the world can bear on what we are to think and do without appealing to 
the given. The aim, in other words, is to achieve Rorty’s goal of “unmask[ing] as illusory the 
seeming compulsoriness of mainstream epistemology,” but to do so in a way that can do justice to 
the intuition that perception puts the world in view (McDowell 2000, 110). The challenge is to find 
a way for perception to i) provide us with reasons for belief, such that the constraint it provides can 
be rational, while also ii) maintaining the independence of the world, such that we can make sense 
of it being the world’s bearing on thought. 
 In his essay ‘Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry?’ Rorty argues “that pragmatism should not claim to be a 6
commonsensical philosophy” and so should not appeal “to intuition as final arbiter,” since the content of 
‘common sense’ will be influenced by the realist metaphysics that pragmatism is supposed to overcome 
(1995, 299). This might be fine as a defence of pragmatism (although see McDowell 1996, 154ff); however, 
it recasts it as a competitor theory rather than a piece of philosophical therapy, leaving the desire for the 
given in place. McDowell’s suggestion is that we can keep most of the insights of the pragmatist account 
while ‘exorcising’ this desire, thus better accomplishing Rorty’s goal of overcoming traditional philosophy 
(2000, 120).
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As we saw above, the benefit of the given is that it is able to give an account of the passivity 
of perception that can do justice to the idea of the world providing a rational constraint on what we 
are to think and do. The worry is that once we lose hold of that “we lose our right to think of moves 
within the [logical space of reasons] as content-involving. So we stop being able to picture it as the 
space of concepts. Everything goes dark in the interior as we picture it” (McDowell 1995, 889). 
Without that connection to something independent of thought, it is hard to make sense of our beliefs 
being about anything at all. The problem is that characterising the given as something purely 
receptive, as external to the logical space of reasons (and so external to that of which we are 
‘spontaneously’, i.e. directly and self-consciously, aware), makes it unable to play its justificatory 
role. In other words, what we need is a picture of perceptual experience that combines the passivity 
of the given with the spontaneous self-awareness of the space of concepts.   
McDowell’s solution this problem is to argue that our conceptual capacities are passively 
drawn into operation in perpetual experience:  
Conceptual capacities, whose interrelations belong in the sui generis logical space of 
reasons, can be operative not only in judgments – results of a subject's actively making up 
her mind about something – but already in the transactions in nature that are constituted by 
the world's impacts on the receptive capacities of a suitable subject; that is, one that 
possesses the relevant concepts. Impressions can be cases of its perceptually appearing— 
being apparent—to a subject that things are thus and so. In receiving impressions, a subject 
can be open to the way things manifestly are. 
(McDowell 1996, xx) 
The idea here is that by having conceptual capacities always already at play ‘in the transactions in 
nature’ we can account for both the independence of the world – since we are not in control of what 
particular conceptual capacities are drawn into operation – as well as the ‘epistemic efficaciousness’ 
of what we perceive – since what we perceive has a conceptual form and so is something that we 
can cite as reasons for belief (as grounds for judgment). For example, when I look into the garden 
and see the cardinal sitting on the fence, all of these concepts are already at play in the experience 
itself: that there is a cardinal sitting on the fence is the content of the experience (at least part of it). 
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Since the experience itself takes this conceptual form I am able to cite it as a justification for my 
belief; and since I do not have any choice over what concepts are passively drawn into operation in 
this way, the account re-establishes the friction between mind and world that goes missing in the 
coherentist account. 
The distinction here is quite subtle however. If the ‘passive drawing into operation’ of our 
conceptual capacities is seen as producing a belief in the subject – a belief, say, that what they are 
faced with is in fact a cardinal – then the position is identical to the coherentist position. The 
important contrast is that, on McDowell’s account, when the conceptual capacities have been 
passively drawn into operation no judgment has yet been made, and so no belief formed. As Kern 
writes, “[t]he fact a subject has a particular [conceptually contentful] sensory experience means that 
she enjoys a mental state that differs from a belief insofar as her being in that state does not, as 
such, imply that she has decided to endorse a particular conceptual content” (2017, 56). The 
conceptual capacities are at play in perceptual experience – it appears that there is a cardinal in the 
garden – but no decision has yet been made about the status of that experience. I could, for instance, 
hold off making a judgment about the existence of the apparent cardinal if I know that my 
neighbour has a penchant for placing decoy birds around the neighbourhood, strategically placed in 
order to thwart any passing epistemologists. Of course, it might turn out on inspection that I decide 
that what I saw was in fact a real cardinal (its flying off would be a pretty big hint), but there is 
nothing in the passive drawing into operation of my conceptual capacities that forces me to take that 
stance. 
There is, in other words, an ‘intentional distance’ between what we see and what we come to 
believe. It is the logical gap between these two elements that makes judgment about what we see 
possible. Kant makes this point at the start of the schematism chapter in the Critique of Pure 
Reason: “Whenever an object is subsumed under a concept, the presentation must be homogenous 
with the concept; i.e., the concept must contain what is presented in the object that is to be 
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subsumed under it” (1996, A138/B176). For a subject to be able to judge an empirical object as, say, 
circular (i.e. as falling under the concept of circle), the object must already show up as circular such 
that it would make sense to judge the appearance as falling under the concept. If perceptual objects 
did not show up as something or other in this way (i.e. according to some concept or other), 
judgment would be blind, it would merely generate beliefs in the subject, and so not really be 
judgment at all. It would thus leave us in the coherentist position of being be unable give an 
explanation of how the world can bear rationally on what we are to think.  7
Another way of thinking of this point is in terms of the spontaneity of belief formation, since 
the very idea of a proposition being ‘generated’ in the subject by some external source beyond the 
reach of reason mischaracterises what it is to believe something. To hold a proposition as true is not 
to be forced to believe it by the impact of some external element on neural machinery, but to freely 
(i.e. spontaneously) judge it to be so, to accept the given grounds as a sufficient explanation for its 
being the case. As Rödl writes, “the concept of belief depends on [such] belief explanation: 
someone falls under this concept only if she figures in explanations of this form” (2007, 103). We 
are aware of a belief as a belief precisely because we have reasons for its being true, reasons that we 
can use to defend it when challenged, and it is this characteristic that distinguishes it from other 
propositional attitudes (e.g. ‘imagining’, ‘hoping’, ‘doubting’ etc.).   8
An explanation of a belief that makes no reference to this characteristic fails to account for 
the inherently first person nature of belief. To suggest, for instance, that my belief that there is a 
cardinal is at the end of the garden is constituted by a disposition to state as much when presented 
 Kant accounts for this necessary homogeneity in terms of the ‘schematism’ of concepts in perceptual 7
experience – his term for the passive drawing into operation of our conceptual capacities. That both terms 
denote the same thing can been seen from the fact that the role that both processes play is largely the same. 
There is a debate, however, over whether Kant thinks that empirical concepts can be schematised, or whether 
this process is reserved exclusively for the Categories. This issue will be addressed in much more detail in 
chapter three, where I will argue not only that Kant sees empirical concepts as being schematised in 
experience, but that they are a transcendental condition for the possibility of any experience whatsoever.
 Of course the having of such reasons does not guarantee the truth of the belief, but the point is that they are 8
at least aimed at this norm. As Kern writes, “the fact that we take a belief back as soon as we realise that it is 
not true proves precisely that beliefs are, as such, aimed at truth” (2011, 216).
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with a certain set of stimuli – to attempt to account for the belief ‘from sideways on’ as McDowell 
puts it (2000, 118) – is simply not to give an explanation of a belief. It explains a certain set of 
physical reactions, but fails to account for a belief as a belief (as a proposition that the subject takes 
to be right to hold). What McDowell’s account allows us to do, in other words, is properly account 
for the spontaneity of the subject’s recognition of the authority of what it is she sees. Since the 
content of the perceptual experience is passive and so can be rejected if the subject sees fit (if the 
circumstances demand it) the subject is able to recognise any judgment or action she makes on the 
basis of that content as her judgment or action.  
Perception on this account is thus an example of what Andrea Kern, following Aristotle, calls 
a ‘rational capacity’. Unlike a disposition, “a rational capacity has a specific mode of actualisation – 
namely a self-conscious actualisation” (2017, 197). A subject that performs an act that is explained 
by such a capacity is self-consciously aware of the act as an instance of the realisation of the 
capacity and so able to cite it as a justification for her belief. Thus, as Rödl writes, “[w]hen 
someone says, ‘I believe that p because I perceive it’, it makes no sense to repeat the question and 
ask, ‘How do you know that you perceive it?’ For, she already said how she knows this: she 
perceives that p. This is how she knows that she perceives it” (2007, 144). In other words, forming a 
belief based on something perceived – to assent to the content of what is recognised as a genuine 
case of an exercise of that capacity – forms a complete explanation for that belief. Far from 
perceptual experience being unable to play a justificatory role in our epistemic practices, perceiving 
something is the form of justification par excellence, the point at which our claims to know are able 
to come to rest. 
Of course part of the difficulty here is that things can go wrong: what appeared to be a 
cardinal at first glance may on inspection turn out to be a decoy, hologram, or summer tanager. This 
would seem to imply that the ‘non-inferential grounds’ that perception is able to provide are fallible, 
at best “inconclusive warrants for claims about the environment” (McDowell 2009b, 228). But if we 
Sam Matthews  of 36 200 19 September 2019
can never be in a position to know conclusively that what we are faced with is in fact a cardinal, 
then “this seems incompatible with supposing we ever, strictly speaking, know anything about our 
objective surroundings” (ibid, 228). If this is the case, then, contrary to what was said above, the 
best we could say in any case is that we seemed to be faced with a cardinal, that it looked to us, all 
things considered, that there was a cardinal at the end of the garden. But that is not to know that 
what we are faced with is in fact a cardinal. Perceptual experience might give us inductive grounds 
for believing what it leads us to believe, but it is not enough by itself to establish the truth of its 
apparent content (or so the argument goes). This model of perceptual experience thus seems to lead 
us back to a position that would vindicate Rorty’s suggestion that perceptual experience is unable to 
provide grounds for knowledge.  9
However, the error here is to see the particular act of perception as fallible rather than the 
capacity itself. For although my capacity to recognise cardinals sometimes goes wrong, e.g. when I 
inaccurately ‘perceive’ a summer tanager as a cardinal, in cases where everything functions as it 
should, the grounds that I have are truth-guaranteeing (and so infallible). For a situation in which I 
actually perceive a cardinal as a cardinal is by definition a state that makes me aware of the way 
things are. Such a capacity is thus defined by its positive instances: only these latter are true cases 
of perception. Apparent acts of perception therefore form a disjunct between genuine cases of 
perception, that is, “objective states of affairs making themselves manifest to subjects” and 
deficient, merely apparent cases “in which it is as if an objective state of affairs is making itself 
manifest to a subject, although that is not how things are” (ibid, 231). Thus although the subject 
cannot be certain which case obtains in any particular situation – since her perceptual capacities are 
fallible and so things will not always be as they appear to be – in cases where the subject stands on 
 Of course, we could weaken the account of justification necessary for knowledge here and say that such 9
inconclusive warrants are enough to establish that a subject knows about her environment. The problem with 
such an approach, as Kern points out, is that it turns every claim to knowledge into a ‘self-contradictory act’ 
whereby somebody who claims to ‘know that p’ on the basis of perceptual experience ends up asserting both 
that “p is true” and “For all I know, p may be false” (2017, 93). 
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the good side of the disjunct (when her perceptual experience is a genuine act of perception), then 
what the subject perceives in the environment before her is able to form a non-inferential, truth 
guaranteeing ground for her claims to know. As McDowell writes, “[t]he acknowledgement of 
fallibility cannot detract from the excellence of an epistemic position, with regard to the obtaining 
of an objective state of affairs, that consists in having the state of affairs present itself to one in 
one’s perceptual experience” (ibid, 232).  10
By presenting perceptual experience in terms of concepts being passively drawn into 
operation, McDowell is thus able to capture the independence of the world that went missing in 
Rorty’s coherentist account, without falling prey to the myth of the given. Perception on this 
account simply is a case of recognising objects in the environment before us as instances of 
particular concepts (or groups of concepts). Yet such conceptual awareness is passive, drawn into 
operation by ‘the world's impacts on the receptive capacities of a suitable subject’ as McDowell 
puts it above. This passivity is what enables us to account for the logical gap between perceiving 
and judging – what I have called an intentional distance – and thus to properly characterise the 
relation to our environment as rational, where we are aware of, and so can freely accept, the 
authority of what we see as a reason for belief (rather than Rorty’s picture where perceptual beliefs 
are merely generated in the subject). This thus achieves the therapeutic goal of overcoming the 
oscillation by showing us a way of achieving the benefits of the given – allowing the world to bear 
on what we are to think and do – while respecting the fact that only something of conceptual form 
can stand as a ground for judgment. 
 It could be asked how we can be sure that there are ever any cases of the good disjunct. If there were no 10
way of proving this, then it might seem that we are no better placed to overcome the sceptical worry of the 
previous paragraph. In ‘Disjunctivism as Material for a Transcendental Argument’ McDowell responds to 
this concern by using Sellars’ suggestion that there is an asymmetry between ‘looking’ and ‘being’, such that 
we can only understand the former once we grasp the latter, e.g. we can only grasp what it is for something 
to merely look red if we first grasp what it is for something to be red (2009b, 230). For to say something 
(merely) looks red is to say that it looks how something that actually is red would look under appropriate 
circumstances. But this implies that we must have at least some cases of the good disjunct, some cases in 
which things not only look, but actually are the way that they appear to be. In other words the good disjunct 
is a condition of the possibility of the bad one (this is all that is meant by the suggestion that a capacity is 
defined by its positive instances). 
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4. Travis’s Critique 
The main achievement of McDowell’s position in Mind and World is thus to show us how the 
‘fundamental question of perception’ need not concern us; that there is no great difficulty in seeing 
how the world can bear on what we can think and do, so long as we see that perceptual experience 
is itself a case of our conceptual capacities in operation. Yet the therapeutic efficacy of this account 
is contingent upon us finding the idea of perceptual experience being conceptually structured 
unproblematic. Although many commentators have sought to show that this is not the case, most 
often arguing that concepts fail to do justice to the complexity or particularity of experience,  only 11
Charles Travis’s objections have succeeded in getting McDowell to make major changes to the 
picture he presents in Mind and World. Although I ultimately argue that these changes are ill-
founded (see chapter three), the fact that McDowell feels compelled to offer them at least indicates 
the apparent seriousness of Travis’s critique. 
Although they stretch across several different papers,  Travis’s arguments against 12
McDowell’s position consists of two main lines of attack. The first of these is what I will call the 
‘phenomenological objection’, a concern that Travis raises in his essay ‘The Silences of the 
Senses’ (2013, chapter one). Essentially Travis’s argument is that the idea of representational 
content  – i.e. things appearing a certain way – is incompatible with the passivity of perception. The 
second line of attack is an ‘ontological objection’ to the idea that perception can be conceptually 
structured, where Travis suggests that McDowell’s account allows concepts rather than things to 
become the objects of perceptual experience, cutting us off from the world in precisely the way that 
McDowell was trying to avoid. As we will see, this second objection forms the core of Travis’s 
critique and is the main point of discussion in all the other essays in his exchange with McDowell. 
 See chapter five for a defence of conceptualism against this kind of objection.11
 Chiefly ‘The Silences of the Senses’, ‘Reasons Reach’, and ‘Unlocking the Outer World’, all of which are 12
collected in Perception (2013), and more recently ‘The Move, the Divide, the Myth, and its Dogma’ (2018).
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The first objection runs as follows. Say we see a cardinal at the end of the garden. Things 
might not actually be as they appear – the bird may turn out to be a decoy, summer tanager, or 
hallucination – but on McDowell’s account there is still a certain way that things appear to be, a 
way that is at least partially capturable in a proposition (e.g. that there’s a cardinal at the end of the 
garden).  If things actually are as they appear to be – if this is a genuine case of our capacity to 13
recognise cardinals – then the content of the experience opens us to the way the world is, such that 
it is able to stand as a non-inferential, truth-guaranteeing ground for our belief. Travis calls this kind 
of representing ‘allorepresentation’, where our perceptual experience “represent[s] things as a 
certain way, with a certain force” (2013, 26). The difficulty with characterising perceptual 
experience in such terms, Travis thinks, is that it is hard to cash out the relevant notion of 
appearances or ‘looks’. For the conceptualist needs a notion of looks that is not only determinately 
contentful, such that it can stand as a justification for our beliefs, but passive, such that we are 
rationally independent of the way things appear to be. As we saw above, this judgmental passivity 
towards what we recognise is necessary not only so that we are properly able to register the 
independence of the world, but so that we can properly account for the self-conscious spontaneity of 
belief formation (i.e. our awareness and free acceptance of our grounds for judgment). Essentially, 
Travis’s argument is that there is no notion of looks that is able to play this dual role, and so we are 
unable to make sense of the logical gap between perception and judgment on the conceptualist 
account: either looks are visual, but in that case unable to determine content, or they are thinkable, 
but in that case imply judgment (ibid, 34). 
Visual looks, on Travis’s account, refer to the ‘objective appearance’ of things, the 
specifically visual properties of the objects in our environment. In the case of the cardinal, this 
would likely be its red colouring, black mask, and bird like shape. Thus, to say that it looks like 
 I say ‘partially capturable’ to indicate that there would presumably be a great number of different ways to 13
capture the content of the experience (e.g. ‘there’s a red bird’, ‘there’s a bird on the fence’ etc.), not to 
indicate that there is some aspect of perceptual experience that is not capturable in this way.
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there is a cardinal at the end of the garden is simply to say that things look as things would if there 
really was a cardinal at the end of the garden. Since the way these properties appear is clearly not at 
the discretion of the subject whose experience it is, they seem well placed to capture the passivity of 
experience that we need in order to avoid a picture of belief generation. The problem with this 
account, however, is that such visual looks underdetermine the way things could be said to be. The 
reason that we are liable to be tricked by decoys, summer tanagers, and the like, is that they share 
these attributes in common (or at least some of them). In other words, what we see of what we see is 
not enough to determine what it is we are actually perceiving. Red colouring and bird like shape are 
neutral between all of these possibilities. If perception is going to be able to represent things as 
looking a certain way then there must be some way to select between these different potential 
contents, but visual looks are not going to be able to do this. Thus, as Travis writes, “[l]ooks, on this 
first notion of them, are thus not a route by which we might be represented to in perception” (ibid, 
37). 
The second sense of looks that Travis considers seem to offer a potential answer to this 
problem. The picture of looks Travis has in mind here is the way in which we talk about 
appearances leading one to think that things are one way when really they are some way else, in the 
sense that the decoy would lead one to think there was a cardinal at the end of the garden even 
though no such cardinal exists. The idea here is that, unlike the visual appearance of an object 
which allows for many possible interpretations, such ‘thinkable looks’ refer to a single way that one 
would be led to judge things to be on the basis of such experiences. This seems to solve the problem 
of visual looks since such looks “fix a way things should be to be the way they look full stop” (ibid, 
44). 
The problem with this account, Travis suggests, is that such thinkable appearances already 
presuppose visual looks and so are unsuitable to act as the vehicle of perceptual content: they are 
what is indicated by visual appearances rather than those appearances themselves. Such looks are 
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“not instanced in the world simply in objects, or scenes, looking as they do, being such as to form 
the visual images they would. They are rather what is to be made of things by a thinker relevantly 
au fait with the world, and knowing enough of what to make of what he is thus aware of” (ibid, 40). 
The core problem for the conceptualist here, according to Travis, is that these looks are thus the 
result of perceptual judgment rather than its ground. They are not that ‘by which’ things are 
recognised as falling under a certain concept, rather they are the result of that act of recognition. For 
Travis, then, ‘thinkable looks’ do not have the passivity that is required for the conceptualist 
account: 
For it to look to one [in this thinkable sense] as if X is for one is to take it that X; for one’s 
mind to be made up. It is not to keep the option of accepting, or rejecting, ‘at face value’, 
that things are that way. Nor is it to be in a condition that may evolve into judgment. It is to 
judge…. Where I see the pig to be before me, my mind is made up. Nothing remains (on that 
score) for me to take at face value or not. The world has already drawn credence from me. To 
see that such-and-such is so is to take it to be so. 
(Travis 2013, 45-46) 
If this is what McDowell meant by looks – where its looking to a subject like there is a cardinal at 
the end of the garden amounts to a judgment that that is the case – then we would seem to be back 
to a coherentist picture where the world simply generates beliefs in the subject rather than providing 
reasons for belief.  14
More importantly, however, Travis argues that modelling perceptual experience on ‘thinkable 
looks’ in this way seems to get the ontology of the perceptual relation wrong, leaving us without a 
direct connection to the objects of our environment, and it is this that forms the second strand of his 
argument against conceptualism. Essentially, his thought is that any account of perceptual 
experience that suggests that concepts are ‘always already at play’ cannot be giving an account of 
how the world can bear on what we are to think, since the world is made up of non-conceptual 
 Several other commentators make a similar point. Stroud, for instance, argues that “tracing the justification 14
back only to what I have called the experience of [e.g.] seeing that it is raining would trace it back only to 
something that still involves judgment or belief about the independent world. To see that p is to judge that 
p” (2002, 84). Similarly, Glüer argues that “McDowell has given no persuasive reason for demanding 
reasons that are not beliefs, a demand, moreover, that McDowell himself does not succeed in meeting; his 
perceptions turn out to be beliefs in disguise” (2004, 211). See also Ginsborg (2006a, 287ff.).
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historical particulars, not conceptual generalities. Such particulars are not the sort of thing that 
convey conceptual meaning all by themselves, they are rather what instances the concepts that we 
have,  so “there precisely must be rational relations between the conceptual (what satisfies the 15
condition) and something else if we are to make sense of experience bearing on what one is to 
think” (2013, 123). 
In ‘Reason’s Reach’ Travis makes this point by saying that that something is the case is not 
part of the ‘layout of reality’: 
If seeing that were seeing an item visible as meat is, one could say: ‘Sid saw that there was 
meat on the rug, though clueless as to what it was he saw’, ‘Sid saw that there was meat on 
the rug, but mistook it for that the Lexus was in the garage’.… Such things make no sense. 
Reason to be wary of the idea that ‘perceptual intake’ is, per se, conceptually structured in so 
much as McDowell’s weak sense. 
(ibid, 127)  
‘That there is a cardinal at the end of the garden’ is not the sort of thing that reflects light or makes 
sound, nor is it the sort of thing that might perch on the fence. Only the cardinal itself does that. 
Propositions and concepts are thus not the sort of things that can be the objects of perceptual 
experience; only the historical particulars of our environment can play that role. ‘That there is a 
cardinal at the end of the garden’ is therefore not something on which the truth of any perceptual 
judgment turns (Travis 2018, 41). What makes a perceptual judgment true is not any representation 
of things being a certain way, but rather things being an instance of how they are represented as 
being. 
Thus, according to Travis, if the world is going to be the thing doing the bearing on thought, 
then it is a metaphysical necessity for perception to put us in contact with the non-conceptual. If all 
perception could put us in contact with were conceptual contents then, Travis suggests, “the best 
 There is however a distinction between such historical particulars and things being so as such, Travis 15
suggests, since the latter is a general way things could be, and is thus conceptual (ibid, 125). For example, its 
being so that there is a cardinal at the end of the garden forms an extendible range of cases that would make 
the corresponding conceptual representation true (ibid). The historical fact of a particular cardinal being at 
the end of the garden, on the other hand, does not admit of instancing and so is non-conceptual (or historical) 
in a full-blooded sense.
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course might be to throw up one’s hands: after all, one might conclude, perception simply cannot do 
what [we] started by supposing it could” (2018, 40). What we need, in other words, is an account of 
perception that puts us in contact with particular things, not general concepts. Travis’s thought is 
that McDowell’s account can only do the latter. Thus, far from answering the concern the 
foundationalist has with Rorty’s position, Travis thinks that McDowell’s picture once again leaves 
us ‘spinning in the void’, without a satisfying account of how it is the world is able to bear on what 
we are to think and do.  
In order to achieve this unmediated contact with the objects of our environment, Travis 
proposes that we characterise perception as a contentless relation between our sensory faculties and 
the objects themselves. Content only enters the scene when we recognise what we are anyway 
perceptually related to as falling under a particular generality. Travis calls this capacity to recognise 
the historical particulars before us as instances of concepts is “the fundamental relation to which all 
relations within the conceptual can be reduced” (2013, 247). The world is able to bear on what we 
are to think and do on this picture precisely because it is what admits of instancing in this way, not 
because it shows up in propositional form. To see the cardinal at the end of the garden is thus 
simply to be directly related to it (qua historical particular) by our sensory faculties. If we are well 
placed and have the relevant concept we may also recognise that what we are looking at is a 
cardinal, that it instances the relevant concept, but we would still ‘see’ it anyway – to the extent that 
we would be perceptually related to it – even if we had no conceptual capacities at all. Thus, 
conceptual capacities “come into the picture only with our operations in thought on what perception 
has anyway provided” (ibid, 241). 
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5. Perception as a Rational Capacity for Recognition 
According to Travis, the chief problem with McDowell’s account is thus that he takes concepts 
rather things to be the objects of perceptual experience.  This seems to prevent us from 16
understanding how it is that the world is able to bear on what we are to think and do as it puts 
generalities where only particulars will go. If this was the position that McDowell was arguing for it 
would be hard to deny this conclusion, but is this really the case? McDowell certainly agrees with 
Travis that “[i]t would… slight the independence of reality if we equated facts in general with 
exercises of conceptual capacities—acts of thinking—or represented facts as reflections of such 
things” (1996, 28). Indeed, the whole point behind the idea that conceptual capacities are passively 
pulled into operation is to maintain the independence of reality, with “[t]he constraint [coming] 
from outside thinking, but not from outside what is thinkable” (ibid, 28). Contrary to Travis’s 
account, concepts on McDowell’s account are the means by which I am made aware of the objects 
of perception, rather than the objects of perception themselves (see e.g. McDowell 2018, 35). 
Yet part of the reason it can be hard to see what McDowell means by this is that he fails to 
give an account of what it means for conceptual capacities to be ‘passively drawn into operation’. 
When he does expand on the metaphor, such as in the Woodbridge lectures, he talks of “conceptual 
shapings of sensory consciousness” (2009a, 34; emphasis altered). It is tempting to read such 
expressions as describing a constructive pseudo-psychological account where “things being as they 
are [is] all chaos, transformed for us by something else into, for example, a pig snuffling beneath an 
oak” (Travis 2013, 20). That is, if we take this image literally it could seem that the ‘cardinal’ at the 
end of the garden is in some sense a product of the understanding, which organises the given 
sensory data into a feathery red shape. The object of our perceptual experience would then be the 
 At least on the account given in ‘Reason’s Reach’ (2013). In latter essays Travis acknowledges that this is 16
not the picture that McDowell means to advocate, but argues that in that case the posited ‘contents’ are 
superfluous (see 2018, 40-41). This point will be addressed in more detail below.
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product of this unifying function and so not really an external object at all. It is hard to see how 
such a picture could avoid a subjective idealism, leaving us once again ‘spinning in the void’. 
Despite the fact that such a picture is contrary to McDowell’s intentions, given that his aim is 
to provide a therapeutic account of perceptual experience, conceptual ‘shaping’ is an unfortunate 
turn of phrase. Indeed, even the image of conceptual capacities being ‘passively drawn into 
operation’ could seem to imply something like this depending on how the image of ‘drawing into 
operation’ is understood. Yet if the philosophical therapy is to be effective, the aim must be to 
present the issue in a such a way that it no longer seems pressing. Characterising the idea of 
perceptual experience being conceptually structured in terms of a conceptual ‘shaping’ of sensibility 
seems to produce the opposite response, of which Travis’s account is a product. 
To this end, I want to suggest that we recast McDowell’s picture of conceptual capacities 
being passively drawn into operation by the world in terms of rational capacities for recognition. 
On this account, perceptual experience is constituted by whatever it is we are able to recognise in 
the environment before us. To see the cardinal in the garden is to recognise the object before me as 
an instance of the kind of thing it is (and no doubt many other things besides), and thus allows me 
to cite my recognition of it as the reason for my belief. In other words, my (particular) recognition 
of the cardinal is non-inferentially justified by reference to my (general) capacity for recognising 
cardinals (‘How do you know there are cardinals around here?’ ‘I know it because I saw one in the 
garden’). Thus, when things go well, what we are made aware of in perceptual experience is simply 
the way things are. Seeing the cardinal is not a case of seeing a proxy (like sense data) or an indirect 
conceptual representation of a cardinal. Rather, what is recognised as something or other is the 
object itself.  17
 This is not to imply that justificatory relations extend outside of the conceptual – what justifies is still the 17
(conceptual) capacity to recognise things being as they are, not the mere presence of the object. Of course, 
whether the particular act is a true exercise of the capacity and so actually able to justify my belief will 
depend on how the world is, but the point is that the thing by itself – i.e. merely in virtue of its presence in 
the environment – does not justify anything.
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What this helps clarify is that when McDowell talks about ‘conceptual capacities being 
passively drawn into operation’ he is not suggesting that these realisations of our conceptual 
capacities then become the objects of perceptual experience, but rather that they make possible the 
recognition of objects and events in our environment as something or other. To perceive an object 
‘by means of concepts’ is thus not to ‘shape experience’ or anything so metaphysically problematic, 
but simply to (passively) recognise it as an instance of some concept (or set of concepts). This is 
very similar – and in some respects identical – to Travis’s own picture of recognition, where what is 
recognised as falling under a certain generality are simply those objects that are perceptually 
available in the environment before us.  
Indeed, we can even follow Travis in saying that just how things are recognised as being will 
be down to the ‘expertise’ of the individual whose experience it is: “Barking, to one who can tell 
when it is threatening, a snout to one who can tell when it is a pig’s, does bear, when he hears, or 
sees, it, on what he is to think,” but if I lack the capacity to recognise those things in that way, then 
they will not so bear (2013, 129; see also Gascoigne & Thornton 2013, 5ff). Such capacities can be 
as parochial or specific as necessary: not just a bark, but the bark of my dog; not just a snout, but the 
snout of a peccary. There is no predetermined way for the environment to be conceptually 
articulated, just how it is recognised as being will depend on the capacities of the individual 
perceiving it. This does not mean that there are no wrong ways to recognise things as being – if it is 
not my dog I hear but my neighbour’s, then I am wrong to believe that it is my dog barking 
(perhaps I should listen more carefully next time) – but just that conceptual capacities do not 
‘structure the world’ in that sense. Things would still be as they are even if they are not recognised 
as being that way (i.e. even if there were no one there to do the recognising). 
So far nothing Travis would disagree with. However, this reformulation of McDowell’s 
account also brings into greater focus the main point of divergence between the two pictures. For 
McDowell, recognition is passive, something that can form the ground of a judgment, but need not. 
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An act of recognition on Travis’s account, by contrast, does not merely provide a ground for 
thinking things are a certain way, but rather amounts to a judgment that they are in fact that way. 
This is the main reason for Travis’s objection to the idea that thinkable looks are going to be able to 
play the passive role required of them by the conceptualist. That someone recognises (or appears to) 
that such and such is as a result of them ‘making something of’ what they are anyway presented 
with. But to make something of what one perceives in this way cannot merely be passive: for me to 
ostensibly recognise that there is a cardinal at the end of the garden can amount to nothing less than 
the judgment that this is the case. As he put it above, if something looks to one as if X in this 
thinkable sense, is for one to take it that X. 
The problem is that this formulation seems straightforwardly false: not every claim that ‘it 
looks to one as if X’ is for one is to take it that X. For instance, if I see the Müller-Lyer illusion, it is 
clear that although it looks to me that one line is longer than the other – such that I could try to use 
my apparent recognition of it as such to justify my belief – I need not judge that to be the case. I 
know that the Müller-Lyer illusion is just that – an illusion – so it does not ‘draw credence’ from me 
(although it may have done the first time I saw it). Equally, as we saw above, even in circumstances 
where I do in fact see things as they are I can hold off making a judgment (forming a belief) on that 
basis, as when I am concerned that the cardinal is one of my neighbour’s decoys. It looks to me as if 
there is a cardinal at the end of the garden – and it turns out that this is in fact a veridical exercise of 
that recognitional capacity – but I nonetheless do not take it to be the case. In other words, as Kern 
suggests, “there can be cases of perception that the subject does not recognise as such, for there may 
be circumstances that prevent the subject from recognising her perception [as the perception it 
is]” (2017, 215; see also McDowell 1996, 11n; 2002, 77-78). There is thus no conceptual difficulty 
in distinguishing things looking one way (in a thinkable way) and a subject judging otherwise. 
Indeed, such a possibility is one of the defining features of a rational capacity. As Aristotle 
suggests, unlike in the case of non-rational capacities (or dispositions) where “whenever what is 
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capable of acting [e.g. fire] and what is capable of being affected [e.g. wood] meet up in the way 
appropriate to the capacity in question [e.g. the capacity to burn], it is necessary for the one to act 
and for the other to be affected [i.e. for the fire to burn the wood],” no such necessity is present in 
the case of rational capacities (2016, 1048a). In the rational case conditions can be perfectly 
favourable and yet the capacity (e.g. recognition) will still not be fully realised (e.g. in judgment – 
viz. the self-conscious acknowledgement that the act is a genuine case of recognition). In Aristotle’s 
terms “non-rational capacities are such that one is productive of one thing,” while “rational 
capacities are productive of contrary ones” (ibid, 1048a). In the case of the wood, we can explain its 
burning (ceteris paribus) by reference to its combustibility – its capacity to burn. In the case of a 
rational capacity, however, we can refer to it to explain two contrary kinds of cases, even when 
conditions are optimal. For I may point to my capacity to recognise cardinals both in a case where I 
recognise that what I am seeing is a genuine realisation of that capacity, and in a case where I think 
that my neighbour may have been playing tricks with decoys (even though he has not).  18
What explains this difference is that rational capacities are self consciously held, where the 
subject is aware of the capacity’s fallibility. Such capacities are thus those “whose paradigmatic 
exercise consists in an act that manifests a decision about what would be right to do according to 
the relevant capacity under the prevailing circumstances” (Kern 2017, 175; emphasis added). To 
have a rational capacity, in other words, is to be responsive to the norm that they represent and thus 
recognising that in certain circumstances things may go wrong. Part of what it means to have the 
capacity to recognise cardinals is to know what a good case of an exercise of the capacity would be, 
and so withhold judgment in what appear to be unfavourable circumstances for its realisation. In 
 We can also explain the wood’s not burning by reference to its capacity to burn, but only by specifying the 18
conditions that prevent it from being realised (e.g. by being too damp). In this sense the privative cases are 
explained only derivatively by the capacity. There is what Kern calls an “asymmetrical structure of 
explanation” (2017, 171). This holds for rational capacities as well – for example when it is too foggy 
outside to see that the postman is walking up the driveway. The point being made in this section however 
does not turn on these cases. Rather, the issue is that even in a situation where conditions are in fact 
favourable to the realisation of the capacity, the rational capacity is still not thereby fully realised. There is 
some extra feature in the rational case that accounts for its realisation in particular cases that distinguishes it 
from a non-rational disposition.
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this sense, my self-conscious possession of the capacity can explain both why I act in some cases 
and refrain in others, even when external conditions suggest the capacity should otherwise be 
realised (or not).  
Aristotle characterises this acting in the light of the self-conscious awareness of the norm of 
the capacity as a “deliberate choice” (ibid, 1048a). The point here, however, is not that there must 
be some moment of explicit deliberation or ‘free choice’ – a temporal gap – before perceptual 
judgment is issued or withheld. Such a picture would clearly not be in keeping with the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience. If I recognise the bird at the end of the garden as an 
instance of a cardinal, my judgment that that is the case – that there really is a cardinal at the end of 
the garden – need not come apart from the act of recognition itself. The point is merely that there 
can be acts of recognition (or apparent recognition) that are not accompanied with such an act of 
judgment when circumstances are (or appear to be) less than favourable (see McDowell 1996, 125). 
To make a perceptual judgment, in other words, is to judge that this act of my capacity for 
recognition is in keeping with the norm.   19
The problem with Travis’s model is that, because there is no distinction between recognition 
and judgment, it is hard to see in that case how the subject can understand their perceptual beliefs as 
anything other than triggered, leaving us with a bad picture of belief generation. For unless the 
subject is able to ‘self assess’ or judge the particular act of recognition in the light of the fallibility 
of her capacity – that in these conditions her capacity may fail – then there does not seem to be any 
 This also goes some way in addressing Travis’s complaint that McDowell ‘personifies’ the activity of the 19
understanding in his account of the passive pulling into operation of our conceptual capacities – “exercised 
somehow, but not by us” (2018, 37). Travis’s objection is that the positing of such an entity is redundant as it 
either a) presents the subject with something that they were already in a position to recognise by themselves, 
or b) presents the subject with something that they are not able to recognise, but then would be presenting 
them with something that “it is in no position to assure me of” (i.e. if I was not in the position to know what 
a case of recognising a cardinal would be it is unclear what status ‘the Understanding’ telling me that that is 
what I am faced with could have) (2018, 57). But the idea that conceptual capacities are passively drawn into 
operation is not supposed to externalise recognition in this way. What does the recognising when I see the 
cardinal at the end of the garden is still me (after all it is my capacity). The point is rather that I know that my 
capacity to recognise cardinals is fallible and so I do not always take things at face value. In other words, the 
passivity of the capacity merely marks my self-conscious awareness of my fallibility, not the handing over of 
recognition to some mysterious entity working behind the scenes.
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space for the subject’s self-conscious awareness of the normative status of what she is led to believe 
(i.e. that it is something that it is right to believe). We seem to be left with mere “exculpations 
where we wanted justification” as McDowell suggests (1996, 13). But if that is the case, then such 
an account would mean (as Travis puts it) ‘throwing up one’s hands and concluding that perception 
simply cannot do what this essay started by supposing it could’. 
Of course, Travis would not see things this way; he wants to say that such acts of recognition 
are based on a prior ‘visual awareness’ of the scene that “perception has anyway provided” (2013, 
241). However, it is difficult to see precisely what Travis think perception is providing here. 
Awareness of what? Say we see the cardinal at the end of the garden: what is it that perception 
provides us with prior to recognition? It cannot be that there is a cardinal at the end of the garden – 
that is on the conceptual side of the divide. Nor can it be merely individuated objects, since what is 
counted as an object will depend on how the scene is broken up by our recognitional capacities (e.g. 
are the cardinal and fence one object or two? The concepts here have decided the answer, but it is 
not clear what it would mean to answer that question outside of them).  A mere relation to the 20
environment does not seem to be the kind of thing to provide awareness by itself. It might be a 
condition for the possibility of perceptual awareness (indeed, that much seems obvious), but outside 
of the recognition of the things it thus relates us to as something or other (minimally: an object –
 although see chapter 3), it seems to make little sense to talk about awareness at all.  21
Travis occasionally writes as if this question can be settled by empirical psychology, that 
visual awareness is afforded by whatever processes are involved in the physical processing of that 
which we receive from the environment (photons, sound waves etc.): 
Visual processing so works in us that we are visually sensitive to colours, colour boundaries, 
edges, depth, various particular kinds of motion, and so on. When the instancing of a way for 
things to be is recognisable by such features, we are, so far as that goes, well placed to do the 
recognising (when processing goes well). The rest… is up to thought.  
 On this point see Boyle’s account at the start of ‘Sortalism and Perceptual Content’ (unpublished a, 2).20
 This will be argued for in more detail in the following chapter.21
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(ibid, 255) 
None of this is problematic in itself. Clearly, the physical make up of our visual systems explains 
why it is that we are responsive to light, for example. But my visual system is not something that I 
can cite as a justification for my belief that what I see is a cardinal (‘Why do you believe that?’ ‘Oh, 
well, you see, I have a visual system that is responsive to certain wavelengths of light…’). Maybe 
Travis thinks that is ultimately all I can do, but then it is once again time to ‘throw up one’s hands’: 
such a ‘justification’ does not cite the subject’s perceptual experience as the reason for belief, but 
rather a scientific description of the way our visual system functions. As McDowell writes “[w]hat 
goes on in arriving at one’s picture of the world is not the stimulation one’s sensory receptors… but 
how things appear to one, which belongs in a quite different conception of experience” (1996, 135). 
Nonetheless, this account does still seem to leave us with the other problem for ‘thinkable 
looks’ that Travis mentioned above – viz. that appearances in this sense are not suitable to function 
as the vehicle of perceptual content (as that ‘by which’ things are recognised as being a certain 
way), rather they are that content, and so cannot be constitutive of perceptual awareness proper (see 
2013, 42). The problem for the picture advocated here, in other words, is that by saying that 
perceptual experience for rational animals simply is recognising things as being a certain way, we 
seem to miss out a key part of the equation, namely just what it is about the objects that is being 
recognised. Indeed, given that perceptual experience here is identified with what we are able to 
recognise in the scene before us, the account given here seems to rule out as impossible the idea that 
there could be something ‘by which’ one recognises things as being a certain way in perceptual 
experience. In this picture what grounds the act of recognition is the capacity, not some prior 
element of perceptual experience. Of course, the capacity will require the presence of certain 
objective visual properties for its realisation, but these are not something the subject herself will be 
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aware of prior to the act of recognition.  After all, she becomes aware of the objective visual 22
properties of objects by recognising them – they do not simply present themselves context-free in 
some pre-conceptual visual awareness (the next chapter will expand on just what this means). Such 
properties are thus unable to play the role of that ‘by which’ the subject recognises things as being a 
certain way. 
The question is whether this problem actually poses the difficulty that Travis thinks it does. 
Given that recognition is a self-conscious capacity where the subject is aware of the way she 
recognises things as being merely by virtue of the realisation of the capacity in question, it is 
unclear what rational role such a ‘by which’ could be playing. Indeed, in an unpublished paper titled 
‘Are the Senses Silent?’, McDowell argues that “it seems just wrong to suppose knowing how one’s 
experience represents things as being would have to be based on something by which one could 
recognise one’s experience as having the kind of content it has” (unpublished, see 46:00). To 
demonstrate, he suggests that we compare the perceptual case to the case of thought. If one is struck 
by a thought – McDowell gives the example of a case in which I am struck by the thought ‘I’ve 
forgotten to take my medication’ – there need be nothing ‘by which’ I recognise what it is I am 
thinking. For although we often talk of thoughts in terms of an inner monologue (whatever that 
amounts to), it is not as if I recognise what I am thinking by virtue of ‘hearing’ what I am thinking. 
Rather, I know what I am thinking simply in virtue of thinking it. McDowell’s suggestion is that 
there is no reason to think that the same thing does not apply to perceptual experience. Just as there 
is nothing ‘by which’ one thinks a thought (one just thinks it), there need be nothing ‘by which’ one 
recognises something perceptually (one just recognises it). 
Nonetheless, Thornton has suggested that the image of being struck by a thought cannot do 
the work that McDowell needs it to do as a parallel to perception (forthcoming, §8.4). Unlike the 
 Chapter three below will show that just what properties these are taken to be will depend partially on what 22
they are recognised as properties of.
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case of McDowell’s purported perceptual contents, to be struck by a thought simply is to make a 
judgment, not merely form the ground for one. McDowell’s example above seems to be an instance 
of precisely this phenomenon. To be struck by the thought that ‘I have forgotten to take my 
medication’ simply is to make the judgment that I have in fact forgotten to take my medication. 
There is no space for this thought merely to suggest a ground for a further judgment. Even on the 
more charitable reading that Thornton gives, where the thought that one is struck by is immediately 
disavowed for moral reasons – such as the thought that “if one murdered one’s parents one might 
inherit their money” (ibid, §8.4) – still seems to be a case of judgment (i.e. the later disavowal does 
not detract from the status of the thought as a judgment). Thus, according to Thornton, “there does 
not seem to be the conceptual space for something thought-like but not auto-representation [i.e. 
judgment]” (ibid, §8.4). 
The main problem with this response is that it seems to assume that the parallel is supposed to 
be ‘total’ in the sense that it has to capture not only the way in which there is nothing ‘by which’ 
one thinks a thought, but also the passivity involved in perception. But there does not seem to be 
anything to stop us from saying that the parallel is only one dimensional. Thinking is like 
recognition in one way (i.e. there is nothing ‘by which’ one thinks or recognises something; one just 
thinks or recognises it), but it is unlike it in another (i.e. thought always amounts to judgment, while 
recognition does not).  McDowell’s point is not that we should model perception on thought 23
wholesale, but rather simply that thought provides us with a readily available model of an 
intentional state that is contentful without there being anything ‘by which’ we are made aware of 
that content. Our awareness is part and parcel of us having the content in the first place. 
 Or so Thornton argues. However, it is not clear that this is true. It seems possible to consider something 23
without forming an opinion on the truth of the content of the thought. I can, for instance, think about the 
arguments in favour of utilitarianism while not endorsing any of them (maybe I am not ready to make my 
mind up just yet), or think about a speculative account of the origin of the universe without being in a 
position to make a judgment either way (perhaps because I lack the relevant expertise or perhaps because it 
is impossible to know if the account is correct). It is true that these are less clearly examples of being struck 
by a thought, but it is easy to turn them into cases of such, e.g. while watching the news it might ‘strike me’ 
why people might be in favour of utilitarianism. Regardless, whether such cases form counterexamples or 
not need not bear on the point McDowell is making.
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6. Conclusion 
In his most recent essay in the exchange, ‘The Move, The Divide, The Myth, and it’s Dogma’, 
Travis sums up his reading of McDowell’s position as follows: 
McDowell thinks that... feats of recognition perception somehow allows us are things we 
could not do on our own; unless our experience were invested with a certain sort of 
[conceptual] aid to so doing. We could not recognise, e.g., by looking, that Sid is eating a 
chilidog; that here before us is such a case. For doing so unassisted would be making (or 
hosting) a move in conceptual space which, for him, is just not there to be made. 
(2018, 36) 
Hopefully the foregoing makes clear that this characterisation is false. Concepts are not in play in 
perceptual experience in order to aid recognition, as if we could not recognise anything unless 
concepts were already at play (such that what we are recognising are the concepts themselves). 
Rather perceptual experience is constituted by such (conceptual) acts of recognition, where what we 
recognise simply are the objects of our environment. What we judge when we make a perceptual 
judgment is the veracity of that act of recognition in the light of the norm of the capacity. The 
recognition, however, stops nowhere short of the object itself. Thus, contrary to Travis’s suggestion, 
we can recognise ‘just by looking’ that Sid is eating a chilidog – indeed, that is precisely the picture 
being advocated here. 
The divergence rather centres around the status of those acts of recognition. For Travis they 
amount to judgment; for McDowell they do not. As we saw, the challenge for Travis is that, in order 
to characterise the relationship to what we recognise as rational, we seem to need some awareness 
of the ground of our judgment that can allow us to cite it as a justification for our belief. For 
McDowell, the recognitional capacity itself is the ground of the judgment. Since the capacity is 
conceptual and self-conscious there is no question here of the subject lacking awareness of the 
ground of her belief. In contrast, Travis posits a pre-conceptual visual awareness on which our acts 
of recognition are based. The next chapter will use Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis to 
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show why no such awareness is possible. Visual awareness – or perceptual experience – for rational 
animals must be described in conceptual terms, and more specifically, in terms of rational capacities 
for recognition. 
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2. Kant on the Objects of Perception: 
Perceptual Awareness and Judgment 
The last chapter argued that any account of perceptual experience that is going to be able to answer 
the question of how it is that the world can bear rationally on what we are to think and do, is going 
to have to picture that experience in terms of rational capacities for recognition. The failure to do 
this results in a bad picture of belief generation that is unable to properly account for the normative 
status of that belief (i.e. that it is something that the subject thinks that it is right to hold). As shown, 
Travis suggests that we can avoid this consequence by appealing to a merely visual awareness of 
the objects in our environment, a form of awareness that, despite lacking content, can still make us 
aware of potential objects for judgment. In order to show why such merely visual awareness is 
unable to play this role, this chapter will present an independent argument for conceptualism from 
the conditions of the possibility of perceptual awareness, drawing on Kant’s account of the threefold 
synthesis in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. The suggestion will be that, contrary to 
Travis’s suggestion, visual awareness itself requires concepts to be at play. In particular, it will be 
shown that the subject needs to be aware of how each moment of perceptual experience is 
connected to the next, something that is only possible by means of concepts. 
This chapter will be divided into six sections. The first section suggests that an alternative 
way of looking at the debate between McDowell and Travis is in terms of two different pictures of 
rationality. On Travis’s account rationality is ‘additive’, it exists in addition to a visual awareness 
that would have existed anyway. To suggest otherwise, according to Travis, would result in a picture 
of rationality as a distorting medium, transforming that which we perceive in the sense of a 
conceptual shaping of sensory consciousness. He attributes such a picture to Pritchard’s reading of 
Kant (1909), and it is this account that is the focus of this section. Pritchard’s account helps to 
distinguish a bad picture of the transformative role of rationality from the one that McDowell 
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advocates, where rationality is transformative in the sense that it makes awareness of objects 
possible in the first place.  
The key problem with Pritchard’s reading of Kant is that he takes the Deduction to be an 
attempt to counter external world scepticism. The second section will distinguish this kind of 
reading from what Ameriks calls a ‘regressive’ reading of the argument of the Deduction, where it is 
interpreted as an attempt to reveal the conditions of the possibility of judgment. This is important 
because it immunises the account given here against the common problems that arise for the later 
reading. The third section will then give an account of the threefold synthesis in the A Deduction. 
This is the core of the argument of this chapter. Essentially Kant argues that all perceptual 
awareness requires a temporal synthesis which connects each moment of awareness to the next. 
This, he suggests, can only take place in terms of the recognition of what we see as falling under 
some concept or other. On this reading, what are connected by the threefold synthesis are different 
acts of recognition, rather than ‘the raw data of the senses’. 
The last three sections will then defend this reading of the threefold synthesis. The first of 
these will address the issue of the ‘subjective’ and the ‘objective’ sides of the Deduction that are 
mentioned in the introduction to the Critique. The traditional way of reading this division takes the 
threefold synthesis in Section II to be the inessential subjective side of the Deduction, a merely 
preparatory section for the essential objective Deduction that follows in Section III. This 
‘inessential’ status would seem to question the transcendental role assigned to Section II in this 
chapter. Instead, this part of my argument will suggest – following Bauer – that the argument of the 
A Deduction only makes sense if the traditional reading is reversed. Far from just a psychological 
speculation, Kant saw Section II of the Deduction as the key part of the account, as giving the 
conditions for any perceptual awareness whatsoever.  
The fifth section will then attempt to defend the unity of the threefold synthesis. Instead of 
seeing each element of the synthesis as interdependent, some commentators have argued that some 
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parts of the synthesis can be at play without the others. This would be problematic since it would 
suggest that there is a level of perceptual awareness possible without concepts being at play 
(offering a large concession to the relationalist position). As will be seen below, this runs directly 
counter to Kant’s argument of the threefold (rather than three part) synthesis. The final section will 
then offer an interpretation of the two different kinds of unity at play in Kant’s account. In 
particular, it will aim to make the way in which concepts are utilised in the threefold synthesis 
clearer, avoiding a picture of mathematical construction or projection that would take us back to the 
bad idea of a ‘conceptual shaping of sensory consciousness’.  
1. Additive and Transformative Rationality 
In the previous chapter it was argued that unless perceptual experience is conceptually structured, 
we would be unable to explain how it is that perceptual experience is able to stand as a justification 
for our beliefs. Only something of conceptual form can be cited by a subject as a reason for 
believing what it is that her perceptual experience leads her to believe. In particular, it was 
suggested that we should conceive of perceptual experience as constituted by rational capacities for 
recognition. What this helped to make clear was that, although still constitutive of experience, we 
need not view such capacities as an intellectual veil standing between us and the historical 
particulars of our environment. For what is recognised by such capacities are things being as they 
are in the environment before us. Indeed, the argument was that without such a conceptual structure 
perceptual experience could at best be seen as generating beliefs in the subject, a picture which 
made it impossible to see how perceptual experience could enable the world to bear rationally on 
thought. 
We can call this the rationality argument for conceptualism (Boyle unpublished b, 6). As we 
saw, this argument Travis is not convinced by. On his account, to say that perceptual experience is 
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constituted by rational capacities for recognition is to confuse the visual awareness we would 
anyway enjoy with the perceptual judgments we make about what we see. So even if we accepted 
that we need not picture a conceptual structure for perceptual experience in terms that would 
confuse facts with things (i.e. by picturing such structuring in terms of rational capacities for 
recognition), the conceptualist account would still seem redundant since perceptual judgment can 
just be of the objects themselves: it need not make any detour through passively-realised 
recognitional capacities. Such capacities instead constitute acts of perceptual judgment, not passive 
experience — to realise them is to judge as Travis says. The ground of such judgment is the 
presence of the object in the environment, a presence that the subject is made conscious of directly 
in a (pre-conceptual) visual awareness. 
From this angle it can seem that the conceptualist is simply presupposing that the ground of 
perceptual judgment must be conceptual – must be something that “has truth to transmit” as Travis 
puts it (2018, 39). Indeed, the lack of an argument showing that such direct visual awareness is 
itself not possible outside of conceptual capacities in operation has led several commentators to 
suggest that McDowell’s account stems from the thought that perceptual judgment must be 
modelled on the kind of judgment involving inference, where we infer the truth of the judgment 
from the truth of the experiential content (see e.g. Stroud 2002; Glüer 2004; also Boyle unpublished 
b, 22).  For this reason McDowell’s protestations that Travis’s account falls prey to the myth of the 24
given – i.e. the argument from the availability of grounds – fall on deaf ears. From Travis’s 
perspective it can only appear that McDowell’s dogmatism about the form that perceptual judgment 
must take forces him to deny the obvious fact of a non-conceptual visual awareness, rather than the 
 We can already see that this mischaracterises the relation between recognition and judgment: what justifies 24
my claim that there is a cardinal at the end of the garden is not this or that bit of experiential content, but 
rather my capacity for recognising cardinals. In a good case I do not infer from the existence of the 
proposition somehow ‘floating in front of my eyes’, but rather accept that my recognitional capacity is 
operating as it should (i.e. it is the general capacity that justifies the particular belief).
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other way around (i.e. where the obvious fact of a non-conceptual visual awareness gives us 
grounds for denying that perceptual judgment must take a pseudo-inferential form). 
This divergence reflects is two competing pictures of the role of rationality in perceptual 
experience. For Travis, our rational capacities are something additional to the visual awareness that 
an individual already enjoys. A subject who lacked such capacities “would still [visually]-see what 
was there to be seen, what in fact instances the generality in question. She would just fail to 
recognise its doing so” (2018, 239). Rational capacities thus do not alter the nature of the 
underlying visual awareness on Travis’s account, but rather merely ‘unlock’ what was already was 
there to be seen.  Such capacities, in other words, are only drawn into operation in response to what 
we are already presented with: “[the] operations of such capacities do not enter into the constitution 
of the relation itself” (McDowell 2018, 24). 
On McDowell’s picture, by contrast, conceptual capacities transform the nature of perceptual 
experience of rational subjects, in the sense that they make possible the awareness of objects in our 
environment in the first place – they do not come into operation in response to what is already 
presented to them. In other words, the perceptual awareness of rational animals has a distinct form. 
The outer world is ‘unlocked’ precisely because “the understanding... is in act in our perceptual 
awareness itself” (ibid, 31). It is only because the understanding is so engaged (in the form of 
capacities for recognition) that we are able to pick out things in the environment as things, as 
objects of awareness. If I was unable to recognise an object as an object then there would be no 
‘presenting’ of it, no possibility of a merely ‘visual awareness’ of it, to be had.  
Thus, while it can be characterised as the conditions of the possibility of the world bearing 
rationally on what we are to think and do, another way of seeing the conflict between McDowell 
and Travis is in terms of the conditions of the possibility of the perceptual awareness of something 
to judge (i.e. of the perceptual objects in our environment). It is because there is a perceived 
potential for the first to be possible in non-conceptual terms that there is the room for dispute on the 
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second point. But, as Boyle points out, McDowell does not offer an independent argument for the 
necessity of conceptual capacities for the visual awareness of objects for judgment, seeing it as a 
consequence of the ‘rationality argument’ – i.e. ‘the myth of the given’ – rather than something that 
stands in need of independent justification (unpublished b, 7). However, this is precisely what is 
required to undermine Travis’s assumption that such pre-conceptual visual awareness is possible. 
What we need, in other words, is an argument for conceptualism that proves that the perceptual 
awareness of rational subjects must take a conceptual form (i.e. of things as things — as an instance 
of something or other). 
In what follows I will argue that Kant’s Critique offers just such an argument in favour of the 
transformative account of rationality, one that can be taken independently of the rest of his system. 
A problem with using Kant to defend this kind of account, however, is that he is often read as 
arguing for a picture of transformation that was described in the last chapter as ‘conceptual shapings 
of sensory awareness’, which posits that information given to the senses is ‘moulded’ by our 
conceptual capacities. Indeed, this is precisely the picture of perception that H. A. Pritchard (1909) 
takes Kant to be presenting – and whose reading Travis follows in ‘Unlocking the Outer 
World’ (2013, 225-33). 
According to Pritchard, Kant’s account of perception starts from the assumption that “that 
perception is due to the operation of things outside the mind, which act upon our sensibility and 
thereby produce sensations. On this supposition, what we perceive is not... the thing itself, but a 
sensation produced by it” (1909, 30; cited by Travis 2013, 227). According to this reading, Kant 
arrives at this position triggered by a Cartesian worry that “[w]e perceive [things] as they look or 
appear and, therefore, not as they are,” a fact that “constitutes a fatal obstacle to knowledge in 
general” (Pritchard 1909, 78). In other words, once we reflect on the fact that there is a distinction 
between how things look and how things are – e.g. a stick that looks bent in water – we realise that 
the point generalises: all we are ever acquainted with are appearances so we can never be sure of 
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any of our claims to know. Once combined with a metaphysical picture of external objects causing 
internal sensations, we are hard pressed to avoid a radical scepticism about the external world. The 
account of experience in the Critique is thus supposed to be an anti-sceptical argument aimed at 
winning us back the right to call ourselves knowers, starting from the perspective of the Cartesian 
subject (for a similar reading see Wolff 1963, 105ff). 
In order to reclaim a ground for knowledge, Pritchard’s Kant suggests we see certain 
functions of the understanding as ‘transforming’ or ‘unifying’ the data of the senses in universal and 
necessary ways, such that “we see that the things to which [experience] refers are only a special 
kind of appearance, viz. that which is the same for everyone, and for us at all times” (ibid, 97). The 
difference between ‘looks’ and ‘is’ statements is thus recast as a distinction within appearances, 
rather than between appearances and the thing in itself. That way, the thought is, although we may 
know nothing of the ‘things in themselves’, we may at least know of things as they (necessarily) 
appear to us. 
The problem with this kind of ‘transformation’, however, is that it fails to achieve what it sets 
out to. For, rather than a new ground for knowledge, we seem to be left with a subjective idealism 
and an even more entrenched worry about the status of our beliefs. Pritchard sums up the worry in 
the following passage: 
[Kant’s] conclusion is that we do not know this object, i.e. the thing in itself, at all. Hence his 
real position should be stated by saying not that the ordinary view [that the mind conforms to 
objects] puts the conformity between mind and things in the wrong way, but that we ought not 
to speak of conformity at all. For the thing in itself being unknowable, our ideas can never be 
made to conform to it. Kant then only reaches a conclusion which is apparently the reverse of 
the ordinary view by substituting another object for the thing in itself, viz. the phenomenon or 
appearance of the thing in itself to us.  
(1909, 16) 
By substituting appearances for things, we do not win back the world, but rather lose touch with it 
all together, for to say we know ‘only how things appear but not how they are’ is not to find a new 
basis for knowledge, but rather to say that we do not really know. This was precisely Travis’s point 
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in the previous chapter: what we perceive had better be things, not mere products of the 
understanding, if the world is going to be the thing doing the bearing on thought. 
Indeed, any account that attempts to read Kant’s argument in the Critique in this way – as 
starting from sensations and then arguing out to the ‘empirical world’ as a condition of the 
possibility of our being aware of those sensations in the way we are (i.e. as of objects) – can only 
result in this conclusion. Such readings are an example of what Ameriks calls a progressive 
transcendental argument (2003, 5). The problem with all such arguments is that the most they can 
establish is what we must believe that what they conclude is the case, not that it actually obtains 
(Stroud 1968, 256). For the best they can show is that certain operations on the given sense data are 
necessary for us to think of them as representing objects, not that there actually are objects to be so 
represented. ‘Rational transformation’ in this sense is only able to win us the semblance of 
knowledge — a good reason to reject it out of hand as Travis does. 
Clearly, then, this is not the kind of ‘transformation’ that McDowell is suggesting when he 
describes the perceptual experience of rational subjects as having a distinct form. Indeed, the 
account just outlined is actually still based on an additive picture of rationality, since the ‘inner 
Cartesian representations’ are independent of the exercises of our rational capacities.  To that 25
extent Pritchard’s Kant is far closer to Travis’s own account than McDowell’s, since both see 
sensibility as functioning independently of the understanding. The contrast between them is rather 
on the kind of awareness that the senses offer. For Pritchard’s Kant the senses merely produce an 
awareness of sensation, while for Travis, as Pritchard says, “[i]f there are ‘appearances’ at all, they 
are appearances of things and not appearances produced by them” (1909, 76). 
There is another way, however, to read the transcendental argument of the Critique that aims 
not at refuting the sceptic, but at providing the conditions of the possibility of experience that is 
 Presumably this is part of the reason that Travis uses Pritchard’s account, as it better fits his picture of the 25
role of rational capacities – i.e. as something operating on that which the subject would be aware of anyway 
– even if it sees these rational capacities operating in a fundamentally problematic way.
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already taken to be objective. Here “experience is not defined in terms of private so-called 
‘Cartesian’ representations, but rather describes a cognitive situation occurring, roughly speaking, at 
a level no lower than the core perceptual judgments” (Ameriks 2003, 5). That is, rather than 
attempting to prove the existence of the external world from ‘inner’ experiences, we accept the 
general objectivity of the kind of experience that we start out with and then search for the 
conditions of the possibility of that instead. Ameriks calls this approach ‘regressive’, since it starts 
from a position of objectivity and then ‘works back’ to show what conditions make it possible. On 
this reading the task of Critique becomes the question of “how... there [are] in general, for us, 
empirical objects representable as substitutional instances for the [variable] ‘x’ in the logical forms 
of our judgments” (Longuenesse 1998, 396). (The ‘x’ here simply refers to the symbol that Kant 
uses to represent ‘historical particulars’ to use Travis’s terminology, e.g. in Kant’s statement of the 
form of a synthetic judgment: “To everything x, to which the concept of body (a+b) belongs, 
belongs also attraction (c)” (1992, §36)).  
As we will see, approaching the argument of the Critique in this way allows us to read Kant 
as presenting a transcendental argument in favour of the suggestion that recognising objects as an 
instance of something or other is a condition of the possibility of any awareness of them 
whatsoever. Thus, far from a forming an unnecessary ‘conceptual veil’ between us and the objects 
of our environment, it will emerge that the ‘transformation’ affected by our rational capacities is that 
which is necessary for our awareness of objects in the first place. With the possibility of a non-
conceptual awareness foreclosed, there will be no space for Travis to claim that recognition can 
have such awareness as its ground. We will then either be forced to distinguish between recognition 
and judgment or else accept a bad picture of belief generation where we are unable to capture the 
self-conscious, normative character of belief. 
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2. Threefold Synthesis and the Coherency of Experience 
Starting from this regressive standpoint, we can see Kant’s account of perceptual experience as 
guided by the thought that it is only because we are aware of the objects of intuition as being the 
kind of thing about which something could be asserted that they can be objects of judgment at all. 
For instance, it is only if we are aware of that which appears in intuition as the sort of thing that 
could have something ‘categorically’ asserted about it that it could be an object for a categorical 
judgment. Thus, for each of the forms of judgment that Kant identifies he suggests that we find a 
corresponding ‘category’, i.e. a “[concept] of an object as such whereby the object’s intuition is 
regarded as determined in terms of one of the logical functions in judging” (ibid, A95/B128).  26
Since these categories cannot be derived from particular empirical judgments about objects, but are 
rather ways objects must be recognised as being if we are to be aware of them as potential objects 
of judgment (i.e. if we are to have anything to judge), they are pure and a priori, arising from the 
from of the understanding alone and so independent of any empirical experience. They thus form 
the basis of what Kant calls ‘Transcendental Logic’ – the forms of thought insofar as they relate to 
the objects of intuition (see ibid, B102/A76-7).  
As stated, this presupposes what Travis denies. What we need is an argument to prove that 
such recognition is a condition of the possibility of our being aware of objects for judgment. As we 
will see, it is just such an argument that Kant provides in the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories, where he seeks to prove that the categories not only apply necessarily to intuition but 
that this applicability is a condition of possibility of any experience (i.e. perceptual awareness of 
 Kant lists these forms in the table of the forms of judgment (ibid, A70/B95), stating that they “are 26
completely exhaustive and survey [the understanding’s] power entirely” (ibid, A79/B105). Clearly this is an 
controversial claim, but to avoid digression, this worry will be bracketed for the moment (however see Wolff 
(2017), Longuenesse (1996, chapter four), and Reich (1992)). The important thing is that, as far as Kant is 
concerned, these forms of the understanding articulate the basic principles of general logic, i.e. logic stripped 
of its relation to any particular content. Since these can have no origin other than the understanding itself (we 
do not, for instance, ‘infer’ the form of an affirmative judgment on the basis of experience, it is just one of 
the foundational elements of any judgment whatsoever), Kant suggests that these can be the ‘guiding thread’ 
that can lead us to the pure concepts of the understanding.
Sam Matthews  of 66 200 19 September 2019
objects) whatsoever.  In particular, the suggestion here is that Kant’s account in the A edition 27
version of the Deduction offers an argument in favour of recognition being constitutive of 
perceptual awareness that is independent of Kant’s broader aims in the Critique. The benefit of this 
version, for our purposes, is that Kant is far clearer in how his account relates to empirical 
perceptual experience.  28
 Kant’s basic argument in the A Deduction is that it is only because each temporal moment of 
our perceptual experience is connected to the next in a certain way that we can be presented with 
objects for judgment. Kant states the outline of this argument at the start of the chapter: 
If each singular presentation were entirely foreign to – isolated from as it were – every other 
presentation and separated from it, then there would never arise anything like cognition; for 
cognition is a whole consisting of compared and connected presentations. Hence when I 
ascribe to sense a synopsis there always corresponds a synthesis; and thus receptivity can 
make cognition possible only when combined with spontaneity. 
 (ibid, A97) 
At a minimal level the argument Kant is making is clear. If there were no recognisable connection 
between this moment of perceptual experience and the one that follows immediately after (i.e. if 
each moment was not even recognised as belonging to my experience), then it is unclear how 
 There is considerable debate as to just what Kant means by experience (for a summary see Ginsborg 27
2006c). Some commentators regard Kant as oscillating between a picture of experience in empiricist terms as 
‘the temporal data of the senses’ on the one hand, and as judgments made about such data on the other. Beck 
suggests, for instance, that Kant appears to use ‘experience’ in both these senses at the very start of the 
Critique; both as a result of the “objects by themselves bring[ing] about presentations” and as a “cognition of 
objects” (1996, B1; Beck 1978, 40). This chapter will argue that the conclusion of the A Deduction suggests 
that no such clear division can be made: temporal perceptual awareness takes the form of a recognition of 
objects in terms of concepts.
 This version of the Deduction is often accused of being ‘too psychological’, since Kant seemingly spends 28
most of the chapter discussing the functioning of ‘subjective’ psychological mechanisms for our awareness 
of objects, rather than proving that such awareness corresponds to the way things ‘actually are’ – a 
shortcoming that Kant allegedly attempts to fix in the B edition of the Critique (see e.g. Strawson 1975, 
31-2; Kemp-Smith 2003). However, this worry is dependent on reading Kant’s argument ‘progressively’, 
from the inner experience of cartesian representations out to the existence of objects. On the ‘regressive’ 
reading advocated here, this accusation of psychologism does not really make sense, for the ‘subjective’ 
conditions for our being aware of empirical objects of judgment is precisely what is at issue. Indeed, on this 
reading, the awareness of objectivity and subjectivity emerge as two sides of the same coin. As Heidegger 
writes, the A edition Deduction is not “‘psychological’, any more than... the second edition [is] ‘logical’... On 
the contrary, both are transcendental, i.e., they are necessarily ‘objective’ as well as ‘subjective’” (1997, 119). 
The second edition of the Deduction ‘improves upon the first’ only in that it makes the transcendental role of 
the categories clearer, not because the first was too ‘subjective’. Indeed, rather than seeing the two 
Deductions as opposed to each other, it makes more sense to follow Longuenesse’s suggestion that the B 
Deduction follows on from and, to a certain extent, presupposes the account of the A Deduction (1996, 57).
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anything could emerge as an object for judgment. Receptivity – a mere relation to the objects of the 
perceptual environment – is not enough by itself to make judgment possible because it cannot by 
itself generate the necessary coherence between the moments of that experience. 
That there must be a minimal level of coherence does not necessarily mean that this synthetic 
activity must take place in accordance with the categories (or indeed concepts more generally). 
Kant’s argument for this more specific point is made by splitting this synthesis into three 
interdependent moments: apprehension in intuition, reproduction in imagination, and recognition in 
the concept. Although the individual titles could suggest otherwise, all of these are moments of the 
same temporal synthesis performed by what Kant calls the ‘imagination’ – effectively the 
understanding in its passive, recognitional mode. Starting from the idea that we could be simply 
confronted by the objects of perceptual experience by an immediate relation to them in intuition, 
Kant shows step by step that the recognition of them as potential objects of judgment requires 
passively recognising them as the same object over time by means of concepts. 
Thus, Kant starts with the ‘synthesis of apprehension in intuition’. Intuition here simply 
refers to our immediate perceptual relation to objects in space and time, a relation made possible by 
the receptive faculty of sensibility. Any such relation, Kant says, “contains a manifold” (ibid, A99), 
that is, it involves multiple, successive moments in the way that my perceptual relation to this table 
in front of me stretches over multiple instances of my perceptual experience of it.  Yet, it seems 29
that in order to recognise this manifold as a manifold – i.e. be aware of each moment as part of the 
same – we must have an awareness of the flow of time in addition to a series of moments of 
perceptual experience. For if we just experienced one moment after another, never being aware of 
any connection between them (i.e. not being aware that the previous moment even existed), then we 
would be faced only with an ‘absolute unity’ each time. In order for this awareness to be possible 
 It also involves an awareness of a community of different objects in space – table here, laptop there – 29
although that aspect of its manifoldness is inessential to the point Kant is making in this section.
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the manifold “must first be gone through and gathered together” so that we can recognise each of 
the moments as part of a broader ‘unity of intuition’ (i.e. as occurring in time) (ibid, A99). This 
gathering together is the synthesis of apprehension in intuition – something that is not only 
performed empirically between actual moments of empirical intuition, but purely since “without it 
we could not have a priori the presentations of either space or time” (ibid, A99). In other words we 
can know that this synthesis must take place without reference to any particular spatial-temporal 
empirical experience, since it is a condition of the possibility of being aware of anything in space 
and time whatsoever.  
Kant suggests that this synthesis itself is only possible in conjunction with the synthesis of 
reproduction in imagination, for it is only insofar as we can ‘reproduce’ the previous sequence of 
moments in imagination that we could be aware of the present moment as part of that larger 
manifold (the table now, the table a moment later, and so on). To explain his point, Kant uses the 
example of drawing a line in thought. If it was the case, he writes, that as I went about thinking the 
line I forgot the earlier parts of it moment to moment “then there could never arise a whole 
presentation… not even the purest and most basic presentations of space and time” (ibid, A102). 
Thus, he concludes, the ability to reproduce (i.e. remember) prior presentations is necessary for the 
synthesis of apprehension in intuition and so for cognition as such – it is therefore, like the first, a 
‘transcendental power of the mind’. 
However – and this is the third and final level of mutual dependency – this synthesis of 
reproduction is itself only possible because of the synthesis of recognition in the concept. The idea 
here is that the ability to reproduce prior presentations relies on being able to identify them as, in 
some aspect or other, the same as the current presentation. As Kant writes, “[w]ithout the 
consciousness that what we are thinking is the same as what we thought an instant before, all 
reproduction in the series of presentations would be futile” (ibid, A103). So for instance the 
apprehension of a line, to stay with Kant’s example, is possible only on the basis of the reproduction 
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by the imagination of its previous presentations moment to moment, which is possible only to the 
extent that it is possible to recognise it as the same thing over time by means of a concept. In other 
words, connecting the earlier moments of the line with the current presentation of it requires the 
recognition that it is part of the same object, for if the previous moments were simply reproduced 
without any way of identifiably linking them with the current presentation then the whole process 
would, as Kant says, be futile – it would be as if no synthesis had taken place at all.  30
The upshot of this threefold synthesis is that the condition for the possibility of being aware 
of anything in the manifold of intuition is precisely that objects of intuition must be recognised 
according to some specific concept, that is, must be recognised as something or other. So when we 
perceive a line drawn on the ground we must be aware of it as the same line for the apprehension of 
it to be possible (at least in that linear form). There is no consciousness outside of this ‘taking as’, 
outside of this awareness of something as something. This awareness might be more or less clear – 
an object of intuition may show up in a fairly ambiguous form, a silhouette among the trees, for 
example – but it will nonetheless show up as something or other (i.e. according to a specific 
concept or set of concepts), for this is a condition for the possibility of there being any presentation 
at all. Thus Kant writes, “[a]ll cognition requires a concept, no matter how imperfect or obscure that 
concept may be” (ibid, A106). 
Thus, it is this synthetic unity itself that makes us aware of an object of intuition, rather than 
the individual moments of perception. For instance, an object is not just how it appears from a 
single angle, or in a certain lighting, rather what marks it out as an object is precisely its ‘sameness’ 
through a variety of conditions. In that sense – and this point will be made more explicitly in the 
 There is of course the possibility that only the manifold as a whole is supposed to be so synthesised. So 30
rather than this synthesis applying to every object individually, the whole of the manifold of intuition would 
be synthesised beforehand, forming a ‘base layer’ out of which individual objects could be identified 
(Longuenesse explores this possibility in 1996, chapter two). Why this is a problematic reading will be 
addressed in the next chapter; for the moment it is just worth noting that such a reading is prima facie at odds 
with the examples that Kant uses in the Deduction – although it is clear that the manifold as a whole is also 
supposed to be so synthesised alongside the individual objects (in terms of the I – it appears as my experience 
– as we will see below).
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following chapter – we never really see something like the real (or ‘constant’) colour or shape of an 
object, rather what those terms (e.g. red, triangular) mark out is a kind of functional unity that 
allows for many different possible realisations – it is in that unity that the object as such really 
consists. A circular object will look elliptical when perceived from the side, but, thanks to the 
threefold synthesis, that does not alter the fact that we are able to perceive it as the same circular 
object over time. Accordingly, our concept of an object in general is “something as such = x,” not 
something with a determinate content (ibid, A104). The concept of the object, as Kant says 
“consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of synthesis” (ibid, A103). This mere idea of a 
synthetic unity of presentations is thus the form of the awareness of an object for judgment. 
Kant suggests that it is ‘the transcendental unity of apperception’ that is ultimate ground of 
this awareness of this synthetic unity. His argument is that there could be no synthetic unity, no 
awareness of a connection between presentations, and so no objects for judgment, if there were not 
an awareness of the unity of the consciousness to which the presentations are presented. This is the 
case as much for empirical objects of intuition as it is for “the purest objective unity, viz., that of the 
a priori concepts (space and time), [which] is possible only by referring the intuitions to this 
apperception” (ibid, A107). Kant thus distinguishes this from an empirical consciousness, which he 
defines as “consciousness of oneself in terms of the determinations of one’s state” (e.g. my 
consciousness of myself as an embodied being typing on a computer), which could not guarantee 
the connection between presentations (1996, A107). Yet this awareness of oneself would not be 
possible if we were not aware of the unity of the threefold synthesis of the manifold according to 
concepts. That is, to be ‘apperceptive’ is to be aware of the necessary synthetic unity of experience. 
In that sense the transcendental object, the ‘something as such = x’, is the counterpart to the unity of 
apperception. Kant sums this up in the following passage: 
[T]he original and necessary consciousness of one’s own identity is at the same time a 
consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to 
concepts – these concepts being rules that not only make these appearances necessarily 
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reproducible, but that thereby also determine an object for our intuition in these appearances, 
i.e. determine a concept of something wherein these appearances necessarily cohere. 
 (ibid, A108) 
Our awareness of ourselves in apperception depends on the synthetic unity of the threefold 
synthesis just as much as that synthetic unity depends on the unity of apperception. In other words, 
we recognise in a concept not only the unity of the object of intuition, but the unity of the self as 
well. 
Kant’s argument is that since transcendental apperception necessarily “precedes all particular 
experience,” this implies that the threefold synthesis must have a pure use that deals only “the a 
priori combination of the manifold” (ibid, A117n; A118). Since Kant has shown that all such 
synthesis takes place according to concepts, and the only possible functions for such a priori 
synthesis must be those that belong to the understanding purely (i.e. they cannot have been derived 
from experience, since they are the conditions of the possibility of it), the only available candidates 
for such synthesis are the categories: 
The Unity of of apperception [considered] in reference to the synthesis of the imagination is 
the understanding [i.e. as the source of its synthetic activity]; and the same unity as referred 
to the transcendental synthesis of imagination is the pure understanding. Hence there are in 
the understanding pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the pure 
synthesis of imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These cognitions, however, 
are the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of the understanding. 
(ibid, A119) 
Since this transcendental apperception is the condition for the possibility of all empirical 
consciousness and so all cognition, this pure use of the imagination articulates “the pure form of all 
possible cognition; and hence all objects of possible experience must be presented a priori through 
this form” (ibid, A118). 
The issue here is that all the synthetic activity of the imagination demands is that it is given 
some rule for pure synthesis is provided, and so, as Allison writes, it appears “the most [he] can 
claim to have shown at this point is that some a priori concepts are required and that the categories 
identified in [the Metaphysical Deduction] are the most likely…. What he cannot show is that they 
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are the only conceivable candidates” (2015, 252). That is, the argument presupposes that we accept 
both a) Kant’s derivation of the categories from the forms of judgment and b) the accuracy of his 
table of such forms. In the first case everything turns on in what sense “the same function that gives 
unity to the various presentations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various 
presentations in an intuition” (Kant 1996, A79/B105). The second case requires a demonstration 
that the table is complete (accounting for all forms) and precise (no duplications) (see Wolff 
2017).  Yet, regardless of the fate of the categories, Kant’s argument demonstrates that the 31
awareness of an object for judgment requires the recognition of it as something or other over time. 
There can be no mere ‘visual awareness’ of such objects to which our recognitional capacities are 
merely added. 
3. Objective and Subjective Deductions 
It is important here to stress the fact that when Kant talks of a threefold synthesis “he is speaking 
not of three distinct syntheses, but of one synthesis which is analysed into three aspects or 
momenta” (Allison 1968, 173; see also Griffith 2010, 201ff.). That is, although it can be tempting to 
think of each of the three moments of synthesis as still being divided among the three sources of 
cognition (particularly because Kant names the second of these as belonging to the imagination, 
implying that the others do not), they are actually all products of a single synthesis by the 
imagination. Indeed, the threefold synthesis that Kant identifies is later simply referred to as ‘the 
synthesis of the imagination’ (1996, A78/B103). For each moment cannot be separated from the 
 Both can potentially be solved within the remit of the A edition. In Kant and the Capacity to Judge (1996) 31
Longuenesse, for example, contends that the solution to the first is found in the ‘Amphiboly of Concepts of 
Reflection’ where Kant describes the conditions for the formation of concepts (1996, A260/B316). The 
suggestion is that the each of the concepts of reflection actually describe how the shared function operates. 
For instance, she argues that what connects Quantity of Judgments and the Categories of Quantities is 
precisely the capacity of the mind to make comparisons, the first concept of reflection, and so on for the 
other forms (1996, chapter nine). The proof of the preciseness and completeness of the table of Judgments, 
on the other hand, Wolff claims to find in the so called ‘Metaphysical Deduction’ itself (2017).
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other: the first presents intuition all together as a manifold, but can only do this on the basis of the 
reproduction of prior moments as part of the same object, which in turn is only possible through its 
ability to be recognised as such by means of a concept. The picture does not establish an order of 
priority one way or the other, either in favour of intuition or the concept. Rather there is “a circular 
relation of dependency between intuition and understanding,” as Angelova suggests (2009, 53; also 
see Bauer 2010, 450). Thus there is only one synthesis here, only one ‘act’ of unification (what Kant 
will come to call ‘figurative synthesis’ in the B edition). 
Some commentators have suggested otherwise. Longuenesse, for instance, presents a picture 
in some ways closer to the relationalist view, where the third synthesis is (or at least can be) 
separated from the first two (see 1996, chapter 2; also Hanna 2001, 203; Allias 2009, 396-7). Take, 
for instance, her description of how the threefold synthesis relates to a sensible given: 
When relating to a sensible given, the act of judging relates first of all to the appearance 
(apparentia), the ‘indeterminate object of a sensible intuition’. But we saw from Kant's 
exposition of the first two syntheses in the A Deduction that however undetermined the 
intuition and the object it immediately, ‘blindly’ relates to (i.e., however undetermined by 
concepts), they are nevertheless products of syntheses of imagination (apprehension and 
reproduction). The latter will ultimately lead to representations of determined objects 
(phenomena) only if they are ‘brought under’ the unity of apperception [i.e. by means of a 
concept]. 
(1996, 109)  
The idea is that these first two levels of synthesis ‘blindly’ present to us an indeterminate base layer 
of contentless perceptual awareness, out of which we are able to then recognise something or other 
by means of a concept in the final level of synthesis. She gives the example of something being 
recognised as a tower from “rectangular shape of various shades of brown standing out on the 
surrounding horizon”, i.e. the product of the first two levels of synthesis (ibid, 25). If this were the 
case it would amount to a big concession to Travis’s position to the extent that it would suggest that 
a perceptual awareness of our surroundings without concepts yet being involved. 
Yet this misses Kant’s argument (quoted above) that “[w]ithout the consciousness that what 
we are thinking is the same as what we thought an instant before, all reproduction in the series of 
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presentations would be futile” (ibid, A103; emphasis added). There must be something over and 
above (i.e. more general than) the individual moments that is able to provide the ground for our 
awareness of the connection between them, namely a ‘function for their synthesis’ – a concept. 
There is no possibility of the second synthesis operating in the absence of the recognition that it is 
the same object as the moment before, i.e. recognition of it as something or other. It is this “one 
consciousness… [in terms of a concept that] unites in one presentation what is manifold, intuited 
little by little, and then also reproduced” (ibid, A103). There is no perceptual awareness of objects 
outside of this synthesis of recognition in terms of concepts.  32
There are several reasons that this interdependency of each level of synthesis can be 
overlooked. First, there is debate over the precise status that Kant attributes to the threefold 
synthesis. In the introduction to the A edition, Kant makes a distinction between the subjective and 
objective sides of the Deduction (1996, Axvi). The ‘objective’ side he says “refers to the objects of 
pure understanding and is intended to establish and make comprehensible the objective validity of 
understanding’s a priori concepts, and precisely because of this pertains to my purposes essentially” 
(ibid, Axvi). While the ‘subjective’ side “seeks to examine pure understanding itself as regards its 
possibility and the cognitive powers underlying it in turn, and hence seeks to examine it in a 
subjective respect… [and thus] does not pertain to [my purposes] essentially” (ibid, Axvi).  
The traditional reading of this division is to suggest that the threefold synthesis in Section II 
is the ‘subjective’ side of the Deduction, so-called because it describes the cognitive powers or 
syntheses that are constitutive of experience for the empirical subject (ibid, A95-114; see for 
example Wolff 1963, 80). Since the categories are shown to be necessary for this synthetic activity 
they are thereby proven to be ‘subjective’ or ‘psychological’ conditions for the constitution of 
experience for an empirical subject. The task of the Deduction, however, is to to establish the 
 Indeed, it is possible to see this even from the description of the hypothetical product of the first two levels 32
of synthesis that Longuenesse gives above, which itself invokes concepts: a rectangular shape of various 
shades of brown. As we will see in the next chapter, this has a great deal in common with McDowell’s 
account of common and proper sensibles in some of his more recent work.
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objective validity of the categories, i.e. their necessary applicability to objects of experience, rather 
than merely as necessary conditions for the experience of the subject (ibid, A115-130). This is 
supposedly attempted in Section III, where Kant shows that the threefold synthesis (and thus the 
categories) are necessary a priori, and so applicable to objects of intuition as such. 
Although this fails to fit the argument that Kant actually presents in the A Deduction – as 
Kemp-Smith suggests, Section III on this reading would fit better “placed midway between the 
initial and the final stages of [Section II]” (2003, 239) – it would at least give textual ground for 
treating the earlier, allegedly empirical, parts of Section II in the piecemeal way that Longuenesse 
does. As mere descriptions of psychological processes, there would be little reason to assume “that 
each moment of the ‘threefold synthesis’... is necessarily conditioned by the next” (1996, 51). 
Indeed, it would make sense of her suggestion that it would be “excessive to suppose that we 
(empirically) apprehend only if we have already (empirically) reproduced, or reproduce only if we 
have already (empirically) recognised under a concept” (ibid, 51). Rather than a single synthesis 
necessarily applied, the empirical threefold synthesis merely indicates a necessary potential for 
what we perceive to be successively bought under each synthesis (the only exception being 
synthetic knowledge a priori).  
Yet we need not view things this way around. As Bauer argues, there are lots of good textual 
reasons for assuming that the threefold synthesis in Section II is the ‘essential’, objective part of the 
Deduction, and Section III the ‘inessential’, merely subjective part (2010). Firstly, Kant claims to 
have established “what we wanted to know,” namely that the “categories... have a priori objective 
validity,” at the end of Section II not at the end of Section III (1996, A111). This follows on from 
Kemp-Smith’s suggestion above that on the traditional reading, the final stages of Section II seem to 
be misplaced. For if it is assumed that the objective Deduction is supposed to “proceed to establish 
for the a priori elements what in its earlier stages it has determined for empirical consciousness,” 
then Kant’s use of the transcendental unity of ‘pure’ apperception in Section II seems to come too 
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soon (Kemp-Smith 2003, 238). We would, therefore, have to attribute to Kant a confusion of just 
what is supposed to be essential and inessential in the Deduction (or indeed a rushed edit “on the 
very eve of the publication of the Critique” (ibid, 231)). Taking the threefold synthesis to be the 
objective side of the Deduction, on the other hand, requires no such exegetical extravagance – we 
can straightforwardly account for the structure of the A Deduction as it is printed. 
Second, given that Section III clearly relies on the threefold synthesis, on the traditional 
interpretation it is difficult to make sense of Kant’s claim in the introduction that only the objective 
section pertains to his purposes essentially (1996, Axvi; see e.g. Wolff 1963, 80). Indeed, the whole 
point of the argument from above and the argument from below in Section III is to show that they 
are both dependent on the threefold synthesis. The argument from above states that the 
transcendental unity of apperception “presupposes or implies a synthesis”, namely the threefold 
synthesis of the imagination, which is thus “prior to apperception” (Kant 1996, A118). Since this 
threefold synthesis is of that which we receive in intuition, we can guarantee that “man’s empirical 
cognitive power contains necessarily an understanding that refers to all objects of the senses” (ibid, 
A119) The argument from below, by contrast, is concerned with the way in which the imagination 
“must beforehand take [sensory] impressions up into its activity” in order to produce an image (ibid, 
A120). Since this threefold synthesis is only possible insofar as it takes place in reference to a 
necessary unity of consciousness, we can be sure that “all appearances must without exception enter 
the mind or be apprehended in such a way that they accord with the unity of apperception” (ibid, 
A122). In both cases the aim is to establish the interdependency of sensibility and understanding via 
the threefold synthesis: Section III does not supply an independent ground for the ‘objective 
validity’ of the categories. 
But even if it is accepted that Section II and the threefold synthesis is supposed to be the 
objective side of the Deduction (so called because it establishes how it is that the categories can be 
known to be applicable to the objects of intuition a priori), it is still unclear why Section III should 
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be seen as ‘subjective’. Bauer’s suggestion is that Kant names it as such because it “clarifies… how 
[the] various cognitive faculties stand together in the subject” by eliminating the empiricist and 
rationalist alternatives (2010, 454). In this part of the text, Kant’s aim is therapeutic: “not to 
establish a claim, but rather to prevent a misunderstanding” (ibid, 541). Kant’s concern is that his 
rationalist and empiricist contemporaries will struggle to accept a picture of a necessary fit between 
the objects of sensibility and the concepts of the understanding. In order to forestall this worry, Kant 
seeks to prove to each that there is “only a single unity – and thus no fit to explain; that is, the very 
same function of imagination brings representations to the unity of apperception (considered from 
the side of thought) and determines the affinity of all possible appearances (from the side of 
sensibility)” (ibid, 540). The rationalist worry is thus addressed in the argument from above, while 
the empiricist is addressed in the argument from below.  33
4. The Unity of the Threefold Synthesis 
This exegetical issue, however, is not our primary concern here. If Kant’s argument stands it does so 
independently of the precise role he attributes to it. The main reason that it can be tempting to take 
the threefold synthesis as offering three independent syntheses is internal to Kant’s account of this 
synthesis itself. For by presenting the threefold synthesis only in one direction, from apprehension 
through to recognition, it can seem as if Kant is suggesting that the threefold synthesis should be 
seen as the emergence of consciousness through successively applied syntheses, culminating in the 
explicit (i.e. objectively-determined) awareness of the objects of intuition by means of concepts. 
 But of course things are not so straightforward. The major interpretative difficulty for this reading is that 33
just before the account of the threefold synthesis in Section II, Kant gives a ‘Preliminary Notice’ where he 
suggests that Section II is preparatory, while Section III is systematic (1996, A98). If ‘systematic’ is taken to 
indicate a completion of what is presented in the preparatory section, then this would seem to stand directly 
opposed to the account just given (Longuenesse gives just such an interpretation at 1996, 44). Bauer suggests 
that we can avoid this implication if we consider that Kant describes the Critique itself as preparatory (e.g. 
A11/B25; A12/B26; both cited Bauer 2010, 456). Read in this way, we can see the ‘systematic’ Section III as 
a clearer presentation of the implications of the preparatory section, not their establishing something that has 
yet to be proven.
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This is compounded by the fact that Kant names each of the syntheses after intuition, imagination, 
and understanding respectively, seeming to suggest that each synthesis is an individual contribution 
by each of these faculties, rather than a single productive synthesis by the imagination. Awareness 
thus appears to be achieved to varying and increasing degrees at each stage, rather than won by a 
unified synthesis itself.  
Of course, the suggestion is not that the three syntheses are totally independent stages of the 
argument. Rather, on Longuenesse’s reading, Kant’s point is to prove that the third synthesis of 
recognition can necessarily be applied to the product of the first two: “[T]he activities described in 
the first two steps [are] always already oriented toward this goal [of recognition]” (1996, 51). This, 
however, does not require us to see each “element in its empirical aspect as necessarily conditioned 
by the next” (ibid, 51). The implication is that Kant sees this ‘necessary conditioning’ as a 
requirement for recognition occurring, not a guarantee that it always does. Indeed, as we saw above, 
Longuenesse thinks that such a view would be ‘excessive’, instead suggesting that “among our 
conscious representations there are some we just apprehend without reproducing them or reproduce 
without subjecting them to the rules of synthesis that allow them to be reflected under concepts – 
that is, to be thought” (1996, 66).  
Such a reading thus takes Kant as presenting a version of ‘state nonconceptualism’ where the 
inner perceptual states of the subject are nonconceptual in the sense of being unarticulated, although 
they are conceptualisable in principle (at least by a subject equipped with the requisite conceptual 
capacities) (Connolly 2014, 334; see Heck 2000, 484-5 for the origin of the classification). In the 
end, what guarantees the conceptualisability of each level of perceptual awareness is that “each of 
the empirically distinguished moments (empirical intuition, reproductive representation of 
imagination, concept) depends upon the ‘numerical identity of self-consciousness’ and thereby on 
the categories” as “the very functions at work in [this] numerically identical act of 
synthesis” (Longuenesse 1996, 56; 52). On this reading, our consciousness of the unity of 
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apperception is not something that itself requires the recognition of an object as an object (i.e. the 
recognition of what is perceived as falling under the categories), but rather is something available at 
each level of synthesis as an independent act that grounds the other syntheses. This independent act 
is the threefold synthesis thought purely (i.e. merely in regard to the forms of space and time); it is 
this that Longuenesse takes Kant to be arguing for in Section III’s arguments from above and below 
(ibid, 44).  34
That this is a problematic way of reading the threefold synthesis can be seen from 
Longuenesse’s treatment of the Analogies. Her suggestion is that, in this section of the Critique, 
Kant wants to establish that experience in the restricted sense of ‘discursive’ or propositional 
knowledge “presupposes experience in a further sense: experience as synthesis in accordance with a 
priori (relational) categories” (1996, 324). Her thought is that perception can provide us with 
grounds for discursive judgment only after the mere succession of appearances given to us in 
apprehension is recognised as united in terms of the categories, by means of ‘an a priori rule of 
synthesis’.  35
To take the example of the First Analogy, the suggestion is that Kant sees the category of 
substance as a rule for deriving an objective succession from the merely subjective succession of 
appearances given to us by the ‘synthesis of apprehension’. This derivation is necessary on this 
view because, unlike “the succession of our representations, [...] the simultaneity and succession in 
states of things are not directly perceived” (ibid, 335). As Longuenesse explains: 
 Longuenesse suggests that this helps to explain Kant’s referring to the synthesis of the imagination as 34
‘reproductive’ in his account of the threefold synthesis (Kant 1996, A102), but as a ‘productive’ synthesis 
elsewhere (e.g. ibid, A118), a distinction that could “otherwise seem like an inconsistency in Kant’s 
terminology” (Longuenesse 1996, 44n). That is, she suggests that while reproductive synthesis refers to all 
synthesis of the imagination as such, the productive attribute is reserved for the pure version of this 
synthesis, i.e. when part of the pure threefold synthesis. The problem here is that the productive synthesis is 
not simply a ‘version’ of the second element of the threefold synthesis – it is the threefold synthesis itself, 
which contains within it a reproductive element. There is, in other words, a difference in kind between the 
reproductive and productive syntheses of the imagination, not merely a distinction in content.
 Longuenesse’s Kant thus has three perceptual elements to Travis and McDowell’s two: she shares non-35
conceptual awareness with Travis, conceptual awareness with McDowell, and judgment with both. As we 
will see, the difficulty lies in the attempt to move from the first of these to the second, which parallels 
Travis’s difficulty in moving directly from the first to the third. 
Sam Matthews  of 80 200 19 September 2019
Kant... observe[s] that in the synthesis of our apprehension, the perceptions are always 
successive... Only by relating these successive perceptions to a supposedly permanent object 
do we distinguish the case in which the succession is merely subjective (as in the case of 
[seeing parts of a house successively as one walks around it], in which the determinations 
successively apprehended are objectively simultaneous, and the succession is only that of the 
subjective act of quantitative synthesis of a figure in space) from the case in which the 
succession is objective ([e.g.] the alteration of [a] piece of wax [exposed to the heat of the 
fire]).  
(1996, 336) 
In order to observe a mere succession of perceptual states given to us in apprehension as more than 
just that, we must interpret that which it presents us with according to a rule. The category of 
substance is that rule – it distinguishes just which bits of that which we successively receive in 
apprehension should be unified in terms of a objective substance and which are mere affections of 
the subject.  36
As Rödl suggests, Longuenesse therefore sees Kant as starting from the empiricist 
assumption that a succession of perceptions is given solely by apprehension, i.e. “that I perceive one 
thing after the other simply in virtue of perceiving one thing after the other; as if a sequence of 
conscious perceptions were as such a consciousness of their sequence” (2012, 124). But this misses 
Kant’s key argument in the First Analogy that distinguishes his position from Hume’s – namely that 
what is given in intuition must already be articulated (i.e. recognised) in terms of a permanent 
substance and changing state for it to be located in a temporal sequence at all. Indeed, far from 
suggesting that we cannot directly perceive ‘the simultaneity and succession in states of things’, 
Kant’s suggestion is that the awareness of any temporal relations has such direct perception of 
things in time as a condition of its possibility: 
All appearances are in time; and solely in time, as substrate, can either simultaneity or 
succession be presented... Now time itself cannot be perceived. Hence the substrate which 
presents time as such, and in which all variation or simultaneity can in apprehension be 
perceived through the appearances’ relation to it, must be found [i.e. recognised] in the 
 The task of the Analogies is thus read as performing the same task as the subjective Deduction on the 36
traditional reading insofar as it “is mainly interested in the conditions generative of experience, and finds its 
natural point of departure in the problem by what processes a unified experience is constructed out of a 
succession of distinct happenings” (Kemp-Smith 2003, 240).
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objects of perception... But the substrate of everything real, i.e., of everything belonging to 
the existence of things, is substance. In substance alone, and as determination [i.e. state], 
can everything belonging to existence be thought. Hence the permanent in relation to 
which all time relations of appearances can alone be determined is substance [contained] in 
appearance. 
(1996, A182/B225) 
Time is not an object of perception, i.e. it is not something that is perceived in the manner of a 
cardinal. It is rather the order of such perceptions. But if time itself is not an object of perception 
then how is it that we are aware of things as being in time? Kant’s answer is through the recognition 
of the permanence of those things – that is, by recognising them according to the form of substance 
and state. If this wax was solid a few moments ago, but liquid now, then what accounts for my 
awareness of these states as temporally successive is precisely that both are predicated of the same 
thing: “A substance holds its determinations together across time; its unity vouches for the unity of 
time. In this way, the substance represents time in the appearance” (Rödl 2012, 120). The point here 
is thus not that an a priori ‘rule of substance’ must be applied to what is already empirically given in 
time, but rather for something to be empirically given as in time, it must first be recognised as 
something or other, i.e. as conforming to the category of substance. Thus, as Kant says, “the 
permanent is the substratum of the empirical presentation of time itself; all time determinations are 
possible only in this substratum” (1996, A182-3/B226). There is no merely given temporal 
sequence prior to this act of recognition in terms of the categories and so nothing to apply an a 
priori rule to (i.e. awareness is always already in conformity to the rule, rather than the rule being 
applied to an awareness antecedently given). 
If even the awareness of temporal succession requires recognising objects according to the 
form of substance and state, it is clear that recognition cannot come apart from apprehension or 
reproduction. We must read the threefold synthesis backwards as well as forwards: To apprehend is 
to recognise and reproduce, just as much as to recognise is to reproduce and apprehend. They 
together form the single productive synthesis of the imagination. Recognition is not an optional 
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element of the threefold synthesis, one that only needs to occur when discursive judgment is on the 
cards, but a necessary element of any awareness whatsoever. Apprehending something, to be aware 
of intuition as an instance of the immediate awareness of an object of our environment, is to 
recognise it as something or other over time by combining this current act (made possible by our 
relation to the object in intuition) with a previous act of recognition (made possible by the 
reproduction of our prior act in memory). The threefold synthesis thus has the structure of a 
capacity, manifesting itself “in an indefinite manifold of acts” (Rödl 2012, 64). This capacity 
transforms perceptual awareness not by ‘conceptual shaping sensory experience’ or by ‘applying an 
a priori rule to what is anyway (empirically) given’, but merely by enabling those who possess it to 
be aware of things as things, as something about which a judgment can be made. 
5. Two Kinds of Unity 
What Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis shows is that the awareness of an object over time is 
only possible through a manifold of acts of recognition of it as something or other. The threefold 
synthesis thus unifies in a twofold sense: it serves not only to identify an object as the same object 
over time through the unification of successive acts of recognition, but to identify it as generically 
the same as other things. Both of these are necessary for recognition: the first is only possible by 
means of the latter one, since we need to know in terms of what the current act of recognition is the 
same as the previous one, while the content of the latter unity seems to depend on the possibility of 
something being recognised as falling under it by means of the former (at least for potential objects 
of perception). 
The first kind of unity – the kind that involves the unification of the manifold of acts of 
recognition as of the same object – Kant calls synthetic. Longuenesse suggests that we understand 
this as kind of unity as ‘mathematical’ (1996, 71). This suggestion needs to be handled with some 
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care however. As we have seen, the point is not that we should see the synthetic unity produced by 
the threefold synthesis as ‘mathematical’ in the sense of geometric construction, i.e. as on the model 
of a carving or a ‘tracing’ (despite Kant using that word in the chapter on schematism). To recognise 
a dog in terms of that concept is not to apply a shape to the data of the senses, but rather to simply 
recognise what we are related to by means of the senses as an instance of that kind. The reason that 
this process is mathematical is that it involves, as Kant writes of arithmetical concepts, “a 
presentation encompassing conjointly the successive addition of one item to another (homogenous 
item)” (Kant 1996, A142/B182; also see ibid, B15-6; 2004, 35). That is, to recognise a dog as a dog 
by means of the threefold synthesis is to connect each successive act of recognition to the next (i.e. 
as ‘homogenous’ with the previous act as insofar as it is an act of recognising the same thing). 
A consciousness of the homogeneity of successive acts of recognition is thus only possible by 
means of the other kind of unity, since it requires something in terms of which we can be aware of 
the manifold of acts as homogeneous. Longuenesse calls this “Kant’s discovery of the essential 
function of discursive thought ([i.e. that] we combine our representations according to the original 
synthetic unity of apperception by means of analytic unity)” (1996, 77). This latter ‘analytic’, or 
discursive, unity is the consciousness of an object as ‘unified’ with other objects which fall under 
the same concept. As Kant writes, “analytic unity of consciousness attaches to all concepts that are, 
and inasmuch as they are, common [to several presentations]. E.g., in thinking red as such, I present 
a property that can be found (as a characteristic) in something or other, or can be combined with 
other presentations” (1996, B133n). The model here is subsumption – to think of something as red 
means being conscious of it as a member of the set of all red things. 
To the extent that such concepts form a system, the recognition of an object by means of a 
concept therefore necessitates the simultaneous awareness of it as falling under other ‘partial’ 
concepts that are contained within it as its characteristic marks (Kant 1992, §7). Using the example 
of the concept of ‘body’ Kant writes: “Thus when we perceive something external to us, the concept 
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of body makes necessary the presentation of extension, and with it the presentations of 
impenetrability, shape, etc.” (1996, A106). The recognition of something as a body cannot come 
apart from these traits (i.e. we must recognise it in these ways too). To recognise the wall as a body 
is also to recognise it as something that I cannot walk through. If it turned out that I could walk 
through the wall I would have two options: I could either rescind my initial judgment that the way I 
recognised things as being was correct (i.e. that I was faced with a body) or I could alter my concept 
of body (see Longuenesse 1996, 50). So long as we do not decide to redefine the concept, the 
recognition of something as a body thus warrants certain analytic judgments that follow from the 
content of the concept in terms of which it is recognised. If bodies are impenetrable, and the wall is 
a body, then the wall should also be impenetrable. As Longuenesse writes, “thinking an object under 
a concept [in this way] provides a reason to predicate of this object the marks that define the 
concept” (ibid, 50).  
Recognition, insofar as it takes place by means of analytic unity, thus shares its form with 
judgment. This may encourage the equation of the two in the way that Travis suggests; however the 
relevant distinction here should be seen in terms of what Frege calls ‘force’ rather than content 
(1979, 198). What we do when we judge is make the claim that (or act as if) the way things appear 
to us, the way that we have passively recognised them as being, is actually the way things are. Kant 
puts this point in terms of “bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception” – i.e. 
presenting them as something necessary (1996, B142). The idea here is that when I make a 
judgment that, for instance, ‘the cat is under the sofa’, I am not just saying that it seems to me, 
given the scratching noises, that the cat might be under the sofa (that there might be an object 
falling under those concepts), rather I am making a universal statement that (I take it) anyone would 
have to assent to, as indicated by the word ‘is’. Rödl writes, “[a] subject, in judging, represents 
herself as the judging subject; in judging, she assumes the place of everyone” (2006, 355). This is 
not to say that I cannot be wrong in making the judgment I do, only that in making a judgment I 
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must make a claim to objectivity – i.e. claim that the threefold synthesis is indeed a case of 
recognition. But the point is that this claim is optional, there is no obligation on me to accept that 
this is really the way things are. 
This dependency of syntheses does not only go in one direction, however; the possibility of 
synthetic unity is what supplies analytic unity with its content. As Kant writes in a footnote to the B 
Deduction, it is  
only by virtue of a possible synthetic unity that I think beforehand can I present the analytic 
unity. A presentation that is to be thought as common to different presentations is regarded as 
belonging to presentations that, besides having it, also have something different about them. 
Consequently it must beforehand be thought in synthetic unity with other presentations (even 
if only possible ones). Only then can I think in it the analytic unity of consciousness that 
makes the presentation a conceptus communis. 
 (1996, B133n) 
Longuenesse suggests that we read this in terms of a picture of concept formation: the only way I 
can present a ‘common concept’ to myself is by reflecting on what is initially presented in a merely 
“intuitive, continuous, and indistinct” way in perceptual experience (Longuenesse 1996, 73). I see a 
cardinal, then a postbox, then a Ferrari, and then – following Kant’s three step procedure in the 
Logic – compare, reflect, and then abstract their common property ‘red’ (Kant 1992, 134). Indeed, 
reading Kant’s suggestion in this way makes sense of his calling the analytic unity analytic, since it 
“results from the analysis of given representations, by means of which a plurality of representations 
is thought under one and the same concept” (Longuenesse 1996, 86). 
The problem with this reading for the account given in this chapter is obvious – to be aware of 
cardinals, postboxes, and Ferraris as sharing the common property ‘red’, I first need to recognise 
those things as displaying that property, but that can only happen by means of analytic unity which 
is precisely what we were supposed to be explaining (Longuenesse has no such problem since she 
separates the first two stages of the threefold synthesis, but as we have seen this is not a viable 
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picture of the argument of the A Deduction). There is, in other words, a vicious circularity here if 
we read Kant’s suggestion in terms of concept formation.  37
However, we need not read the passage in this way. Kant’s point can be put in terms of the 
content of analytic unity being provided by the potential for objects of perceptual experience to be 
recognised as falling under them. What I do when I think of the property ‘red’ is think of red 
objects, of things that are recognised as falling under the concept (things that will therefore ‘also 
have something different about them’). It is this that accounts for the sense of the concept. To think 
of a concept under which no object could even potentially be recognised as falling would not be to 
think of a ‘mere analytic unity’ but to think nothing at all (i.e. it would be an ‘empty concept’ in 
Kant’s sense (1996, A51/B76); also see McDowell 1996, 68). Kant’s point here, in other words, is 
not based on a theory of concept formation, but rather a theory of sense. Understanding a concept as 
common depends on the awareness of the possibility of things falling under it: “[W]e cannot 
understand anything except what carries with it, in intuition, something corresponding to our 
words” (1996, A277/B333; also see ibid, B298). 
As it stands this sounds like a form of verificationism.  Strawson calls this ‘Kant’s principle 38
of significance’, where “[i]f we want to use a concept in a certain way, but are unable to specify the 
kind of experience-situation to which the concept used in that way would apply, then we are not 
really envisioning any legitimate use of that concept at all” (1966, 16). The problems that face such 
a principle are well known. Even putting aside the status of the principle itself, it is unclear how it 
would account for the sense of concepts like ‘solar system’ or ‘DNA molecule’, for it is not obvious 
that there is any standpoint from which such things could be objects that we could recognise in the 
 Indeed, similar concerns have been used as the basis of a more general critique of the idea of abstraction as 37
the principle of concept formation (see e.g. Lotze 1884, 37ff. and Sigwart 1895, 248ff). This issue will be 
addressed in more detail in chapter four, where it will be argued that Kant’s account of abstraction should not 
be seen as a principle of concept formation, but rather a making explicit of what was implicit in the concepts 
already obtained through what Aristotle calls ‘acts of learning’.
 In ‘Corresponding with Reality’, Putnam accuses McDowell of verificationism on similar grounds (see 38
2012, 86).
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manner of the threefold synthesis (for these examples see Evans 1982, 99-100). Indeed, even if 
there were such a standpoint it seems wrong to say that the sense of the concept depends on its 
being recognisable from such a position (somewhere out in the Kuiper belt say).  
As Hanna points out Strawson’s ‘principle of significance’ cannot be all there is to Kant’s 
picture of meaning since “the propositional content of every judgment contains a set of a priori 
logical forms deriving from the pure understanding, as well as a higher-order a priori rational 
subjective unity deriving from the faculty for apperception or rational self-consciousness” (2017, 
§3.2). And that is just in the Analytic: in the Dialectic we find transcendental Ideals of reason that 
guide inquiry but that do not correspond to any possible experience; and in the Critique of Practical 
Reason we find concepts like ‘freedom’ and ‘the good’ which obviously have no perceptual 
correlate. Clearly there is more to meaning for Kant than just what we are able to recognise 
perceptually.  
Regardless, for our purposes we can bracket these verificationist worries. The focus here is on 
perceptual awareness, and in this case the concern is precisely with those concepts under which 
things or events in our environment can be recognised as falling. The sense of these concepts 
depends on the possibility for recognition in the manner of the threefold synthesis, even if other 
kinds of concepts (or the same concepts in different contexts) do not. To this extent we can read 
Kant’s suggestion here in terms of Evans’ ‘generality constraint’ in the Varieties of Reference: “any 
thought which we can interpret as having the content that a is F involves the exercise of an ability – 
knowledge of what it is for something to be F – which can be exercised in indefinitely many distinct 
thoughts, and would be exercised in, for instance, the thought that b is F” (1982, 103). To know 
what it is for something to be red, to stay with Kant’s example, requires knowing not only what it is 
for this particular cardinal to be red now, but what it is for any object (of which colours are a 
logically appropriate predicate) to be red. As Kant suggested above, ‘a presentation that is to be 
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thought as common to different presentations [must thus be] regarded as belonging to presentations 
that, besides having it, also have something different about them’.  
A similar point applies to concepts of objects as well, where the grasp of such a concept is 
seen as consisting in the ability to distinguish an instance of that kind from both all other objects 
and other instances of that same kind (ibid, 108). That is, to understand the concept of ‘cardinal’ a 
subject must understand what it would be for an object to be a cardinal, what it is that would 
distinguish such a thing from all other things. Such a ‘fundamental ground of difference’ “must 
enter our every conception of a state of affairs involving [an instance of that kind]. For there is no 
thought about objects of a certain kind which does not presuppose the idea of one object of that 
kind, and the idea of one object of that kind must employ a general conception of the ways in which 
objects of that kind are differentiated from one another and from all other things” (ibid, 108). The 
sense of a ‘common concept’ of objects consists in the thought of possible instances of the kind, i.e. 
of objects which – in virtue of possessing a fundamental ground of difference relative to the kind in 
question – are distinguished from everything else.  
What Kant’s argument in the A Deduction shows is that in the case of perceptual objects such 
‘differentiating awareness’ is provided by the temporal recognition of an object or event as in some 
way or other ‘the same’ over time, and so in these cases it makes sense to think of the content of 
these concepts in terms of a ‘possible synthetic unity that I think beforehand’ as Kant says. But on 
Evans’ account there is no necessary link between the sense of the concept and our ability to 
perceive it directly (or reduce it to something that can be so perceived) like there is on the 
verificationist picture. We can still think meaningfully about solar systems or DNA molecules so 
long as we can understand them in terms of their fundamental ground of difference. The fact that 
part of this ground is going to be shared with perceptual objects (i.e. part of what makes ‘the solar 
system’ the solar system it is, is precisely its spatial position and temporal duration) does not require 
us to be able to perceive it directly in order for it to be meaningful for us. Of course, the fact that we 
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can do this in the case of directly perceivable objects gives them a special epistemic role to play, but 
this is distinct from the sense of the concepts involved. 
6. Conclusion 
 Kant’s argument in the A Deduction shows that in order to be aware of a perceptual object we must 
recognise it as something that is in some way the same over time, an awareness that can only take 
the form of rational capacity for recognition. This, at the very least, must be a condition of any kind 
of awareness of objects at all. If the subject can truly be said to judge things to be a certain way, at a 
minimum it seems obvious that she should know which thing it is that she is making a judgment 
about. In the absence of any concepts in terms of which an object can be recognised as in some way 
the same as a moment before, Travis’s picture of a purely visual awareness is unable to account for 
this differentiation of perceptual objects. Since he equates recognition with judgment, this can only 
leave us with a picture of judgment as blind, as merely generating beliefs in the subject. 
Yet it remains open just how much must be recognised, for there seems to be the scope for a 
minimal conceptualism, where what is recognised is conceived purely in terms of the physical 
properties of things. Indeed, this is just the position that McDowell adopts in some of his most 
recent work, where he argues that we should understand perception proper as constituted by an 
impoverished base level of content out of which we are able to recognise instances of higher level 
concepts (see 2008, 256-274). In the next chapter, however, it will be argued that no such base layer 
can be identified, since just what categories (or common and proper sensibles) are seen to be at play 
will depend on the empirical objects that are recognised. That is, it will be argued that empirical 
concepts and not just pure categories are required for perceptual experience to be possible. 
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3.Content-Rich or Content-Poor?: 
Perceptual Minimalism and Kantian Categories 
This chapter will argue for a ‘content-rich’ account of our recognitional capacities, where perceptual 
experience contains everything that it allows the subject to know non-inferentially. This contrasts 
with a content-poor approach which argues that only a specific subset of our conceptual capacities 
are at play in perceptual experience itself. Two instances of this minimalist position will be 
considered. The first of these is the account McDowell gives in his essay ‘Avoiding the Myth of the 
Given’, where he rescinds the rich picture of perceptual experience in Mind and World in favour of 
a minimal level of ‘non-discursive’ contents. The second is taken from the contemporary debate 
surrounding non-conceptual content in Kant, where some commentators have suggested that only 
the categories need to be at play in order for perceptual experience to be possible.  
Both accounts seem to offer an intermediate position between an empiricist picture of 
perceptual experience as constituted by non-conceptual sensory data and the richly-contentful 
account advocated in this thesis. On the surface, this might appear an attractive alternative: by 
keeping the conceptual capacities involved in perception proper to a minimum, they promise to do 
justice to the empiricist intuition that perceptual experience is primarily a case of our being made 
aware of the sensory properties of things, while avoiding the non-conceptualist pitfalls outlined in 
the last two chapters. Despite this initial attractiveness, however, it will be shown that no such 
independent level of perceptual experience can be identified, since ‘what we see of what we see’ is 
partially dependent on what it is we take ourselves to be recognising. 
The following chapter will be split into four sections. The first two will focus on McDowell’s 
new position and contrast it to the position that he held in Mind and World. The particular focus will 
be the two central tenets of Mind and World that McDowell abandons. The first of these – that 
experience contains everything that it allows the subject non-inferentially to know – will be the 
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focus of section one. Key here will be McDowell’s distinction between what we see and what we 
see of what we see. Unlike in Mind and World, McDowell now sees only the latter as constitutive of 
perceptual experience proper. Section two will then look at the second proposition that he decides to 
relinquish, namely that perceptual experience has propositional content. It will be suggested that by 
making this concession to Travis, McDowell is unable to explain how perceptual experience is able 
to make the world bear rationally on what we are to think and do without either rendering his base 
level of contents superfluous, or else falling prey to a bad picture of belief generation. 
The third section will then look at an alternative – purportedly Kantian – way of articulating 
such a base level of content in terms of the content given to us by the categories. The idea here is 
that, since the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, we could at least guarantee 
this level of content. Such a suggestion emerges out of the debate over non-conceptual content in 
the Critique, where it is thought that attributing such a minimal level of content to Kant’s position 
can help in understanding some of the more difficult passages for the conceptualist reading. The 
problem for this reading of Kant is that while the categories determine the form that perceptual 
experience must take, they do not by themselves determine its content. For this latter task empirical 
concepts are necessary. The final section will then support this conclusion by giving examples of 
how what we (appear to) recognise can have an impact on what are supposed to form the 
‘independent base level of contents’. Perceptual minimalism fails because it ignores the potential 
for interaction between our higher and lower level recognitional capacities. 
1. Content-Rich or Content-Poor? 
The previous chapter showed that perceptual experience for a rational subject has to be conceptually 
structured if it is going to be able to explain how the world is able to bear on what we are to think 
and do. For, in order to be able to cite something as a reason for belief, we must we aware of it, an 
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awareness that in the minimal case takes the form of our recognising something as the same thing 
over time, a process that is only possible in terms of some concept or other. However, there is a 
question here over just how much content perceptual experience needs to have in order to make 
sense of such awareness. On the account that McDowell gives in Mind and World, a version of 
which I am defending here, perceptual experience contains everything that it allows a subject to 
know non-inferentially. So, if we look out into the garden and see the cardinal sitting on the fence, 
then so long as we have the relevant conceptual capacities for recognition, then what that 
experience allows us to know non-inferentially is that there is a cardinal sitting on the fence. On 
such a picture perceptual experience is conceptually rich in the sense that the content that it 
provides is limited only by the recognitional capacities of the subject whose experience it is. Thus, 
if an art historian has the capacity to recognise a Morandi still life, for example, then that something 
is an instance of a Morandi still life can potentially be part of the content of what is perceived for 
her. 
Yet the mere fact that experience must be conceptually structured does not seem to entail this 
rich level of content. Indeed, it may seem that allowing such complex or specific conceptual 
capacities mischaracterises the content of perceptual experience. For while what we are perceiving 
might be a cardinal, it might seem to make more sense to characterise the conceptual content of the 
perceptual experience in terms of what we see of that cardinal – its red colouring, black mask, and 
bird like shape – rather than the specific concept itself.  One reason that it can seem this way is 39
that, as Travis suggests, different objects can share the same visual appearance (see chapter one). In 
such cases, we might want to say that the perceptual experience of the objects is the same (ceteris 
paribus), despite the fact that the objects responsible for those experiences differ. Whether we are 
 These visual and spatial concepts are also actualised in the rich account – by a capacity to recognise red, 39
for instance – however, on the minimalist account only the latter are actualised. 
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looking at a decoy or a real cardinal, on this account, the recognitional capacities that are 
constitutive of the perceptual experience are the same in both cases. 
It is this aspect of Travis’s critique that McDowell seeks to accommodate in his essay 
‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’. The example that McDowell gives is slightly different, 
presenting a picture of two different observers viewing the same scene instead of looking at the 
perceptual experience of a single subject perceiving two visually-identical objects:  40
Consider an experience had… by someone who cannot immediately identify what she sees 
as a cardinal. Perhaps she does not even have the concept of a cardinal. Her experience might 
be just like mine in how it makes the bird visually present to her. It is true that in an obvious 
sense things look different to me and to her. To me what I see looks like (looks to be) a 
cardinal, and to her it does not. But that is just to say that my experience inclines me, and her 
similar experience does not incline her, to say it is a cardinal. There is no ground here for 
insisting that the concept of a cardinal must figure in the content of my experience itself. 
(2009a, 259) 
We seem to want to say that both observers have the same visual experience, despite being able 
recognise different things in what they see. What they see is the same object in the same 
environment, so it does not seem to make sense to characterise content in terms of capacities that 
they do not both already share. 
Accommodating this point, McDowell thinks, means giving up two of the central tenets of 
Mind and World. First, the suggestion that in order “to conceive experiences as actualisations of 
conceptual capacities, we would need to credit experiences with propositional content, the sort of 
content judgments have” (ibid, 258). And second, the suggestion “that the content of an experience 
would need to include everything the experience enables its subject to know non-
inferentially” (ibid, 258). This is no minor alteration: giving up these elements fundamentally 
changes both McDowell’s picture of perceptual experience and the way he seeks to avoid the myth 
of the given. His thought, however, is that by giving up these two claims he can do justice to the 
 It seems that there is no real substantive difference in the point being made here, the shift is purely 40
rhetorical. Both Travis and McDowell are arguing that there must be some level of ‘visual appearance’ 
independent of our richer conceptual capacities (or conceptual capacities generally in Travis’s case) based on 
essentially phenomenological considerations.
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idea of shared perceptual experience, by distinguishing our rich recognitional capacities from a 
more basic level of non-discursive intuitional contents that accounts for perceptual experience 
proper. In contrast to the Mind and World account according to which we can see that there is a 
cardinal at the end of the garden (where such content is constitutive of perceptual experience), on 
this new account what we really see is some basic level of purely visual content – what we see of 
what we see (2008, 232)  – characterised in terms of the common and proper sensibles, e.g. a non-41
discursive ‘small-red-object’. We may then recognise the object of this bit of intuitional content as a 
cardinal, but such rich content is not constitutive of perceptual experience itself. 
This appears to be moving towards the picture of a sensory given that McDowell spends 
most of Mind and World trying to avoid. For, as Sellars argues, it is difficult to see how what we 
perceive can stand as a potential ground for a perceptual judgment if it lacks the propositional form 
it would take to entail something. McDowell’s reply is to suggest that, despite this base level of 
content being merely intuitional and non-discursive, it is nonetheless still conceptual since “every 
aspect of the content of an intuition is present is a form in which it is already suitable to be the 
content associated with a discursive capacity, if it is not – at least not yet – actually so 
associated” (ibid, 264). As stated, this suggestion appears ad hoc and stipulative, a mere shift in 
vocabulary that otherwise concedes everything to the proponents of non-conceptual content. Indeed, 
it appears rather close – if not identical – to what McDowell calls in Mind and World a ‘cheap 
defeat of the given’: “merely affixing the label ‘conceptual’ to the content of experience, although 
[we] regard the content of that experience in the very way that… opponents express by saying that 
it is not conceptual” (ibid, 46). On such an account, as Hanna writes, “it becomes almost impossibly 
difficult to tell… what distinguishes between a [non-discursive] conceptual content and a 
 It is worth noting that such a description makes a lot less sense outside of vision. If I hear a cough, for 41
example, what do I hear of what I hear? It seems an impossible question to answer without referring to sense 
data, i.e. what I hear of the cough is a certain pattern of sound waves, which is clearly not the picture 
McDowell is aiming for. Perhaps our auditory senses are thus richly contentful in a way that our visual 
senses are not, but it would seem odd for sight to have a lesser status than hearing.
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nonconceptual content” (2005, 250; also see Connolly 2014, 320).  The central lesson of the myth 42
is that any account of perceptual experience that is going to be able to explain how the world is able 
to bear rationally on what we are to think and do, is going to have to explain how it is that the 
subject is aware of what she sees such that it can stand as a reason for belief. It is unclear prima 
facie how something non-discursive can play this role and seems clear that mere stipulation that 
intuitional content is conceptual will not be enough to establish the point. 
McDowell occasionally cites Kant’s suggestion that “the same function that gives unity to 
the various presentations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various 
presentations in intuition” (1996, B104-5; cited McDowell 2009a, 260), as if this lends his position 
some support. Yet this equivalence is something that Kant takes the whole Transcendental 
Deduction to establish; it is not something he takes for granted. If McDowell wanted to appropriate 
the argument of the Critique then this might have some argumentative force, but he is clear that he 
does not want to be restricted by Kant’s account, instead suggesting that “the idea that forms of 
intuitional unity correspond to forms of propositional unity can be separated from the details of how 
Kant elaborates it” (2009a, 261). But in that case it seems to be incumbent on McDowell to provide 
some sort of Transcendental Deduction to prove that his propositional forms actually are applicable 
to his new non-discursive intuitional contents, i.e. Kant’s question quid juris. This is not only 
something that McDowell does not provide – indeed is in principle unable to provide since he does 
not specify forms of intuition (see Rödl 2008) – but is a project that would be directly opposed to 
the Wittgensteinian, therapeutic ambitions of his earlier work in Mind and World. 
Instead, it seems that McDowell’s point is that Kant’s picture can be helpful in elucidating, 
rather than justifying, the sort of account that he is advocating. That is, McDowell seems to think 
 Indeed, that this is a problem can be seen from the fact that Hanna’s description of his own non-42
conceptualist reading of Kant sounds suspiciously similar to McDowell’s new account: “The existence of 
[non-discursive] proto-cognitions is perfectly consistent with the existence of empirical cognitions in the full 
or judgmental sense, since, according to Kant’s doctrine of the three syntheses of apprehension, 
reproduction, and recognition, empirical cognitions in the full or judgmental sense are always discursive 
generative transformations of proto-cognitions” (2001, 203; emphasis added). 
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that Kant’s mention of ‘the same function’ being at work in judgment and intuition is supposed to 
indicate that intuitional contents are necessarily always propositionally articulable but not always so 
articulated. McDowell’s justification for his new position, by contrast, makes no claim to the 
Kantian framework. In this regard he stays far closer to the account of Mind and World, aiming to 
play off the demand for perceptual experience to be conceptually structured against the 
phenomenological demand for a base level of content. His suggestion seems to be that, since 
perceptual experience must be (i) characterised in terms of conceptual capacities being passively 
pulled into operation if we are to avoid the myth, and yet must also be (ii) constituted by some basic 
level of intuitional content if we are to do justice to the idea of the observers sharing the same 
perceptual experience, then (iii) such intuitional contents must themselves be conceptually 
structured. This, however, puts a lot of weight on the intuitive appeal of the idea of the shared 
experience of the other requiring us to think in terms of a base level of content. 
2. Propositional Content 
Yet even if we temporarily grant this argument for the ‘conceptuality’ of intuitional content, it is still 
unclear how such content is supposed to provide the subject with reasons for belief. A picture of 
conceptual intuitions does not thereby make sense of how they can justify our beliefs about the 
world, if they lack the propositional structure to entail anything. For this reason, it could be 
tempting not to abandon the propositional aspect of Mind and World at all, viewing such 
‘intuitional’ content as not only conceptually-structured, but propositionally so (e.g. ‘there’s a red 
object’). Nothing in the argument above seems to rule out such a move, and it would appear to 
answer the phenomenological worry. But McDowell is clear that this is not the picture he wants 
(ibid, 260). Indeed, he now argues along with Travis that “[i]f experiences have propositional 
content, it is hard to deny that experiencing is taking things to be so” (ibid 269). Instead, he wants 
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us to picture intuitional content as “a different kind of thing that entitles us to take things to be 
so” (ibid). The question is what kind of thing this is and how it is able to play this role. 
The only alternative position that McDowell considers is from Sellars’ Science and 
Metaphysics, where Sellars presents such intuitional contents in terms of demonstrative ‘this-
suches’ (1968, 5).  The perceptual experience of the cardinal, on this view, would have the content 43
of something along the lines of ‘this-red-object’. Such contents are not able to stand by themselves 
as reasons for belief, but rather represent the potential subject and predicate terms of perceptual 
judgment. In this sense such contents “are essentially incomplete,” unable to play a role in our 
epistemic practices “unless [we know] how to complete them to form such representations as ‘This 
cube is a die’” (ibid, 6). Such a position would go some way in explaining how we are able to use 
what we receive in intuition as a justification for what we believe since the content it provides is 
“essentially fragmentary discursive content” waiting to be completed via an explicit judgment or 
assertion (McDowell 2009a, 270).  This, however, is not the sort of picture that McDowell is 44
advocating. Rather, on his new account “intuitional content is not discursive content at all,” and 
instead of being fragmentary, “[h]aving something in view, say a red cube, can be complete in 
itself” (ibid, 270). He calls them merely ‘categorically unified’ (see ibid, 263), a characterisation 
that we will return to below. 
 Or at least the kind that are the product of the productive imagination. Sellars distinguishes between two 43
senses of intuition in Kant, the kind under discussion here (determinate objects of perceptual awareness) and 
intuition as ‘sheer receptivity’, where it is pictured as non-conceptual sensory intake that guides the 
schematism of our conceptual capacities ‘from without’ (1968, 16).
 Even this seems to prevent us from properly explaining how perceptual experience enables the world to 44
bear rationally on what we are to think and do, since these this-suches do not entail anything on their own. 
By the time we get to something that does – namely the explicit propositions of judgment or assertion – 
judgment has already taken place. As a result, we appear to lack the intentional distance between the two 
moments, and so are hard pressed to avoid a picture of belief generation (and thus the failure of experience to 
play a justificatory role). In other words, it is unclear what rational role intuition is supposed to be playing 
here other than perhaps to explain what Sellars takes to be the phenomenology of perceptual experience. It is 
probably better to read Sellars argument in this part of Science and Metaphysics as a genetic account of how 
we come to make perceptual judgments – part of “the how of our experience and cognition” as DeVries puts 
it (2011, 61) – rather than an attempt to make good on the claim that such fragmentary discursive contents 
can play a justificatory role in our epistemic practices.
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We can get a better idea of what McDowell means here by looking at the first of the two 
ways he says that intuition enables judgment, where he suggests we “carve out” a bit of the 
intuitional content in order to make it explicit, “determining it to be the meaning of a linguistic 
expression” (ibid, 263). For instance, if we look out into the garden where the cardinal is perching, 
we may recognise the small red bit of intuitional content that stands out against the green 
background. By using the concepts that belong to the more basic level we may give this content 
propositional articulation, e.g. ‘Look, there’s a red object!’, separating it from the rest of the 
intuitional backdrop. Thus, far from a mere passive conceptual awareness that what we are faced 
with is a red object, McDowell seems to want a picture of a preexisting (in the sense that it is prior 
to our awareness of it) ‘intuitional clay’ that we can then carve up, or ‘make determinate’, by 
bringing our discursive capacities to bear on what is so presented. 
Putting aside the difficulties that were raised in the first chapter around the language of 
‘conceptual shaping’ that this new account seems to exacerbate by talking of discursive ‘carving’, 
and the temptation to read McDowell here as saying that such intuitions form the objects of our 
perceptual judgment – which is clearly not what he means to suggest (see chapter one, §5) – the 
larger problem for McDowell is that it is still unclear how we can class the role that such intuitions 
play as rational. For the propositional content that rationally links up with the rest of what we 
believe comes too late – as a result of a judgment being made – rather than from the intuitional 
content of perceptual experience itself. What matters for justification, in other words, is what the 
subject is able to recognise (or ‘carve’ as McDowell puts it) in such intuition rather than the 
intuition itself. But in that case why not bypass such intuition altogether and just say that what the 
subject recognises are not things in ‘intuition’ but the environment in front of her?  
The problem here extends beyond a worry about an intuitional ‘idle wheel’ in McDowell’s 
new account. For since intuition is supposed to play the passive or receptive role in perceptual 
experience, in place of propositionally-structured ‘concepts being pulled passively into operation’, 
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it threatens to leave us with a bad picture of perceptual belief generation and so a negative answer to 
the fundamental question of perception. A consideration of the second way that McDowell says that 
intuition enables judgment makes this more explicit. In this case, he suggests, “knowledgeable 
judgment enabled by an intuition has content that goes beyond the content of the intuition” (ibid, 
266). Here, the idea is that when we have the relevant conceptual capacities, we are able to know 
non-inferentially more than we can strictly speaking see, e.g. recognising what is presented to us as 
a mere red object in intuition as an instance of a cardinal. What justifies my knowledge that there is 
a cardinal at the end of the garden is thus not intuition but rather my recognitional capacity: “It is 
not that I infer that what I see is a cardinal from the way it looks, as when I identify a bird’s species 
by comparing what I see with a photograph in a field guide. I can immediately recognise cardinals if 
the viewing conditions are good enough” (ibid, 258-9). This may sound similar to the picture of 
recognitional capacities advocated in chapter one, but, crucially, recognition here is not logically 
distinct from judgment. To recognise a cardinal on McDowell’s account here simply is to judge that 
what one is faced with is in fact a cardinal. But in that case the belief is merely generated, for at no 
point was it open to the subject to believe otherwise. 
As Doyon writes, the problem is that “by asserting that empirical intuitions are unarticulated, 
McDowell… cannot explain how the passage from an empirical intuition to empirical judgment is 
achieved while preserving the identity of content between the passive and active modes of 
actualisation” (2015, 74). In order to explain this passage between perception and judgment, and so 
avoid a bad picture of belief generation, McDowell must either accept that the content of intuition is 
propositional (thus dropping the requirement that it is non-discursive) or that ‘carving’/recognition 
can happen passively in a way that does not amount to judgment (thus rendering intuitions 
superfluous). The second option is essentially identical to the picture advocated here, since, in the 
absence of a substantive notion of intuitional content, the distinction between mere ‘carving’ and 
full-blooded recognition no longer has any basis. This results in a rich picture of perceptual 
Sam Matthews  of 100 200 19 September 2019
experience constituted by whatever it is that the subject is able to recognise in her environment. The 
first option, by contrast, seems to leave open a possible role for minimal perceptual content, albeit 
in a propositionally-structured form. This would still allow the rejection of the second tenet of Mind 
and World (the idea that perceptual experience contains whatever it allows the subject non-
inferentially to know) and potentially a way to do justice to McDowell’s phenomenological 
concerns. 
3. Categorical Conceptualism 
Before looking at this second option, however, we still face a difficulty in deciding just what gets to 
count as ‘minimal conceptual content’. McDowell characterises such minimal contents in terms of 
the common and proper sensibles, namely those physical features that can be sensed by multiple 
senses (e.g. space occupancy) and those that are exclusive to a particular sense (colour, pitch). Yet 
this does not get us very far, since it is not clear what specific concepts of this kind are able to count 
as common and proper sensibles. McDowell uses the example of ‘red’, suggesting that colour terms 
should be taken as the paradigm example of proper sensibles, but colour terms can be incredibly 
specific. ‘Ultramarine blue’, for example, refers to a very particular shade of brilliant blue. Now I 
certainly would not know if the object before me manifested that shade, but I know that my artist 
friend would. This would suggest that such a conceptual capacity is on the recognition side of the 
divide rather than the content of intuition. The question, then, is how we draw the line between the 
two kinds of cases. To go the other way, some remote tribes are known to (at least historically) to 
only have colour concepts for red, white, and black (Deutscher 2010, 61). Does that mean that we 
draw the line there? Or is that too restrictive? However we answer it seems they are not going to be 
fit for purpose, if the aim is to describe a common level perceptual experience that accounts for our 
recognising different things in what we are perceptually related to. 
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One potential solution to this issue is suggested by McDowell’s description of intuition as 
merely categorically unified (2009a, 263; 2009b, 318). For if we were able to transcendentally 
guarantee a set of concepts as necessary for experience as per the Kantian categories, then we could 
account for the supposed universality of the base level of content in terms of the synthetic 
propositions ‘emanating a priori’ from their schematism in experience. A version of this picture is 
often attributed to Kant himself, most recently in the contemporary debate on non-conceptualism in 
the Critique, where defenders of a conceptualist reading have used this picture of a minimal level of 
conceptual content based on the categories to account for those passages of Kant’s writing that are 
hard to square with a strict conceptualism.  Particularly relevant for our concerns here is the 45
conceptualist attempt to overcome what Hanna calls Kant’s ‘phenomenological proofs’ for non-
conceptual content (Hanna 2005, 260; also 2001, §4.2). These mostly revolve around situations 
where perceptual experience continues to occur in the absence of a specific empirical concept, 
much like McDowell’s cardinal example above. Such examples “[pump] our philosophical insight 
by appealing to introspectively or intersubjectively given self-evident facts about conscious 
 The interpretive difficulty lies in the fact that Kant’s account in the Transcendental Aesthetic and 45
introductory parts of the Critique stresses the independence of the sensibility and understanding – Kant’s 
“two stems of human cognition” (1996, A15/B29) – while the Transcendental Deduction and the sections 
that immediately follow, stress the role of the imagination and the apparent mediation of sensibility by the 
understanding. Thus, as Hanna argues, Kant’s account seemingly “covertly sponsors both conceptualism and 
nonconceptualism” (2005, 251). For the conceptualist, the challenge is to explain away (e.g.) Kant’s 
suggestion that “[sensibility] alone supplies us with intuitions” (ibid, A19/B33). Typically, the conceptualist 
response here is ‘revisionist’, arguing that Kant revises the ‘independent’ status of intuition in the light of the 
argument of the Deduction (e.g. Pippin 2005, 34; Ginsborg 2008, 66; Griffith 2010, 199; Bauer 2012, 226). 
For the non-conceptualist, by contrast, the challenge is to explain away the Deduction’s insistence (e.g) that 
“[the unity of an intuition] is none other than the unity that… the category prescribes” and that “implies a 
synthesis of the manifold” (1996, B144-5n; B155). One way to do this would be to undermine the idea that 
the synthetic activity of the imagination is to be seen as necessarily guided by the understanding. Hanna 
(2001, 203; 2005, 249) and Allias (2009, 396-7), for example – like Longuenesse in the previous chapter – 
argue that the first two syntheses of the threefold synthesis of the A-Deduction are separable from the 
‘synthesis of recognition in a concept’ thus providing intuition with its own non-conceptual form of sensible, 
spatio-temporal unity (a reading that the previous chapter argued overlooks the mutual dependence of the 
three moments). The main problem, however, with arguing that intuition is independent in this sense is that 
“it [becomes] difficult to fathom how Kant can be taken to have established a synthetic a priori connection 
between concepts, more precisely, the categories, and intuitions” (Schulting 2016a, 232; see also Ginsborg 
2008, 70). If intuition is seen as a pre-existing manifold to which the categories are only subsequently 
applied, then it seems that such application can only be a posteriori and so cannot establish the necessity that 
Kant needs in order to guarantee the applicability of the categories (and so overcome Hume’s scepticism 
about reason).
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cognitions” (2001, 260). Once again, much seems to turn on explaining (or explaining away) the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience. 
The most directly problematic of these examples is Kant’s account of the ‘savage’ in the 
Jäsche Logic, who – despite being a rational subject – lacks the concept of house: 
In every cognition we must distinguish matter, i.e., the object, and form, i.e., the way in 
which we cognise the object. If a savage sees a house from a distance, for example, with 
whose use he is not acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very 
same object as someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling 
established for men. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in 
the two. With the one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at the same 
time. 
(1992, 544-5) 
Barring the question of the relationship between the Logic and the Critique, it is clear how such a 
statement is prima facie problematic for a conceptualist reading of Kant’s position, since it seems to 
be suggesting that intuitions can provide us with ‘cognition’ in the absence of concepts. The 
‘savage’ still sees the house despite lacking the concept itself. Such examples, Ginsborg suggests, 
appeal to our intuitions about the “primitive character of perception relative to thought and 
judgment” (2008, 71). A strong conceptualism seems to get the relation between concepts and 
perception the wrong way around. For clearly I do not need the concept of a house in order to 
perceive what is there before me – it is not as if there is an empty space in my perceptual field – I 
still see the house, even if I do not see it as a house. Indeed, this seems quite a common occurrence 
in our everyday lives, occurring whenever we encounter something new for the first time (a tablet 
computer say, or a new model of car). As Hanna suggests, “[i]nsofar as I very frequently perceive 
things that I do not know how to conceptualise, I am no doubt a rational ‘savage’ many times daily” 
(2005, 262). Indeed, on what is traditionally taken to be Kant’s picture of concept formation – 
where empirical concepts are formed through a process of comparison, reflection and abstraction 
(see 1992, §6) – it seems a condition of the possibility of my having such a concept that I am first 
able to perceive the object in question so that I can abstract its general characteristics. It is thus 
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tempting, as Ginsborg says, “to view sensibility… as responsible for perceptions whose content can 
be entertained by us without any grasp of concepts” (2008, 68). 
Yet things are not quite so straightforward for the nonconceptualist picture, as such examples 
do not rule out that other conceptual capacities could be at play.  As Connolly argues, while it is 46
true that I can perceive an apple while lacking the concept ‘apple’, it does not follow that the 
perceptual experience itself is therefore possible in the absence of any antecedent concepts at all: 
[The] mistake is the assumption that just because one can see an apple without possessing 
the concept of an apple, one can see an apple without possessing any concepts. In other 
words, [the nonconceptualist] assumes that seeing that it is an apple would be a 
conceptualisation of a nonconceptual state, and not a reconceptualisation of a previously 
conceptual state. However, if you see that it is an apple now, but previously saw that it is an 
object, your new perceptual state would be a reconceptualisation of a previously conceptual 
state.  
(Connolly 2014, 322) 
In other words, a strong conceptualism does not require that a specific empirical concept is known 
in order for objects of that kind to be perceived (although such a concept would be required for it to 
be recognised as an instance of that concept), just that some empirical concepts are needed in order 
for perceptual experience to be possible (here ‘object’, ‘red’, ‘spherical’ etc.).  
It is thus open to the conceptualist interpreter of Kant to claim that the example of the 
‘savage’ does not undermine the necessity of conceptual capacities for perceptual experience. It 
does however require explanation: if not to affirm the independence of (allegedly) non-conceptual 
intuitional contents from our conceptual capacities, then just what is Kant getting at here? The clue 
is in the first sentence of the quotation, that in every cognition we must distinguish between matter 
(the object/referent) and form (the way in which we cognise the object, its mode of presentation). 
What Kant is stressing is the relational nature of intuition: the way in which – despite the lacking 
the concept ‘house’ – the ‘savage’s’ perceptual experience still relates him to the same object (the 
 Indeed, Kant presumably must not rule out such a possibility if the ‘savage’ in question is going to be 46
classifiable as rational. Hanna thus calls this an example of “local very strong nonconceptuality” to 
distinguish from the ‘global’ non-conceptuality of a non-rational animal (2005, 262).
Sam Matthews  of 104 200 19 September 2019
house itself). But then why does he say the relation here is merely intuitional? As we saw in the 
previous chapter, concepts for Kant can be used in one of two different ways: to either unify 
synthetically (in recognition) or to unify analytically (in judgment). In the context of the Logic it 
seems clear that Kant is using ‘concept’ in this quotation in the second of these two senses, in terms 
of an explicit judgment (i.e. that there is a house in the distance). So when he says that for the 
‘savage’ the form of the cognition is merely intuitional, he need not be seen as denying that some 
concepts are at play synthetically in intuition by means of recognition, but merely that the object is 
not explicitly represented as falling under the specific concept ‘house’ in judgment. 
This seems to be confirmed by Kant’s distinction in the same section of the Logic between 
intellectual (or conceptual) and sensible distinctness. While the first kind of distinctness rests on the 
“analysis of the concept in regard to the manifold that lies contained within it” – i.e. knowing the 
characteristic ‘marks’ or properties that an object must have in order to fall under that concept – the 
second, “consists in the consciousness of the manifold in intuition” (1992, 546; emphasis added). 
Of such sensible distinctness, he gives the example of looking at the night’s sky: 
I see the Milky Way as a whitish streak, for example; the light rays from the individual stars 
located in it must necessarily have entered my eye. But the representation of this was merely 
clear, and it becomes distinct only through the telescope, because then I glimpse the 
individual stars contained in the Milky Way. 
(ibid, 546) 
Despite being merely ‘intuitional’, Kant’s perceptual experience here is still clearly an instance of 
conceptual capacities in operation, an instance of his recognising that the collection of objects 
above him is the Milky Way (albeit in an indistinct way since he is unable to see the individual 
objects that make it up). Similarly, looking through the telescope he still recognises the star as a 
star. The point is rather that the distinctness involved here is different to the ‘intellectual’ 
distinctness of judgment, where the star would be explicitly represented as falling under the 
concept. In the same way, the ‘savage’ would still see the house as something or other in an 
indistinct way (i.e. it would be passively recognised as something), but it would be without 
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‘conceptual’ distinctness in the sense that Kant is using that term here, as it would not be explicitly 
represented as falling under a concept in a judgment. 
Nothing, therefore, about the savage example requires us to give up a strong conceptualism, 
either as a philosophical position or as a reading of Kant. Nonetheless, the temptation on the 
conceptualist side has been to explain the content of the ‘savage’s’ perceptual experience in terms of 
intuitions that are ‘merely categorically unified’, in a way that parallels McDowell’s response to his 
similar phenomenological worry above. The thought is that, by picturing the contents of perceptual 
experience in terms of merely what is provided for by the categories, they can do justice to both 
Kant’s argument for the necessity of conceptual synthesis while also going some way in 
accommodating the phenomenological point that the non-conceptualist trades on. On such a picture, 
following the propositions put forth by Kant in the Axioms of Intuition and the Analogies of 
Experience, we could see this base level of content in terms of casually related (ibid, A189/B232) 
substances enduring through time (ibid, A182/B224) that have extensive magnitudes (ibid, A162/
B202) and that “can be perceived in space as simultaneous with each other” (ibid, A211/B256). We 
could guarantee the ‘savage’ would thus see the house at the very least as an extended object, 
enduring through time, casually related to the things that surround it.  47
Griffith, for instance, argues that we know on the basis of what Kant says about the ‘savage’ 
that perceptual synthesis is not always “governed by an empirical synthesis,” but that since we 
know from the Deduction that perception requires some synthesis, there must at least be a synthesis 
in terms of the categories (2010, 204). Thus, he argues, “in perception, the particular will be 
represented as having features common to all spatiotemporal objects, e.g. appearing as a distinct 
 Even outside of this contemporary debate, this is quite a common way of interpreting Kant’s account of 47
perceptual experience. Pippin, for example, argues that in the Deduction Kant “wants to claim that 
conforming to the intuitional constraints of sensibility itself requires a minimal conceptualization” (Pippin 
1989, 30). While Sellars writes that “Kant's thesis, like the Aristotelian, clearly requires the existence of 
perceptual this-suches which are limited in their content to what is ‘perceptible’ in a very tough sense of this 
term (the ‘proper sensibles’). It requires the existence of completely determinate ‘basic’ perceptual this-
suches” (1968, 7).
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figure extended in space at a particular location” (ibid, 215). This is, of course, almost identical to 
McDowell’s new position, as we saw above, although this time with the minimal level of content 
seemingly guaranteed by the transcendental necessity of the categories. Indeed, Griffith is clear that 
he sees such minimal content as playing the same passive role that McDowell does, allowing us to 
avoid a picture of belief generation: 
Importantly, it is not that in empirical perception we think or judge that the particular is thus 
and such a height or thus and such a distance from myself, rather, in perception, what is 
represented has the appearance it does in virtue of having its manifold be synthesised 
according to a category; an appearance which can be (but is not yet) measured, judged, or 
quantified. 
(ibid, 215) 
The passive synthesis or schematisation of the categories is thus supposed to form an independent 
layer of perceptual experience that can be used as the ground of subsequent judgment (although he 
does not rule out that such synthesis could be governed by an empirical concept). 
Similarly, Connolly argues that while phenomenological proofs like the ‘savage’ count 
against strong conceptualism and a rich perceptual content, they do not speak against a weak 
conceptualism and a minimal perceptual content characterised in terms of the categories. Indeed, 
Connolly’s position is stronger than Griffith’s, for according to Connolly, the application of 
empirical concepts is always a judgment made on the basis of the prior schematisation of 
appearance by the categories:  
Our empirical concepts classify appearances posterior to appearances. When you look at a 
house and form the judgment that the object is a house, for instance, you employ your 
empirical concepts of an object and a house. All this is consistent with the traditional view. 
But what Kant’s view adds is that this conceptualization is actually a reconceptualization, not 
of another belief…, but of your appearance. The house appears to you only after the 
appearance is structured by the categories. 
(2014, 332) 
Here the application of empirical concepts is modelled on inference, where, on the basis of certain 
spatial and temporal properties, I am able to infer that what I see is an instance of a particular.  The 
problem with this stronger ‘inferential’ position is that it seems to mischaracterise the 
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phenomenology of perceptual experience. For typically in perceptual experience – at least in all but 
the most uncertain of circumstances – we do not consciously infer on the basis of certain visual 
properties that an object is an instance of a certain kind; if we have the requisite conceptual 
capacity, we simply recognise it as an instance of the kind of thing it is. Heidegger makes this point 
when talking about the perceptual experience of the lectern in one of his lectures. It is not as if upon 
walking into the class room “I first of all see intersecting brown surfaces, which then reveal 
themselves to me as a box, then as a desk, then as an academic lecturing desk, a lectern, so that I 
attach lectern-hood to the box like a label… I see the lectern in one fell swoop” (Heidegger 2008, 
56-7). Connolly’s position would be less jarring if the whole point of restricting the conceptual 
content of perceptual experience – i.e. of advocating weak conceptualism over strong – was not 
itself made to accommodate a phenomenological point (i.e. the perceptual experience of the 
‘savage’ and similar examples). As it stands, Connolly is led to distort our everyday experience of 
perceptual experience in order to accommodate the phenomenology of what is clearly quite an 
extreme (and hypothetical) situation. 
Leaving aside this phenomenological problem, the main issue with ‘categorical 
conceptualism’ is that the categories are incapable, in principle, of articulating perceptual 
experience in the way that the account requires. For while it is true that for Kant the categories 
articulate the ‘concept of an object in general’ (i.e. the form that something must have in order to be 
an object for thought), they are nonetheless completely indeterminate when it comes to the objects 
of empirical intuition. This point is made most clearly in the A Deduction when Kant talks about 
this necessary unity in terms of the ‘transcendental object’, the mere idea of the unity of an object in 
terms of which our empirical intuitions are united (“something as such = x”) (1996, A104). As he 
explains: 
The pure concept of this transcendental object (which is actually always the same, = x in all 
our cognitions) is what is able to provide all our empirical concepts in general with 
reference to an object, i.e. with objective reality. Now this cannot contain any determinate 
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intuition whatever, and hence presumably pertains to nothing but that unity that must be 
encountered in any manifold of cognition insofar as this manifold has reference to an object. 
This reference, however, is nothing but the necessary unity of consciousness, and hence also 
of the synthesis of the manifold brought about through the mind’s concerted function of 
combining this manifold in one presentation. 
 (1996, A109; emphasis added) 
The necessary unity that the categories provide is what allows our empirical concepts to make 
reference to an object, but this unity itself cannot determine intuition by itself. That is to say, 
although the fact that the categories articulate the form that any object of intuition must have – such 
that any empirical object must conform to this unity (i.e. be determined in terms of the categories) – 
they are not, in the absence of an empirical concept, able to determine the particular way in which 
the content of that experience should be articulated (see Guyer 1990b, 229). 
This is clear from the structure of the threefold synthesis that we saw in the previous chapter. 
The first two syntheses (apprehension and reproduction) are dependent upon my being able to 
recognise this particular object as the same as the moment before. Yet picking one object out of the 
environment in this way requires empirical concepts to be at play, i.e. a rule by which we are able to 
identify perceptually an object not only as an instance of a kind, but as the same instance over time. 
What the categories express is simply the necessary unity that such a rule must display. Kant 
explains this using the example of a triangle: 
[W]hen we think of a triangle as an object, we do so by being conscious of the assembly of 
three straight lines according to the rule whereby such an intuition can always be exhibited. 
Now this unity of the rule determines all that is manifold, and limits it to conditions that 
make possible the unity of apperception. And the concept of this unity is the presentation of 
the object = x, i.e. the object that I think through the mentioned predicates of a triangle. 
(1996, A105) 
It is the subject’s capacity to recognise triangles that allows this particular object to be recognised as 
an instance of the concept, not the prior articulation of the manifold by the categories. For while the 
categories that guarantee that any unification of the manifold in terms of such a rule must have 
certain formal characteristics (extended, causally-related etc.), it is only because such empirical 
concepts are at play that we are able to recognise the object’s particular extension and substantiality 
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– as something that stands out against the background environment – and so its causal relations to 
other objects. In other words, the problem for the categorical conceptualists is that “the necessary 
causal structure of our sensibility is entirely general in nature, leaving the specific causes of events 
undetermined” (Bauer 2012, 231). Kant’s aim in the Deduction is thus not to imply that perceptual 
experience requires no empirical concepts at all, but rather to show that whatever empirical 
concepts are at play will pick out – or ‘unify’ – objects in a way that makes them potential objects 
for thought and judgment. 
This point is also confirmed in the chapter on schematism where Kant points out that both 
pure and empirical concepts are schematised (i.e. passively pulled into operation) in perceptual 
experience.  He points out, for instance, that in order for me to judge that the object in front of me 48
is an instance of the concept dog “my imagination [must be able to] trace [verzeichnen (pre-figure)] 
the shape of such a four-footed animal in a general way, i.e., without being limited to any single and 
particular shape offered to me by experience” (ibid, A140/B180). The mere image of a particular 
dog would never be able to be the ground of a judgment that what one is faced with is a dog, since it 
is too particular (i.e. from this angle in this lighting) and could never match the universality of the 
concept. What forms the ground of our judgment that something is a dog is our recognition of it as 
such (at least in a veridical case). If only the categories were at play in perceptual experience, no 
such perceptual judgment would be possible – the best we could do is infer from this base level of 
content in the problematic way that Connolly suggests. 
 Makreel has questioned whether Kant means empirical concepts to have schemata at all, arguing that 48
“[t]he schema of a pure sensible concept, such as of a figure in space, is not to be confused with an image of 
an empirical concept” (1990, 30-3). Kant, however, is clear that empirical concepts have schemata. He 
writes, for instance, that “an object of experience or an image thereof [is never] adequate to the empirical 
concept; rather, that concept always refers directly to the schema of the imagination, this schema being a rule 
for determining our intuition in accordance with such and such a general concept [e.g.]...the concept 
dog” (1996, A141/B180). A likely reason for Makkreel’s error here is Vaihinger’s suggested substitution in 
the Akademie edition of ‘reproductive’ for ‘productive’ in Kant’s statement that the “the [empirical] image 
is... a product of the productive imagination” (ibid, A141/B181; see Pluhar’s translators note). However, as 
Pluhar writes, this substitution is not present in the original text and obscures the way that “the productive 
imagination... also has an empirical use” (ibid, A141/B181n).
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Indeed, Kant’s argument is not only that such empirical schematism is possible, but that it is 
a condition of possibility of there being a visual image in perceptual experience: 
The image is a product of the productive imagination’s empirical ability. A schema of 
sensible concepts (such as the concepts of figures in space) is a product and, as it were, a 
monogram of the pure a priori imagination through which, and according to which, images 
become possible in the first place. But the images must always be connected with the 
concept only by means of the schema that they designate; in themselves the images are 
never completely congruent with the concept. 
(ibid, A142/B181) 
Images are always images of something or other. A mass of chromatic sensation is no more an 
image than static noise is a sentence. So interpreting an appearance as the ‘visual image’ of an 
actual triangle requires that concept to already be at play. We already need to recognise (i.e. 
schematise) something as a triangle for us to interpret its particular appearance, i.e. from this angle 
at this time etc., as an image of a triangle.  
This, however, is not the case with the categories, which according to Kant are unable to 
produce an image at all: “A schema of a pure concept of understanding... is something that one 
cannot bring to any image whatsoever. Such a schema is, rather, only the pure synthesis conforming 
to a rule, expressed by the category, of unity according to concepts as such” (ibid). This was the 
source of the problem that Hume highlighted in the Enquiry, namely that there is no rational ground 
for applying metaphysical concepts like ‘causality’ and ‘substance’ to appearances, since there is 
nothing directly corresponding to them in our perceptual experience (e.g. 2007, 69). Kant’s problem 
then, having shown (against Hume) that the synthesis and application of such metaphysical 
conceptual capacities is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, is to explain how it 
is that we are able to judge in terms of them, i.e. to answer the question of what in perceptual 
experience is able to act as the ground for our judgment that things are, say, causally related.  
Kant’s suggestion is that time, as the form of inner sense, plays this role – being both 
homogenous with appearance and being based on an a priori rule – with the schematism of the 
categories made possible in terms of “a priori time determinations according to rules” (1996, A145/
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B184). Thus, the schema of substance becomes the “permanence of the real in time,” causality “the 
manifold’s succession,” etc. (ibid, A144-5/B183). Yet this synthesis in terms of time determinations 
does not by itself produce any image, it rather demarcates the form of recognition as such, by 
articulating the ways in which each moment of recognition can be connected to the next. The mere 
temporal connection of one moment to the next is not itself of anything, however, and so cannot be 
constitutive (by itself) of perceptual experience.  49
Connolly anticipates this objection – i.e. “that the operation of a priori concepts in 
perception requires the operation of certain empirical concepts” (2012, 324) – and suggests that he 
can accommodate the point so long as he makes ‘two restrictions’: 
First, the empirical concepts allowed must be restricted to a single token concept: the 
concept of an object. Second, the concept of an object needs to be deployed multiple times. 
We can allow that the category of plurality requires the deployment of empirical concepts, 
as long as we hold that it is the same empirical concept (the concept of an object) that we 
deploy multiple times: once for the chimney, and again for the roof, and a third time for the 
door, and so on. 
(ibid) 
Such a response seems unsatisfactory. Firstly, such a basic concept would leave undetermined how 
we can pick out these particular bits of the house as objects – separating the chimney from the roof, 
for instance, seems to require empirical concepts beyond just ‘object’. Secondly, it is not clear that 
the concept of an object can be an empirical concept for Kant. Rather, as we have seen in the 
account of the ‘transcendental object’ above, it articulates the necessary unity of the manifold in 
terms of which the recognition of something as something is made possible. But it was precisely 
 Indeed, this point is made throughout the Principles. For instance, in the Axioms Kant states that the 49
principle maintains that “appearances can be apprehended only through the assembly of what is homogenous 
and the consciousness of the synthetic unity of this manifold (this manifold homogenous [sic])” (ibid, B202). 
Yet recognition of something as homogenous is precisely what requires empirical concepts. This is made 
even more explicitly in the case of the Anticipations where Kant writes that “there is something in 
appearances that is never cognised a priori and that hence amounts to the proper difference between 
empirical and a priori cognition: viz., sensation (as the matter of perception)” (ibid, A167/B209). Thus, when 
he states that the principle of the Analogies of Experience is that “[e]xperience is possible only through the 
presentation of a necessary connection of perceptions” (Kant 1996, A176/B218), it is clear that just what 
‘necessary connections’ these are will depend on the empirical content of those perceptions. As Kant writes 
the Analogies thus have “the peculiarity that they do not consider appearances and the synthesis of their 
empirical intuition, but consider merely [the appearances’] existence [in general] and their relation to each 
other in regard to that existence” (ibid, A178/B220; emphasis added).
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this that the strong conceptualist account says requires empirical concepts. Thirdly, if it is such an 
empirical concept (i.e. and so distinct from Kant’s ‘transcendental object’) – perhaps closer to the 
concept of body (Kant 1996, A106) – then the restriction seems entirely ad hoc and we seem to be 
back in McDowell’s position of being unable to give a justification for why certain concepts and not 
others get to qualify as a base layer of content. 
Much like McDowell, Connolly seems to imply that this restriction is required to account 
for the phenomenological point that the non-conceptualists make. He argues that “[w]hile they have 
shown that according to Kant, we can see a chimney without seeing it as a chimney, they have not 
shown that he permits that we can see a chimney without seeing it as an object” (2012, 325). But 
once we have allowed that empirical concepts are necessary for perceptual experience there are no 
grounds for making such a restriction. All that the point requires is that the subject must have some 
empirical concepts such that they can identify that there is something or other over there. But just 
what these concepts are is an empirical matter. For while it may emerge – say as a result of 
historical or psychological enquiry – that certain empirical concepts are in fact taken as basic in all 
times and places, it is still the case that we have no grounds for establishing just what concepts they 
will be prior to experience.  50
4. Perceptual Relativity 
Of course, even if there are no transcendental grounds for establishing a base level of content, it is 
still open to proponents of such a view to simply stipulate a base level of propositionally-structured 
content. Perhaps it is thought that the phenomenology of the imagined shared perceptual experience 
simply demands that there is such a base level – McDowell’s ‘what we see of what we see’ – even if 
we are unable in every instance to cash out what exactly that content is. The problem with this 
 See e.g. Spelke’s ‘Principles of Object Perception’ (1990) for an example of such an empirical study.50
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position – besides its arbitrariness – is that the phenomenological and psychological evidence points 
to the fact that contents at the level of the common and proper sensibles are not independent of our 
recognitional capacities. What we recognise as object as has the potential to change these 
supposedly independent perceptual contents. 
The phenomenon of colour constancy makes this point clearly. For any given object there is 
an apparent colour and constant colour. Apparent colour refers to the way, say, a piece of paper 
appears grey in the shade of the office, but appears bright white when it is taken outside. Constant 
colour refers to what we would call the ‘real colour’ of the object. That is, we do not think that the 
paper ‘really’ changes colour as we take it outside, it just manifests the apparent colour that an 
object that shade of white would, if put into bright sunlight.  Colour constancy refers to this ability 51
to attribute a permanent colour to an object despite its changing appearance. This in itself is not a 
problem for an account that sees the minimal content of perceptual experience as objective. Part of 
what it means for the cardinal to appear in terms of the proper sensible ‘red’ is for it to look a 
variety of ways in a variety of conditions. That is, it is a colour that belongs to the object, not just 
the contingent way it appears to the subject in that moment (at least if that is what McDowell means 
then it is unclear how such proper sensibles could be seen as placing the world in view). 
The issue is that the constant colour that we attribute to an object will depend in part upon 
what object it appears to us to be – upon what Cassirer calls its ‘point of reference’. As he writes: 
If the thing that bears a certain colour is taken as this point of reference [e.g. a red cardinal], 
the recognition and representation may be said to follow the guidance of the thing. A 
constant colour is imputed as a permanent attribute to the constant object – and all colour 
phenomena [i.e. apparent colour] have only the one meaning and the one function of 
representing this attribute for us, of serving as a sign for it. Accordingly we disregard the 
change in lighting effects and regard only the permanent colour of the object. But as soon as 
 In this sense constant colour is not, strictly speaking, something seen; it describes a function that has many 51
possible apparent manifestations depending on background conditions. No apparent colour is the ‘true’ 
colour of the object any more than one point on a parabolic curve could be said to describe the ‘true’ value of 
the function. The picture being advocated here can be seen as an instance of colour relationalism: “[T]he 
thesis that yellow is not an intrinsic property of bananas and lemons but actually a relation that involves the 
fruit, the seer, and the ambient conditions” (Chirimuuta 2015, 6).
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this purpose and point of view are changed, the total face of the colour phenomenon changes 
with them. 
(1957, 138) 
We can imagine a situation like this in the case of the cardinal. Say I live in an area where albino 
cardinals are the norm due to some selection mechanism favouring them (perhaps they blend in 
better with the snow) such that I am unaware that normal red cardinals even exist. In such 
circumstances it is conceivable that when a red cardinal lands in my garden it appears to me to be a 
white cardinal in odd lighting conditions (my neighbour playing his usual tricks in order to fool the 
local philosophers). Yet to a visitor from Chicago, it just looks (rightly) like a red cardinal. 
There are even more extreme examples in the case of colour. One of the most impressive of 
these is the so-called Land effect, where a picture composed purely of different shades of one hue of 
colour will be recognised as displaying a variety of different colours depending on the objects that it 
depicts. For example, a picture of a bunch of bananas that is composed purely of different shades of 
blue-purple will still appear yellow, even though the image itself does not contain any of that colour. 
The recognition of the object as a banana overrides the supposedly independent base level of 
content despite the fact that when viewed in isolation – i.e. when the context of it being an image of 
a bunch of bananas is removed – the colour of the image is clearly blue-purple. The point of such 
examples is that the perception of colour is not an isolated element in perceptual experience, but 
rather “part of an overall best interpretation of the scene” (Chirimuuta 2015, 83). 
Such examples are not limited to colour phenomena. Cassirer’s example of such a shift in 
point of reference is of walking down a forest path and having what initially had the appearance of 
white split lime in the shade of the tree, reveal itself to be in fact grey-brown earth lit up by sunlight 
shining through the gaps in the canopy above. Here we can see that the way that the object is 
recognised – as lime or as light – “drives the purely optical phenomenon into very definite channels. 
In one case the optical phenomenon is used as a representation of a thing-attribute context, in the 
other as a representation of a causal context: in the one case it symbolises a substantial reality (the 
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reality of the spot), in another a light reflection as a momentary effect” (1957, 138). Here not only 
the perceived colour shifts based on the object ostensibly recognised, but the categorical content 
itself changes as well (i.e. the content at the level of common sensibles).  Indeed, as Chirimuuta 52
shows, such spatial contents are so intimately related to colour contents that it is not feasible to see 
them as making independent contributions to perceptual experience (2015, 70). 
Further examples can be found in the phenomenon of ‘optical inversion’ where “[o]ne and 
the same optical complex can be transformed now into this, now into that spatial object, can be 
‘seen’ as this or as another object” (1957, 158). Although two dimensional examples of this 
phenomena (such as Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit) do not involve such shifts in categorical content, 
the three dimensional versions invariably do (e.g. the hollow face illusion), since the ostensible 
potential causal relations of such objects are dependent on the particular space they are recognised 
as occupying. Here again, as Cassirer writes, “it is confirmed that a change in sight changes the 
perceptive content, that every shift in viewpoint transforms the pure phenomenal facticity of the 
thing seen” (ibid, 158) 
The details in each case are irrelevant of course: the point is that, insofar as we are talking of 
‘what we see of what we see’ standing as a ground for a subject’s judgment (i.e. something they 
could refer to in order to justify their belief that something is the case), they cannot come apart from 
our recognitional capacities. In other words, each level of perceptual experience should be seen as 
interrelated with every other level. There is no aspect of perceptual experience that can be 
transcendentally guaranteed as common between two observers, no independent level ‘out of 
which’ objects are recognised as something or other (‘carved’ as McDowell puts it). ‘Visual looks’ 
are always relative to a ‘point of reference’ (i.e. what is recognised) rather than something that 
stands before us context-free – a situation that Cassirer describes as the ‘symbolic pregnance’ of 
 It is worth noting that such examples would count against Kant on the categorical minimalist 52
interpretation, since they show that categories alone do not determine categorical content. This is not an issue 
for the account I am advocating, since how the categories are schematised will depend on the way in which 
objects are recognised in the environment.
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perceptual experience (1957, 202). Whatever answer there is going to be to the phenomenological 
problem of ‘shared perceptual experience’, it is not going to be solved by positing a constitutive 
base layer of contents.  
It can be tempting to use this relativity of perceptual content as a basis for undermining the 
idea that the world is everything that is the case. That is, it can seem that if the content of perceptual 
experience is relative to our ‘factical’ situation – i.e. the capacities we have, the contextual 
information we are aware of, our pragmatic concerns etc. – the world must exceed any particular 
way of categorising it. Indeed, Wrathall makes precisely this argument when discussing the path 
example above:  53
Such experiences call into question the idea that there is an objective, stable, determinate 
perceptual world. If we suppose that there is an indefinite number of meanings to which we 
could be attuned, and we recognise that different attunements will result in different 
experiences of the perceptual field, then we will have to conclude that there is no final, 
objective fact of the matter about what is given to us in perception…. This means that the 
world must be something more than all that is the case; it must be rather a setting: ‘the world 
is not a sum of things which might always be called into question, but the inexhaustible 
reservoir from which things are taken’. 
(Wrathall 2010, 69) 
The key problem here is that the argument makes a leap from the idea that there is no fact of the 
matter when it comes to what Wrathall calls the ‘perceptual world’, i.e. the content of perceptual 
experience, to the idea that the same applies to the world as such. But no such move is warranted. 
The fact that I see spilt lime while my companion sees light on the earth does not change the fact 
that I am wrong if I accept things as being the way they appear to me. So while there is no fact of 
the matter about what is ‘given in perceptual experience’, in the sense that we cannot assume a base 
level of content, there is a fact of the matter when it comes to the way the world is. It is not as if the 
world itself is relative to what I am able to recognise (if it were, we would be back spinning in the 
 The example that Wrathall cites is taken from Merleau-Ponty (2012, 310), but it is almost identical to the 53
example that Cassirer gives in the Philosophy of the Symbolic Forms that was cited above. Indeed, this is no 
coincidence since, as Matherne (2014) argues, Cassirer was a key source for the Phenomenology of 
Perception. 
Sam Matthews  of 117 200 19 September 2019
void). The relevant normative standard is still what is the case, whether I am equipped to recognise 
it as being that way or not.  
Even if we restrict ourselves to non-deceptive cases, the fact that there is a potentially 
infinite number of ways that we could recognise things as being still does not require giving up the 
idea that the world is what is the case. For we can accommodate this quite easily by saying that all 
that is the case always outstrips our recognitional capacities. Again, this does not mean that the 
content of perceptual experience exceeds what we are able to recognise, rather the point is that there 
is always more in any environment that we could recognise – that is there to be seen if we only had 
the capacity in question (or were not so distracted, had the relevant contextual information etc.). 
5. Conclusion 
In his essay ‘Kant and Nonconceptual Content’, Hanna suggests that the weakness of the 
conceptualist reading of Kant is that it cannot account for the phenomenal character of objects in 
space and time “because the purely logico-rational features of cognitive content, as purely logical 
and rational in character, are of course thereby also non-phenomenal in character” (2005, 280). As 
we have seen, the drive towards perceptual minimalism seems in many cases an attempt to 
overcome this apparent phenomenal lack as we have seen. Such accounts talk about our richer 
conceptual capacities ‘shaping’, ‘tracing’, and ‘carving’ the lower level, or indeed the lower level 
itself ‘shaping’ some even more basic sensory content, such that our perceptual awareness is, in 
some sense, constituted by a literal synthesis of this more basic layer into a sort of topological map 
of the environment. The general picture is one of what DeVries describes as a ‘sensory clay’, albeit 
one that is conceptually formed – a base level of sensory material that is supposed to account for the 
phenomenal character of perceptual experience (2011, §29). 
Sam Matthews  of 118 200 19 September 2019
I think that it is clear that, far from a weakness, the great strength of the recognitional 
account is precisely its transparency with regard to the phenomenal contents of perceptual 
experience. What is being temporally synthesised is not some phenomenal data received by the 
senses that forms part of the content of that experience, but rather our recognition of the object that 
our senses puts us in contact with as something or other. That is, the threefold synthesis connects 
this moment of recognition to the next. It does not need to shape or carve bits of sensibility in a 
quasi-psychology of perceptual experience. What we are looking for is an answer to the question of 
how it is that what we perceive can provide us with grounds for belief, not to give an account of 
visual processing. That task is one for the empirical sciences and will turn on the sensory and 
neurological machinery of the kind of rational animal in question.  
Nonetheless, we seem to be faced with a problem here. For if this chapter is right in 
suggesting that the passive operation of empirical conceptual capacities is a condition of the 
possibility of perceptual experience, then we seem to be unable to explain how it is that perceptual 
experience can get off the ground in the first place (what this thesis will call ‘the bootstrap 
problem’). The next chapter will attempt to address both of these issues. 
Sam Matthews  of 119 200 19 September 2019
4. The Bootstrap Problem: 
The Origin of Empirical Concepts 
This chapter will address what will be called ‘the bootstrap problem’, namely how it is that we can 
come to have empirical conceptual capacities if they originate from the very same experience that 
they make possible. The great advantage of the minimalist accounts that were discussed in the 
previous chapter is that, if we can guarantee a base level of content – be that in terms of common 
and proper sensibles or the schematisation of pure concepts – then we can easily explain the origin 
of empirical concepts in terms of a process of abstraction from that base layer. However, the last 
chapter showed that the identification of such a level was not possible. The pure concepts only 
describe the form of the recognition of an object of perceptual experience and not its content, while 
common and proper sensibles could not be isolated from the richer conceptual content that they 
were supposed to provide a ground for.  
In the absence of such a base level of content we therefore need to find an alternative solution 
to the origin of empirical concepts if we are to avoid a paradox. The obvious place to start with this, 
given that this issue arises from a reading of the A Deduction, is via Kant’s discussion of the topic. 
As we will see, however, neither his discussion of the origin of empirical concepts in the Logic nor 
in the Critique of Judgment are able to help solve the bootstrap problem, since both accounts 
presuppose some level of empirical content. This seems to leave us with two options: we either give 
up the claim that empirical concepts are necessary for perceptual experience, or the claim that all 
empirical concepts are drawn from such experience. The first approach is taken by Ginsborg, who 
argues that we should see empirical concept formation as the result of the psychological activity of 
the imagination that is understood as primitively normative. The problem with this approach is that 
it involves separating the activity of the imagination from our recognitional capacities in a way that 
was ruled out in chapter two. Instead, it will be suggested that we take the second option and reject 
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the idea that we need see all empirical concepts as originating from perceptual experience as such. 
Although this might seem to imply innate concepts, the account given here will suggest that we see 
rational capacities as emerging from non-rational dispositions obtained prior to the formation of 
perceptual experience proper. 
The chapter will be split in to six sections. The first section will define the bootstrap problem 
itself and look at Kant’s account of empirical concept formation in terms of abstraction. It will be 
suggested that abstraction fails to solve the bootstrap problem as it presupposes empirical content 
thorough the subject’s need to identify the objects to be compared. The second section will then 
look at Kant’s account of reflective judgment in the Critique of Judgment which also seems to 
promise to offer an account of the origin of empirical concepts. It quickly becomes clear, however, 
that reflective judgment is not proposed as a solution to the bootstrap problem as such, but is 
instead an account of concept formation once things are already off the ground. 
Nonetheless, Ginsborg suggests that Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment can serve as a 
model for the process of empirical concept formation despite being a form of reflective judgment, 
and it is her account that will be the focus of sections three and four. Essentially, Ginsborg’s 
argument is that the only way to solve the bootstrap problem is to posit a level of pre-conceptual 
awareness made possible by the synthetic activity of the imagination. The idea is that this activity 
can then form the basis of our empirical conceptual capacities through our taking it to be 
‘exemplary’ of a specific rule. It will be suggested that there are two key problems with this 
approach. First, by picturing the activity of the imagination in terms of a shaping of sensory 
consciousness, the account makes it difficult to see how we can understand the world bearing on 
thought. Second, it will be suggested that an awareness of the psychological activity of the 
imagination itself presupposes empirical concepts. 
 The fifth section will then present an alternative solution to the bootstrap problem by 
suggesting that we should see the process of concept acquisition in terms of acts of learning. 
Sam Matthews  of 121 200 19 September 2019
Initially these take the form of a process of mimicry where a child acquires dispositions that mimic 
fully-fledged rational capacities, before being transformed into rational capacities through the 
subject’s taking a critical attitude towards them (i.e. through the recognition that such capacities 
manifest a norm). In this way, instead of being drawn from perceptual experience as such, our initial 
conceptual capacities can be seen as emerging from the dispositions conform with a shared practice 
that we acquire before that experience has emerged. The final section will then defend this account 
against a worry about supernaturalism via a discussion of McDowell’s account of Bildung. 
1. The Bootstrap Problem 
The last chapter suggested that it was not possible to identify a base level of content in perceptual 
experience. The most we could say in an ‘a priori’ manner about empirical perceptual experience is 
that it must take the form of the recognition of something as something, but the actual content of 
such awareness in a given situation is not something that can be determined beforehand. In 
particular, it was suggested that pure concepts of the understanding would not be able to provide us 
with such a base layer of contents. Such concepts merely provide us with the concept of an object in 
general, i.e. the form of the recognition of an object of perceptual experience, Kant’s ‘something as 
such = x’. Just what is recognised – the contents of perceptual experience – depends on the 
empirical concepts that the subject has at her disposal.  
Indeed, as we saw in chapter two, in the absence of empirical concepts the threefold synthesis 
would not be possible, since we would lack that in terms of which the reproduction of previous 
moments of recognition could be united. To have the perceptual experience of an object as an object 
requires recognising it as the same object that we were confronted with a moment before (i.e. as a 
substance). This can only happen in terms of some concept or set of concepts, that is, in terms of a 
general representation that unites the present moment of recognition with all those that preceded it 
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as in some sense ‘the same’. Being aware of a bit of wax as a single object, one that was once solid 
but now liquid, is not something that is merely given in experience, but requires knowing the kind 
of thing that wax is: something that will melt when hot, that continues to exist in its liquid state, 
something separate from the wooden container in which it sits. The mere form of an object in 
general cannot make such distinctions by itself. Just what gets to count as an object, in other words, 
is not something a priori concepts can articulate by themselves. In order for a subject to be aware of 
a potential, determinate object of judgment, empirical concepts must be at play: they are a 
necessary element of perceptual experience. If there were no empirical concepts at play there would 
be no perceptual experience, no awareness of things as things.  
So long as we start from what Ameriks characterises as the regressive starting point – namely 
‘at a level no lower than the core perceptual judgments’ – and then ask after the conditions of the 
possibility of such judgments, then the fact that empirical concepts form such a condition will not 
strike us as necessarily problematic (see chapter two). Such a starting point is, as it were, static. It 
starts from a position where empirical concepts are already at play and so taken for granted in the 
explanation that follows. Nonetheless, once we start thinking genetically, in terms of the origin of 
such empirical concepts, we seem to be unable to make sense of their possibility. For if empirical 
concepts, qua empirical, must have their origin in experience, and yet are a condition of the 
possibility of that experience, we seem to be left with a paradox (we seem to need to ‘pull ourselves 
up by our own bootstraps’ as it were).  
In Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity, Wolff gives a clear explanation of this ‘bootstrap’ 
problem for Kant’s account. As he writes, 
Kant appears to be caught in the assertion that something can be the cause of itself. He claims 
that the unity of consciousness, and thereby consciousness itself, is possible only through the 
application to the given manifold of the pure concept of an object = x. But this pure concept, 
as it has no content itself, must work by means of an empirical concept, such as ‘body’. Now 
empirical concepts are formed, according to Kant, by abstracting certain common 
characteristics from experience and putting them together into a class notion. This can only be 
done after I am conscious, presumably. So it would appear that empirical concepts are 
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ingredients in the very mental activity (unification of consciousness) whereby they first 
become possible. They both precede and depend upon consciousness. 
(Wolff 1963, 118: emphasis added) 
Allison calls this problem ‘devastating’ for the account being advocated here (1968, 180n). For if it 
is true that empirical concepts can only be formed ‘by abstracting certain common characteristics 
from experience and putting them together into a class notion’, and that experience itself depends 
on the application of such concepts, then this does indeed seem to require that empirical concepts 
are in some sense causa sui, for they seem to depend on themselves for their own existence – they 
make possible the experience from which they are abstracted. But of course this is no explanation 
whatsoever, for if the concept is already at play in experience then it cannot have its origin in such 
abstraction. 
Indeed, this issue is apparent in Kant’s own account of empirical concept formation in the 
Logic: 
To make concepts out of representations one must thus be able to compare, to reflect, and to 
abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal 
conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever. I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a 
linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from 
one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that 
which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves, and I 
abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree. 
(Kant 1992, §6) 
The circularity here is threefold. Firstly, the account clearly relies on our being aware of 
determinate perceptual objects. If we were not already aware of the spruce, willow, and linden as 
things, it is unclear what sense could be made of ‘comparison’ (for what would we be comparing?). 
As we saw in the first chapter, this awareness requires empirical concepts to be already in play, and 
so is going to be unable to explain the origin of such capacities.  
Secondly, reflection on and recognition of the common characteristics of the objects 
compared requires the subject already to have at least those conceptual capacities (e.g. trunk, leaves, 
branches). For unless the subject has at least some such concepts in terms of which the objects can 
Sam Matthews  of 124 200 19 September 2019
be recognised as similar, reflection would be futile; there would be nothing in terms of which such a 
relation could be established. Perhaps this could account for the formation of some concepts once 
things are off the ground. The fact that a subject already has concepts for ‘trunk’, ‘leaves’, and 
‘branches’, could potentially allow her to obtain the concept for tree in the manner that seems to be 
suggested by Kant (although see the next paragraph), however, at a certain point the subject will 
already have to have empirical concepts in terms of which the reflection on similarity can take 
place, and so once again the process shows itself unable to account for the origin of empirical 
concepts. 
Thirdly, the selection of just these objects seems to presuppose a tacit understanding of them 
as already in some way similar. As Sigwart argues: 
[T]he process [of abstraction] presupposes that the series of objects to be compared is already 
in some way determined, and a tacit assumption is made of some motive by reason of which 
we group together just these objects, and seek their common elements. If we are guided by 
any motive, and not by mere caprice, it must be found ultimately in the fact that the objects 
are from the first recognised as similar, because containing certain elements common to all; 
that is, a general [concept] is already there, by means of which these objects are selected from 
amongst all others.  
(1895, 248; cited Heis 2007, 137n) 
For example, in forming the concept ‘tree’, we select a certain set of trees (or set of species of trees) 
in order to reflect on their common characteristics. But why the comparison of just these objects 
unless we already know they are trees (e.g. why not include birds or television sets in our 
comparison)? And why abstract away certain other characteristics they have in common (e.g. 
‘covered in lichen’, ‘exists prior to the current moment’)? As Nietzsche suggests, “[i]f someone 
hides something behind a bush, looks for it in the same place and then finds it there, his seeking and 
finding is nothing much to boast about” (1999, 147). Yet this is exactly how things appear to stand 
when we go to form a concept in abstraction. Our selection of objects presupposes an understanding 
of what we are looking for and so is going to be unable to explain the origin of such concepts. 
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Given that the possession of conceptual capacities is presupposed at each level of this 
account, this could once again encourage a rejection of the idea that empirical concepts are a 
necessary element of perceptual experience in favour of categorical minimalism. For if all empirical 
concepts are formed by this threefold process of abstraction, then it could seem that there simply 
must be some base level of perceptual content that forms the ground of this process (see e.g. 
Longuenesse 1998, 196; Allison 1968, 180n). We saw the issue with trying to articulate such a base 
layer in the previous chapter, and, as Ginsborg suggests, such a minimal level of perceptual content 
would be particularly redundant here, for “[e]ven if we allow that there could be a synthesis of the 
empirical manifold according to pure concepts alone… it is hard to see how it could put us in a 
position, either to form empirical concepts, or to recognise the appropriateness of this or that 
empirical concept on any given occasion” (1997, 56-7; see also 2006c, 67).  
Indeed, categorical minimalism seems to fail to provide a solution to any of the three 
problems listed above. Say that we are presented with some set of mere ‘substance phenomena’ – to 
borrow Allison’s term (1968, 180n) – on the categorical minimalist account. In order to answer the 
first issue, the categories would have to be able to determine by themselves where one such 
substance ends and anther one begins. Yet, as we have seen, in the absence of empirical concepts, it 
is not clear how this could be possible. To solve the second they would have to be able to articulate 
some ‘characteristic features’ which serve to distinguish the selected objects from all others, but, by 
definition, any features that the objects display would apply to all possible objects of experience 
(i.e. as causally related, extended etc.). Finally, it seems that other than the ‘concept of an object of 
possible experience’ – Kant’s something = x – it is unclear how we could select a relevant group of 
objects without presupposing empirical conceptual capacities. Perhaps we could restrict ourselves to 
a comparison of the things that are presently before us, but again it is unclear how such a restriction 
would help us move in the direction of concepts that are even remotely cognitively valuable. Thus, 
if this threefold process of comparison, reflection, and abstraction really is the only picture of 
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concept formation that Kant has available, then we seem to need to presuppose empirical concepts 
in a way that renders his account viciously circular.  
In order to avoid this conclusion, Pippin suggests that we should question if this is really how 
Kant views the origin of empirical concepts (1982, 113). He suggests as an alternative that “the 
process described [above] seems more like our making much clearer to ourselves a concept we 
already have than to be a genuine derivation. As such, this reflective procedure would be helpful in 
‘arriving at’ as general a concept of tree as we can isolate, but would not account for the origin of 
the concept itself” (ibid, 113). Indeed, this seems to fit better with Kant’s suggestion that “in terms 
of content no concepts can originate analytically,” but are instead given content by the possibility of 
the ‘synthesis of the manifold’ in recognition (ibid, A77/B103; see chapter two). Thus, on this 
reading “in spite of the way such comparison, reflection, and abstraction help in organising and 
ordering the knowledge we already have, it remains true that ‘every analysis presupposes a 
synthesis’” and so will be unable to provide a solution to the bootstrap problem (Pippin 1982, 114). 
One way to read this suggestion is in terms of making explicit the norm or standard that the 
conceptual capacity represents – to determine just what it is, for instance, that makes it right to say 
that an oak is a tree, but a sunflower is not. Clearly, in order to be said to be in possession of the 
capacity, an understanding of the norm or standard of the capacity is necessary (see chapter one), 
but this may not extend to a full awareness of the conditions of class membership – as Kant 
suggests “[synthetic] cognition [i.e. recognition] may still be crude and confused at first and hence 
may require analysis” (1996, A77-8/B103). It is perhaps a consciousness of these conditions of 
class membership that the threefold process of comparison, reflection, and abstraction is supposed 
to provide us with. For although Kant says that ‘these three logical operations of the understanding 
are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every concept whatsoever’, it could 
simply be that the possibility of the application of these logical operations is necessary for the 
generation of a concept. Certainly, it is difficult to see how a set of perceptual objects for which 
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comparison, reflection, and abstraction is not possible could be something for which we could have 
a general concept. As in the previous chapter then, we seem to be left with a contrast between 
analytic and sensible distinctness, between an explicit awareness of the discursive content of a 
concept (i.e. its characteristic marks) and the ability to utilise the same concept in recognition. 
Whether or not this is the picture that Kant is advocating, such a reading only saves Kant’s 
account of abstraction from circularity, it does not solve the bootstrap problem as such. For we still 
need an account of the origin of the empirical concepts for which comparison, reflection and 
abstraction provide a clarification. Indeed, the bootstrap problem is far more general than the 
Kantian focus so far may imply. Any account of perceptual experience that sees empirical concepts 
as a condition of the possibility of that experience will face the same issue. For, as Kern points out, 
the issue is with making something that can only be obtained through the use of a capacity a 
condition of the possibility of the possession of that very capacity (2017, 262). There seems to be an 
insurmountable circularity that is not restricted merely to a reading of Kant’s picture of empirical 
concept formation in terms of abstraction.  54
2. Reflective Judgment in the Third Critique 
It might be thought that a solution to this problem can be found in Kant’s account of reflective 
judgment in the third Critique. At first glance, Kant seems to suggest that he will provide such a 
solution to the bootstrap problem when he distinguishes between determinative and reflective 
judgment in the introduction to that work: 
 In many ways this is almost identical to the so-called ‘Paradox of Learning’ where it is similarly argued 54
that concept acquisition is impossible as it requires the subject to already have the concept to be acquired 
(see Fodor, 1975, 95; Fodor 2008, 139). The difference in the case of the Bootstrap Problem is that this issue 
is specifically applied in the context of an argument that says that perceptual awareness itself is only possible 
on the basis of such capacities. This restriction both makes the Bootstrap Problem more narrow, in the sense 
that is not aimed at the question of learning once things are off the ground, and more intractable, in that it 
shuts down one possible answer in the form of an appeal to a pre-conceptual form of awareness.
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Judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal. If 
the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular 
under it, is determinative… But if only the particular is given and judgment has to find the 
universal for it, then this power is merely reflective. 
(1987, 179) 
Determinative judgment is ‘merely subsumptive’, and as such its form is not particularly 
problematic. This is the kind of judgment that occurs when we judge something to be the case on 
the basis of the actualisation of a capacity for recognition. If I take my apparent recognition that 
there is a cardinal at the end of the garden to be a genuine case of that capacity, then I judge that the 
particular so recognised falls under that concept. Here the generalities are, as Kant says, ‘given’ – a 
determinative judgment utilises conceptual capacities that we already have and thus cannot account 
for their origin. 
In reflective judgment, by contrast, a particular is given for which we currently have no 
concept. The question is whether or not framing the process of abstraction as a kind of judgment 
takes us beyond the account that Kant presented us with in the Logic. One of the clearest differences 
between the two accounts is that in the Critique of Judgment, rather than merely describing the 
process of abstraction, Kant asks after the conditions of its possibility. His suggestion is that this 
capacity rests on an a priori principle: “The principle by which we reflect on given objects of nature 
is this: that for all natural things concepts can be found that are determined empirically. This means 
that we can always presuppose nature’s products to have a form that is possible in terms of 
universal laws which we can cognise” (Kant 1987, 211-212*).  Kant’s thought here is that it is only 55
on the basis of this assumption that an attempt to find a concept for a particular can make sense: 
How could we hope that comparing perceptions would allow us to arrive at empirical 
concepts of what different natural forms have in common, if nature, because of the great 
variety in its empirical laws, had made these forms (as is surely conceivable) exceedingly 
heterogeneous, so heterogeneous that comparing [them], so as to discover among them an 
 The asterisk denotes a page in the so-called ‘First Introduction’ of the Critique of Judgment that Kant 55
decided was ‘overlong’ (see Guyer (1990b, 230fn) and Pluhar (1987, xxix) for more on the history of this 
chapter).
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accordance and a hierarchy of species and genera, would be completely – or almost 
completely – futile? 
(ibid, 212-213*). 
For the act of comparison, reflection, and abstraction to be a rational act – an act for which we can 
provide a justification – we must assume ahead of time that such an act is actually possible. If 
nature presented itself to us in a way that was not amenable to such an act then “all our reflection 
would be performed merely haphazardly and blindly, and hence without our having a basis for 
expecting that this [reflection] is in agreement with nature” (ibid, 212*). Kant puts this assumption 
in terms of “the principle of a purposive arrangement of nature in a system,” in the sense that we 
must assume that nature is in some sense organised ‘for us’ (ibid, 213-4*). 
As it stands, this idea raises more questions than it answers, yet even without going into more 
detail, it is immediately apparent that any such description of the conditions of the possibility of the 
process of abstraction is incapable of addressing the bootstrap problem. For even if we assume, as 
Kant says, that ‘the arrangement of nature is purposive’, this does nothing to solve the problem of 
how we initially acquire those empirical concepts that make perceptual experience of nature 
possible in the first place, even if such an assumption might aid or be essential for the creation of 
new concepts once things are up and running. Indeed, Kant’s distinction between the two different 
kinds of judgment helps to clarify the issue with abstraction, viz. that judgments of reflection that 
result in the creation of new concepts presuppose determinative judgments. As Kant writes, “[in 
order to cognise,] our understanding must wait until the subsumption of the empirical intuition 
under the concept [i.e. in recognition] provides this determination for the power of judgment” (ibid, 
407). It is only because we have (ostensibly) recognised the particulars of our environment as 
falling under certain concepts that we are aware of objects that we could reflect on in the first place, 
and only because we have judged these acts of recognition to be genuine cases of the capacity that it 
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makes sense to reflect on the characteristics of the objects we are thus made aware of in order to 
form a new concept.  Comparison, reflection, and abstraction always come too late. 56
However, not all reflective judgments result in the creation of new concepts, and it is the cases 
where reflection fails to do provide us with a determinate concept that are the primary focus of the 
Critique of Judgment. As Longuenesse suggests, aesthetic and teleological judgment are 
distinguished because in them the “the effort of the activity of [reflective] judgment to form 
concepts fails” and conceptual determination is shown to be impossible (1998, 164). In the former 
case this occurs because an object is judged to be beautiful not on the basis of the recognition of a 
property ‘beauty’ that inheres in the object (see Kant 1987, 290), but rather as a result of a 
‘disinterested’ (i.e. non-desirous) feeling of pleasure that results from the ‘free-play’ of the 
 The reverse is also true to an extent: determinative judgments involve a reflective element, insofar as we 56
are responsive to the norm that the capacity represents. Part of what makes an act of recognition rational is 
that we are responsive to the possibility that the way we recognise things as being may not be how things 
actually are. In doing so we reflect on the norm of the capacity and compare the present case to how the 
capacity should function. This differs, however, from reflective judgment proper to the extent that the 
reflection here is not (yet) aimed at finding a concept – the whole point is that in recognition the concept is 
given and it is just that which is in question. Longuenesse offers a contrasting view (1998, 163-5). Her 
suggestion is that for Kant every determinative judgment is also a reflective one, to the extent that each 
moment of perception presents us with bare particulars for which we must find a concept. The reason that 
this seems necessary on her account is that, as we saw in chapter two, she separates the first two moments of 
the A Deduction’s threefold synthesis from the third, allowing for such non- or proto-conceptual awareness. 
Once this possibility is shown to be untenable, it becomes clear that reflective judgment can only apply to 
objects that are already conceptually determined in some way or other, and so there is no reason to think that 
reflective judgment occurs in every case of determinative judgment, even if the latter involves ‘reflection’ on 
the norm that the capacity represents as outlined above.
Sam Matthews  of 131 200 19 September 2019
imagination harmonising with the understanding (ibid, 217).  As a result, instead of determinate 57
concepts, Kant says that a work of art is understood in terms of an aesthetic idea: “a presentation of 
the imagination which prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., 
no [determinate] concept, can be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow 
us to grasp it” (ibid, 314). 
Similarly in the case of a teleological judgment, the idea of an end is not something directly 
recognisable as part of the object, but instead is posited as a regulative idea in order to make sense 
of the phenomenon in question (ibid, 405). We can see this quite clearly in the case of organisms 
and their parts, which Kant says we make sense of in terms of a ‘natural purpose’, namely 
something that is “both cause and effect of itself” (ibid, 371; emphasis removed). For example, we 
think of the leaves of a tree as existing not only as an effect of the tree, but as something which 
makes possible the sustaining of the existence of the tree itself. As Kant puts it, “just as each part 
exists only as a result of all the rest, so we also think of each part as existing for the sake of the 
 Just what this free-play amounts to is an issue of significant debate, one that runs parallel to many of the 57
issues that have been addressed in earlier chapters. In his essay ‘The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited’, 
Guyer helpfully distinguishes three broad approaches taken in the literature to interpreting what Kant means 
here (2006). The first of these he calls ‘precognitive’ (ibid, 165). On this kind of interpretation, the free-play 
of the imagination either occurs in the absence of any concepts whatsoever (e.g. Bell 1987, 229; Ginsborg 
1997, 70) or merely with the categories at play (e.g. Makkreel 1990, 46-7). Clearly neither of these 
approaches will fit the account given here. Guyer himself advocates a second approach, however, that he 
calls ‘metacognitive’. On this kind of account, although “[a] beautiful object can always be recognised as an 
object of some determinate kind, [...] our experience of it always has even more unity and coherence than is 
required for it to be a member of that kind” (2006, 183). On the surface this could also fit with a 
conceptualist account since he is clear that all perceptual experience necessarily involves empirical concepts 
(ibid, 180). The problem, however, is making sense of the idea of something having ‘more unity than is 
required’ in a way that does not result in a problematic picture of that conceptual activity as a ‘conceptual 
shaping’ of sensory data as we saw in chapter two.  
The final kind of interpretation that Guyer distinguishes – one that best fits the account of perceptual 
experience developed in this thesis – is what he calls ‘multi-cognitive’, where the free play is interpreted as 
“a play among alternative cognitions or conceptualisations of the object“ (ibid, 183). The idea here is that 
although the awareness of a work of art must involve empirical concepts, it is complex enough to provide the 
imagination with multiple possibilities for the passive realisation of our recognitional capacities. Guyer 
suggests that the chief weakness of this approach is that “it is not clear why [such] an experience... should be 
pleasing” (ibid, 177). As he suggests, flitting back and forth between different interpretations is not 
necessarily pleasurable, and can in fact be quite unnerving. However, I think the pleasure here can be seen as 
coming from the fact of making sense of the object at all. That is, the pleasure comes from the moment of 
understanding the object, given its complexity, in a particular way such that everything seems to suddenly 
fall into place. Bell, despite falling into the precognitive group, describes something like this experience in 
‘The Art of Judgment’ (see 1987, 236). Defending this interpretation however goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
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others and of the whole” (ibid, 373). This purpose however, i.e. of the tree’s sustaining itself, is not 
something that is present directly in the tree itself but is rather an idea posited in order to make 
sense of the organism (and its parts) as an organism. As Bowie writes, we can see the connection 
between the two kinds of ‘merely’ reflective judgment here to the extent that “[n]atural products 
appear to contain an ‘idea’ which makes them take the form they do, in the way an artist can realise 
an idea by making a work of art” (2003, 27). In both cases perceptual recognition in terms of 
concepts is going to be insufficient to capture the phenomenon in question (i.e. since there is 
nothing ‘in the object’ to recognise as such). 
3. Aesthetic Judgment and Primitive Normativity  
Given that Kant’s chief claim about aesthetic and teleological judgment is therefore that they fail to 
result in the formation of determinate concepts suitable for use in recognition, it may seem that such 
judgments are unlikely to aid us in a solution to the bootstrap problem. In both cases empirical 
concepts are still presupposed. For even if the aesthetic value of an object is unable to be captured 
by any particular concept, our awareness of it as an object still requires concepts to be at play. As 
Kant writes, “[e]very art presupposes rules, which serve as a foundation on which a product, if it is 
to be called artistic, is thought of as possible in the first place” (1987, 307). Similarly, for a subject 
to make a judgment about the purposiveness of an organism, the organism itself must first be 
recognised as something or other if the judgment is to make sense (i.e. for the judgment to be 
understood as being about something or other). Despite this characteristic, however, Ginsborg has 
suggested that Kant’s picture of aesthetic judgment is in fact able to provide just such a solution to 
the bootstrap problem, to the extent that it is able to make us aware of what she characterises as the 
normatively primitive status of the synthetic activity of the imagination (see especially 1997; 
2006b; 2006c).  
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The problem for Kant, as we have seen, is that “[o]n the one hand, his view of concepts as 
rules for synthesis seems to commit him to the claim that empirical concepts precede the activity of 
synthesis; on the other hand, his view that synthesis is a precondition of conscious perceptual 
experience seems to commit him to the claim that empirical concepts depend on synthesis” (1997, 
39; also see 2006b, 38; 2006c, 80). The temptation here, according to Ginsborg, is simply to drop 
the requirement that the activity of the imagination is guided by rules at all, and instead to see is as 
a natural psychological activity which occurs blindly (i.e. without the application of self 
consciously held conceptual capacities) (ibid, 53). As she writes, “[b]ecause this interpretation does 
not require that concepts precede the synthesis of imagination, it has the advantage of allowing us to 
appeal to the synthesis of imagination in accounting for the acquisition of concepts” (ibid, 54). The 
problem, however, is that picturing the process in this way makes it impossible to see it as objective, 
i.e. as operating as things should rather than merely as they happen to. In the absence of any rules 
governing the activity, if my imagination ‘synthesises’ my perception of the cardinal such that it 
appears to be a blackbird, there is no sense in which ‘it’ has done anything wrong. This would make 
it difficult to see how perceptual experience would be able to stand as justification for our beliefs, 
since we would be lacking any normative standard by which we could say that how we were 
perceiving things now is how things ought to be perceived, i.e. that my imaginative activity has 
done something right in representing things to be this way rather than some other. 
In order to overcome this difficulty, Ginsborg suggests that we should see the synthetic 
activity of the imagination as exemplary of rules, rather than as guided by them or as lacking them 
all together. Her thought is that when something exemplifies a rule in this sense, the rule that it 
represents need not be seen as preceding the practice. This is especially clear in the case of the use 
of a natural language like English, which is “subject to rules which are not imposed externally but 
rather determined by the very activity they govern” (ibid, 64). The only place we can find an answer 
to the question of how English should be spoken is by observing how it is actually used. The rules 
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of language use were not first set down and then followed, but instead are internal to the practice. In 
this way the practice sets the standard of correct usage and so is normative in a primitive sense.   58
Her suggestion is thus that we treat the otherwise merely psychological activity of the 
imagination as exemplary of rules in just this way: 
What our imagination in fact does in the perception of a given object may be regarded as 
setting the standard for what our imagination ought to do in the perception of that object and 
others of its kind. Thus we can think of imagination as subject to standards, and hence as rule-
governed, without requiring that these standards be grasped prior to the exercise of 
imagination which is subject to them. 
(ibid, 64)  
The picture of rationality here is thus purely additive. Excluding material variation, perceptual 
awareness operates exactly as it does in a non-rational animal. “[T]he only difference is that, unlike 
an animal, [a rational subject] carries out the [psychological] activity with the awareness of its 
appropriateness to the circumstances” (2013, 141). The idea is that this enables us to avoid the 
bootstrap problem since the ‘blind’ activity of the imagination is taken to be exemplary of the rules 
that it presents to us through that activity. Indeed, Ginsborg goes as far as to cite this as the ground 
of our entitlement to think of the activity of the imagination in this way, suggesting that “it is 
required as a condition of the very possibility of empirical concepts” (1997, 66; cf also 2006b, 
59fn). 
This could make it seem like empirical concepts are something that each subject must hit on 
individually rather than as something obtained as part of a linguistic practice. For it is the activity of 
my imagination that I take as exemplary and that allows me to form the concept of a tree. Indeed, it 
is just this subjective starting point that allows the account to avoid the bootstrap problem – an 
appeal to an awareness of already existing conventions would mean that empirical concepts have 
already been presupposed. But then why settle on the word ‘tree’ for just this kind of phenomenon? 
 It is worth noting however that Ginsborg distinguishes this ‘primitive’ sense in which something is said to 58
be exemplary, from a ‘derivative’ sense where an object or action is said to meet some antecedently defined 
standard. To say that something is as it ought to be, on this basis, is to say that it meets the standard as 
specified by the rule. If cardinals are red and the one at the end of the garden meets this standard, then the 
bird ‘is as it ought to be’ in this derivative sense. 
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Indeed, divorcing the initial formation of empirical concepts from a communal practice in this way 
seems to get the order of events in reverse. There seems, for instance, little reason that the mere 
‘psychological activity’ of the imagination would make a distinction between a tree and a shrub 
prior to the subject’s exposure to such a practice. 
This implication can be avoided however by drawing on Ginsborg’s notion of training from 
her account of rule following. Just as in her picture of perceptual experience, Ginsborg wants to 
articulate a middle position between a mere causal account where the meanings of our terms are 
accounted for in the ways we are disposed to react to them (dispositionalism) and an account where 
conceptual capacities are sui generis and so not able to be reduced in this way (non-reductionism). 
Her thought is that by using the idea of primitive normativity to supplement a purely dispositionalist 
account, we will be able to hold on to the naturalist intuitions that make the dispositionalist picture 
attractive (i.e. the thought that meaning must in some way be reducible to phenomena describable in 
the language of the natural sciences), while also being able to account for the subjective sense of 
‘appropriateness’ that distinguishes the actions of a rational subject from that of a non-rational 
animal or automata (i.e. mere dispositions as a mere law-bound causal description can make no 
sense of an actions being right or wrong). 
Some allegedly instinctive reactions aside – like looking in the direction a hand is pointing – 
Ginsborg suggests that dispositions to respond in certain ways to particular signs and commands 
arise through a process of training by other subjects: 
[T]he effect of the training is precisely to turn the sound... into something which functions, for 
the [subject], in the same kind of way that a pointing hand functions for an untrained person. 
The training exploits the [subject’s] natural predispositions to acquire certain habits of 
response, and to invest each of his habitual responses with a consciousness of its 
appropriateness to the item he is responding to, so as to bring about that these items come to 
be perceived by him as calling for, or pointing to, or indicating the responses he gives. That he 
regularly responds to [a certain stimulus in a particular way] is, of course, in part a function of 
how he has been trained. But the role of the training is limited to that of shaping and 
directing... [his] natural tendencies... 
(2011, 178) 
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After a process of training, where my natural responses are corrected, I come to have a disposition 
to respond in a certain way in accordance with the practice. What distinguishes my reaction from 
that of an automata or animal is that I take my dispositions as appropriate to the situation in 
question. Once the correct dispositions are obtained in this way, however, the subject is able to 
“regard himself as responding appropriately or correctly to [an] expression... without relying on any 
conception of him as conforming to a general practice in virtue of which the sign is 
meaningful” (ibid, 174). Indeed, on her account of rule following “[t]he only intentional content... 
[taken] for granted is whatever content is involved in the consciousness of normativity as such. All 
other contents are, so to speak, constructed, by means of this consciousness, out of the raw material 
of our nonintentionally characterised responsive dispositions” (2011, 172).  
Something along these lines seems to apply in the case of perceptual experience. It is not the 
case that the subject merely arbitrarily stumbles upon the concept ‘tree’, but rather obtains it after a 
process of ‘training’, e.g. a parent pointing in the direction of a tree and saying the word, and only 
then comes to take the synthetic activity that their imagination displays in these instances as 
exemplifying the concept in question. Take, for example, Ginsborg’s description of the formation of 
an empirical concept: 
[I]n the act of perceptual synthesis through which I acquire, say, the concept of a tree, I take 
my act of imagination not only to exemplify but also to be governed by the concept ‘tree’. It is 
true that I do not grasp this concept antecedently to my act of synthesis, since it is precisely 
this act of synthesis which is required if I am to acquire the concept in the first place. But I 
come to grasp it in the act of synthesis, which means that I take my act of synthesis itself – the 
very act through which I come to grasp it – to be governed by the concept. 
(ibid, 69) 
The imagination was already synthesising according to the rule, i.e. dispositionally as a naturally 
occurring psychological process. Yet through training, I not only grasp this activity as exemplary in 
itself, but as also exemplifying the specific concept ‘tree’, e.g. as something that it would be 
appropriate to dispositionally respond with the phrase ‘That’s a tree’. In other words, to acquire a 
perceptual concept on this account is to acquire a disposition to respond to the passive synthetic 
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activity of the imagination in conformity to a shared practice, where the latter activity is taken by to 
be exemplary by the subject in a way that makes the former response seem appropriate (see e.g. 
2013, 137). 
Although this account of the origin of empirical concepts is not given by Kant himself, 
Ginsborg suggests that Kant invokes just this kind of experience of subjective necessity in his 
account of aesthetic judgment. Unlike the necessity involved in theoretical and practical cognition 
where we judge that something will or ought to happen, Kant suggests that the necessity of aesthetic 
judgment “can only be called exemplary, i.e., a necessity of the assent of everyone to a judgment 
that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state” (Kant 1987, 237; cited 
Ginsborg 2006b, 58). The difference in the aesthetic case is that I do not take the ‘exemplary’ 
activity of the imagination as taking place according to a determinate empirical concept, but rather 
am made aware of the ‘free lawfulness’ of its activity.  The content of the awareness is, as it were, 59
merely exemplary. What I am aware of “is precisely that I ought to engage in my present mental 
activity [i.e. that the activity of my imagination is right], and hence that I ought to be in that very 
state of mind” (1997, 71). Aesthetic judgment is thus the ‘pure form’ of such exemplary normativity 
– in the sense that it involves no appeal to empirical concepts – and so be said to be the 
transcendental ground of all empirical concept formation. 
4. The Problem with Primitive Normativity 
Regardless of its accuracy as an interpretation of Kant – as Ginsborg suggests there is little textual 
evidence for suggesting that this is Kant’s official view on the formation of empirical concepts 
 Ginsborg goes as far as to claim that in judging an object to be beautiful “I do not perceive the object as 59
having any determinate property” (1997, 70; emphasis added). Taken literally, this goes too far: even the 
most abstract of paintings or pieces of music has objective features that we can recognise, and must have if 
we are to be aware of there being an object at all. The point is, rather, that in judging the object to be 
beautiful I am not thereby made aware of an additional property of the object itself.
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(ibid, 66) – the possibility of being able to ground the formation of empirical concepts in the 
experience of subjective necessity is attractive not only in that it promises to solve the bootstrap 
problem, but in the way it attempts to unify Kant’s picture of reflective judgment in the Critique of 
Judgment with his account of cognition more broadly.  
Nonetheless, the account faces some serious difficulties. In particular, the idea of the 
‘psychological activity of the imagination’ – which is taken for granted in Ginsborg’s argument – is 
based on a reading of the threefold synthesis in the A Deduction that sees the first two syntheses as 
separable from the third, where the “procedures of imagination... correspond roughly to Kant's 
syntheses of ‘apprehension’ and ‘reproduction’” (ibid, 50). This split reading is necessary for 
Ginsborg’s solution to the bootstrap problem since the imagination must synthesise according to 
rules independently of the concepts held by the subject whose imagination it is, in order for it to 
serve as the ground for the subsequent reflective judgment of the activity as exemplifying a 
particular concept. Such rules must therefore be ‘innate’ to the imagination, in the sense of being 
natural dispositions for processing sensory data. As Ginsborg writes, on such an account “I 
construct the image on the immediate prompting of my present sense-impressions, and... these 
sense-impressions serve as part of the material for the image” (1997, 52). The picture here is thus of 
a shaping of sensory consciousness, where (in the case of vision) the imagination connects bits of 
coloured data in order to form a visual image – one that we are then able to recognise as exemplary 
of a particular kind of phenomenon. 
This is a necessary assumption for the picture of ‘training’ that was outlined above as well, 
since it rests on the assumption that the psychological activity of the imagination operates in more 
or less the same way in every subject. Take the example of the parent training their child to identify 
trees above. The account assumes that – with regard to the tree at least – the psychological activity 
of the child matches that of the parent, for only then could the child take the same kind of 
psychological activity as their parent as exemplary of the phenomenon in question. If instead of a 
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psychological shaping of sensibility the account took perceptual experience to be constituted by 
rational capacities for recognition, then there would be no guarantee of this shared base level of 
content since – as we saw in the previous chapter – the other recognitional capacities, contextual 
information, and pragmatic concerns could all potentially impact on the visual and spatial properties 
that a given object appears to have. 
Yet, as we saw in chapter two, such an account of the threefold synthesis is untenable. Firstly, 
it results in a picture of perceptual experience that leaves us detached from the external world, since 
what we recognise as ‘exemplary’ is not this or that object, but merely the product of our own 
synthetic activity. It seems in that case that the best we can say is that this bit of synthetic activity is 
exemplary ‘for us’ of a specific phenomenon, rather than the object itself, which is posited merely 
as the hypothetical cause of this activity. In such a case it is not the world that is rationally bearing 
on thought, but merely the psychological activity of the imagination. In the unified picture of the 
threefold synthesis advocated in this thesis, by contrast, it is not sense data that is connected by the 
imagination, but rather acts of recognising objects as falling under concepts. The imagination’s 
activity is thus necessarily world-involving since the acts of recognition are of things being as they 
are in the environment.  60
Secondly, the split account of the threefold synthesis overlooks the fact that perceptual 
experience requires something in terms of which the subject can recognise the object as in some 
way the same over time. As Kant’s argument in the A Deduction shows, it is not enough simply to 
 This world-involving view is not available on Ginsborg’s account unless we are willing to attribute such 60
recognition to the mere psychological activity of the imagination prior to the subject’s awareness of the 
concept. Two versions of such a picture are available. On the first all concepts of perceptual objects, no 
matter how temporally or culturally specific, would have to be innate to the imagination and at play in 
perceptual experience. In forming an empirical concept I would then understand the imagination’s act of 
recognition as exemplifying a specific concept. Such a view is radically implausible and would require, 
among other things, the imagination of an individual from a remote Amazonian tribe ‘recognising’ a mobile 
phone dropped from a plane as a mobile phone even if the community in question had never encountered 
such an object before. Alternatively, we could say that the imagination recognises merely in terms of some 
basic subset of concepts that are innate. This would avoid the implausibility of the previous view, but then 
we find ourselves in the same position as McDowell in the previous chapter needing to find a way to identify 
just which concepts these are. Regardless, it is clear that this is not the kind of picture of perceptual synthesis 
that Ginsborg envisions (see 1997, 52).
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stipulate that the subject is aware of the psychological activity of her imagination as representing 
discrete objects; Ginsborg must explain how it is that the subject can be aware of this bit of 
psychological activity – e.g. the bit that carves out the shape of a tree from the manifold – as in 
some way ‘the same’ as the moment before. The difficulty here can be seen in her own description 
of forming the concept tree: 
When I acquire a concept on the basis of perceptual experience, on the view suggested, I take 
features of what my imagination actually does in the perception of an object – its combining 
and reproducing of representations to form, say, the image of something with leaves, 
branches, and a trunk – to serve as a rule determining how that, and other such objects, ought 
to be perceived. 
(ibid, 68-9) 
The image that the subject is supposedly made aware of is represented to us – as readers with fully 
fledged conceptual capacities about trees – as of something with leaves, branches, and a trunk. This 
makes it easy to imagine what the potential subject (i.e. pre-conceptual capacities) is faced with, 
viz. a tree-shaped object persisting from one moment to the next. The problem is that the subject 
herself has no way of connecting each sequential moment of tree-shaped psychological activity, 
since she has no concepts in terms of which she can recognise them as in some way ‘the same’. This 
makes it impossible to understand how she could be said to be aware of anything at all, let alone 
something of a form that she can take to be exemplary of a certain kind of phenomenon.  61
5. Acts of Learning 
This, however, does not help us solve the bootstrap problem. Indeed, the fact that it was not possible 
to make sense of perceptual experience outside of rational capacities for recognition was precisely 
 It is no good to point to an awareness of the psychological activity of the imagination as such either, for 61
the problem simply repeats itself again at this more general level. That is, we would need an account of how 
it is that the subject is aware of each moment of the psychological activity of her imagination as part of the 
same temporal manifold that makes up her experience over time. As we saw in chapter two, Kant shows in 
the Analogies that such a temporal awareness can only occur via the recognition of a permanent substance 
that endures through time, something that is only possible in terms of empirical concepts.
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that thing that generated the difficulty in the first place. The problem emerges precisely because the 
subject’s possession of empirical concepts is shown to be a condition of the possibility of the 
perceptual awareness of objects in the environment, and yet (it seems) such capacities can only be 
obtained through the very experience they are a condition of the possibility of. Ginsborg’s solution 
involves dropping the first premise – i.e. that the subject’s possession of empirical concepts is a 
condition of the possibility of perceptual experience – and so side stepping the problem in a way 
that misses the true import of Kant’s argument in the A Deduction. Yet, if Ginsborg is right that our 
having a pre-conceptual form of awareness is a condition of the possibility of our coming to have 
conceptual capacities, then the issue threatens to be insurmountable (1997, 66). 
Instead, it will be suggested that we should reject the second premise, the idea that all 
empirical concepts must be obtained through the subject’s own perceptual experience. Lacking any 
other potential source, this might seem to imply that some such capacities must be innate (see e.g. 
Fodor 1975, 95-7). Although perhaps implausible at first glance, such a picture has some attractions 
when framed in the right way. For instance, to suggest that certain empirical conceptual capacities 
are passed down as the result of evolution seems to fit with a scientistic naturalism, where the aim is 
to explain our rational capacities in law bound terms. On this account, what would explain my 
having an innate capacity to recognise snakes, say, would be some evolutionary fact about our past 
(e.g. that the ability to recognise snakes was advantageous for our ancestors survival). In such a 
case we need not appeal to a pre-conceptual form of awareness in order to explain our possession of 
empirical concepts and so can save the first premise by rejecting the second. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, one of the issues with an account that posits a base level of 
concepts is that we need a principled way of selecting just what concepts these are. The 
evolutionary account suggests a solution to this issue however, since we can just point to 
evolutionary pressures in order to make the selection. The more challenging problem for this sort of 
account is that it overlooks the importance of the subject recognising the authority of their own 
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capacity. As Kern writes, “a capacity for knowledge is not simply one whose exercises consist in 
acts that fall under the concept of that capacity from some perspective or other. A capacity for 
knowledge is one whose exercises fall under the concept of this capacity from the perspective of the 
subject whose capacity it is” (Kern 2017, 252). It is not enough that we have a built in capacity to 
respond to certain perceptual stimuli in a predetermined way, we must recognise our doing so as 
something that it is correct to do if we are to understand our capacities as rational, i.e. as able to 
provide us with non-inferential justification for belief and action. This is what was right in 
Ginsborg’s account: in positive cases I need to be able to understand the exercise of my 
recognitional capacity as exemplary, as presenting things as they ought to be presented (i.e. 
objectively).  62
The problem with this account is that the mere fact that we have evolved to have a certain 
dispositional response to certain stimuli is not enough to explain why it is that the subject takes her 
capacity as exemplary in this way, because the form of explanation it employs is external to the 
capacity. The fact that our ancestors evolved a disposition to avoid snakes does not lend any 
justificatory support to the epistemic authority of any particular instance of the realisation of that 
capacity. This is not to deny that evolutionary pressures are in large part responsible for the kind of 
objects that we are able to recognise: things that reflect light, things that move, sounds above 20Hz, 
etc. Indeed, we need not even deny that such pressures provide us with specific ‘innate’ 
 The difficulties here are similar to those that Kant raises about the idea of divinely implanted ‘subjective 62
predispositions’ being responsible for the agreement of the categories and experience (Kant 1996, B167-168; 
see Kern 2017, 253). Such an account, Kant says, might seem to be a middle course between seeing the 
agreement in terms of the categories making experience possible (the account that Kant argues for) and 
experience making the categories possible (the account of the ‘transcendental realist’ or empiricist) (1996, 
B167). In the case of empirical concepts we cannot see any specific subset as themselves necessary for 
perceptual experience, even if empirical concepts as such are, and that seems to leave us with the second 
option, namely that we know the empirical concepts to be objectively valid because they were drawn from 
experience. In this context, Kant’s proposed ‘middle way’ could appear to be the only other available option 
if we are to reject the second premise of the bootstrap problem. The issue with such a picture, Kant suggests, 
is that the subject herself would not recognise the authority of her capacity, for “[I] could say only that I am 
so equipped that I cannot think this presentation otherwise than as [in terms of this concept]” (1996, B168). 
But, as Kant says, this is no justification at all for since “one could not quarrel with anyone about something 
that rests merely on the way in which his [self as] subject is organised” (ibid, B168).
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dispositions, e.g. to avoid snakes. But the point is that these details are not enough to explain the 
emergence of rational capacities rather than mere dispositions. What we need to explain the 
emergence of rational capacities is an account of how capacities for recognition can be recognised 
by the subject as providing the justification for the acts that fall under them. 
Instead of innate concepts, what we need is an account that, while not grounding our initial 
concept formation on a pre-conceptual form of awareness, still shows how it is that I am able to 
come to understand the epistemic authority of my own capacity. Once things are off the ground this 
process of coming to accept the epistemic authority of my own capacity for recognition is easy to 
explain through the concept of practice. Say I take it upon myself to learn to recognise the call of a 
specific bird. At first the distinction between the different calls may not be distinct at all for me and 
I may accidentally mix up the calls (I think I hear a sparrow, but it is a wren at the end of the 
garden). At this point I am not going to put much stock in my recognitional capacity. After some 
practice at comparing the calls, however, I learn to pick out the call of the sparrow without any 
hesitation. Of course I recognise that in certain circumstances my capacity is hindered – when a 
similar migratory species is present in the summer, say – but so long as those circumstances do not 
obtain, once I reach this level of competency I can be confident in my capacity to recognise a 
sparrow’s call. In such a case I need not refer to anything else other than my capacity in order to 
justify my claim to know that what I am hearing is a sparrow.  63
The acquiring of a recognitional capacity via practice is easy to account for in the above case 
because all sorts of other recognitional capacities have been presupposed. I am able to recognise, 
for instance, birds, bird calls, pitch, rhythm, causal relationships, and ambient noise, and so on, so 
that in acquiring the capacity I am utilising capacities I already had, albeit in a more complex and 
fine-grained way. The reason that the bootstrap problem – the initial case of concept acquisition – is 
 The idea of acquisition through practice is thus, as Kern says, “intrinsically linked” to the idea of a rational 63
capacity (2017, 262). It is only because practice gives me the chance to test and improve the efficacy of my 
capacity in the light of a presupposed norm that I can come to recognise its epistemic authority.
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so much more challenging to account for is that there are no other rational capacities to draw on. 
Indeed, we cannot even appeal to a fully-fledged idea of subjectivity, since as Kant shows in the A 
Deduction, an awareness of the self presupposes an awareness of objects (not least because, as we 
have seen, an awareness of time – what Kant calls inner sense – requires the recognition of 
permanent substances). This is what Ginsborg’s posited ‘psychological activity of the imagination’ 
is supposed to provide for. For if it were legitimate to posit such a level of pre-conceptual 
awareness, then empirical concept acquisition could be as easy to account for as my capacity to 
recognise the call of a sparrow. 
The question is thus how we are to explain the possibility of practice – i.e. that through which 
I come to recognise the epistemic authority of my capacity – if the subject cannot draw on their own 
capacities of recognition. Kern suggests that we can solve this problem by expanding our picture to 
include another subject who is a competent user of the capacity in question. As she writes: 
[W]hen a subject is about to acquire a capacity for perceptual knowledge through practice, she 
performs acts of perceptual knowledge whose accord with the capacity for perceptual 
knowledge cannot be explained through a capacity that is available to the learning subject 
independently of the other subject’s exemplary exercises of that capacity. Rather, a learning 
subject performs acts of perceptual knowledge whose accord with a capacity for perceptual 
knowledge is explained through a capacity that is available to her only through the exemplary 
acts of the competent subject. 
(2017, 266-7) 
This is very similar then to Ginsborg’s notion of training above. The difference is that on this 
account we are not positing any level of perceptual experience shared by the learning ‘subject’ and 
teacher. Say a child mimics her mother saying to her ‘Look a tree!’ by repeating the word ‘Tree!’. 
On this account we need not attribute any recognitional capacities (and so no perceptual experience) 
to the child as such, her direct relation to the tree and her mothers capacity need only be 
characterised dispositionally. Indirectly, however, we can explain the child’s response as an 
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imperfect exercise of the capacity, since the goal of the child’s activity is to mimic the capacity of 
her mother’s (whether the child realises that or not) (ibid, 266).  64
In this account, rather than merely taking already occurring psychological activity to be 
exemplary, “a subject gradually comes to possess a capacity of the relevant sort precisely by 
repeatedly performing acts that agree with the capacity in this mediated manner” (ibid, 261). We 
can sketch the process as follows. Initially the child’s response is dispositional, consisting of mere 
reactions to various stimuli in mimicry of her parent (she need not realise that this is what she is 
doing, it is enough that she is biologically disposed to do so). Her disposition is sanctioned or 
rewarded depending on how well it accords with the norm of the capacity she is mimicking. 
Eventually, however, the child begins to recognise that she is able to judge the efficacy of the 
disposition herself such that she recognises situations in which their disposition (to treat something 
as a tree, say) is likely to be mistaken. It is at this point, where the child begins to distinguish good 
from bad exercises of their own disposition (i.e. where they begin to understand the capacity as 
representing a norm), that a true self-conscious, rational capacity begins to emerge.  For it is then 65
that she is able to understand her response to the presence of an object “to be an instance of the 
same capacity that she represents her mother’s perceptual judgment to be an instance of” (e.g. for 
recognising trees) (ibid, 266). 
Thus, the reason we can drop the second proposition of the bootstrap problem is that the 
material for the formation of the subject’s initial conceptual capacities does not come from 
 Kern initially says that the learner must understand the activity of the teacher in terms of the capacity 64
being learned (2017, 261), but then later says that this awareness is only necessary when the subject is on the 
verge of acquiring the capacity (ibid, 266). It may be that she only means to attribute the former explanation 
to subjects who already have some level of recognitional capacities, or alternatively to suggest that the child 
must act toward the mother as if her activity is exemplary (rather than in terms of a self-consciously held 
attitude). Regardless, it seems implausible to attribute the former level of self conscious awareness to the 
child at this stage.  
 In some ways, then, this is the exact opposite of Ginsborg’s position in the sense that on this account 65
gaining the capacity occurs in the moment that the potential subject realises that the disposition is not always 
exemplary, rather than in the moment that we recognise that it is (as per Ginsborg’s account). To this extent, 
McDowell is wrong to dismiss “[t]raditional epistemology[’s] accord[ing] a deep significance to the fact that 
perception is fallible,” for there is a deep significance here, just not for the sceptical reasons that traditional 
epistemology would have us believe (1996, 112).
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perceptual experience, but rather from a store of non-rational dispositions that the potential subject 
obtains long before any fully-fledged subjectivity emerges. As McDowell says in a slightly different 
context, the non-rational dispositions to follow certain rules that we acquire as children serve as “a 
substratum on which the capacity for concept-carried awareness is constructed” (1998, 283).  66
Ginsborg’s mistake, in other words, is to think that we need something to subjectively ground the 
initial formation of concepts rather than merely provide the ‘causal antecedents’ of such capacities 
(see McDowell 1998, 283). She is correct that we must see the initial stages of the development of 
our rational capacities as based on something non-rational, but wrong in thinking that we must 
understand this non-rational element as something that persists once the capacity has been formed. 
That is, unlike the additive account that Ginsborg advocates, where the psychological activity of the 
imagination forms the content of the conceptual capacity, on this account, once the subject is able to 
judge the efficacy of their capacity in relation to a norm, then their response is no longer 
dispositional but rather transformed into a rational capacity for recognition (in the sense outlined in 
chapter two).  67
 McDowell’s aim in the cited essay (‘One Strand in the Private Language Argument’) is stated in terms of 66
defending pre- or non-conceptual forms of awareness in infants and animals, against Rorty’s suggestion that 
this is “a [mere] courtesy extended [to] potential or imagined speakers of our language” (1987, 190), arguing 
that “[i]f we refrain from this overkill, there is room for a project of making the process of initiation into the 
space of reasons intelligible” (McDowell 1998, 283). At first glance this might seem to place his account 
with Ginsborg, however he is clear that he does not see such ‘awareness’ as persisting “into a life of concept-
involving awareness” (ibid, 283). His point is merely that speaking in terms of such awareness – as the above 
account tacitly does by referring to the child ‘mimicking her mother’ – can help make sense of the transition 
from this kind of dispositional ‘awareness’ to the fully-fledged rational awareness that we enjoy.
 In ‘Kant and the Problem of Experience’, Ginsborg considers a position very similar to this but rejects it 67
on the grounds that it “leaves us with the mystery of how the transition between the [dispositional and 
conceptual] stages is accomplished (2006c, 85). The difficulty, she thinks, is that on a fully conceptualist 
picture the only way we can recognise the ‘appropriateness’ (i.e. epistemic authority) of our conceptual 
capacities is if they are open to reflective criticism in terms of other concepts, but since these are absent at 
the dispositional stage, then there appears to be no clear bridge between the two. Although there is some 
truth to this conclusion – the transition between stages is by no means obvious – the criticism itself overlooks 
the role of the teacher. The child is not only evaluating her responses by her own lights, but in the light of the 
corresponding response of the adult. In other words, the child not only has a disposition to acquire patterns of 
response according to “an innate standard of similarity” (Quine 1969, 123; cited Ginsborg 2006c, 83), but 
also an innate disposition to conform to the pattern of response of those who she mimics. Sometimes the first 
conflicts with the second – i.e. when the child is corrected by her parent – but she gradually comes to make 
this kind of evaluative judgement herself. This presumably will take the form of her coming to recognise the 
ways in which her various capacities are related, as Ginsborg suggests, but we need not see the transition 
here in terms of an unbridgeable gap between the purely dispositional and fully conceptual. “Light dawns 
gradually over the whole,” as Wittgenstein says (1969, §141; also see Wiggins 1997, 418).
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6. Rational Transformation and Naturalism 
The fact that an additive picture like Ginsborg’s can seem natural is primarily due to the assumed 
primacy of the perceptual image in our own perceptual experience. This leads us to think of the 
perceptual experience of animals and infants in these terms, which can make it difficult to accept 
that no content carries over from these earlier, pre-conceptual stages in our own development. 
However, as we have seen, it is only through the recognition of the fallibility of our capacities that 
the idea of a distinct ‘visual image’ – of the kind that Ginsborg takes to be primary – makes sense as 
an image. For in order to recognise such a thing, we need to understand not only the idea of it being 
of something or other (as argued above), but the idea of something appearing a way that is not. The 
perceptual image is, as it were, the index of error. It concretely represents to us the fallibility of our 
recognitional capacities in the sense that it is what we point to when things go wrong. If the light 
fools me and I think I see a cardinal when really it was a dove, it is the idea of the visual image I 
use to explain the failure of my capacity (‘It looked like a red bird to me, but really it was white’). 
Its epistemological relevance is purely negative (in the sense that when things are as they appear to 
be there is no need to refer to the idea of the perceptual image) and parasitic on our rational 
capacities for recognition (since images are always images of something or other). 
This self-consciousness of the fallibility of our capacities cannot be characterised in 
dispositional terms, for on such an account there is no space for the recognition of the possibility of 
error. If a dog is trained to have a disposition to bark at the postman and the postman appears, it will 
bark (ceteris paribus). It is not an open possibility for the dog to question how things appear to it. It 
just acts on a given stimulus or it does not, as it is disposed to do. Of course, things can go wrong 
and the dog may mistakenly bark at its owner, but it need not – and cannot – offer a reason for its so 
acting (either to itself or to others). In such a case the idea of a perceptual image, distinct from a 
mere perceptual relation to the environment has no role to play. The perceptual image matters when 
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justification does, so the perceptual image emerges alongside our rational capacities for 
recognition.  68
Perhaps it is tempting at this point to suggest that perspective is enough to grant an awareness 
of a perceptual image. For we need not recognise the fallibility of our capacities in order to be 
responsive to the fact that objects have a different appearance when viewed different angles, and it 
could seem that this is enough to credit the possessor of such a non-rational capacity with an 
awareness of a visual image. Indeed, presumably an infant or animal who is credited with a 
disposition to respond to the presence of trees in some way would be unlikely to be credited with 
such a capacity if they only responded to such a stimulus from a certain angle. But the point is that 
in such cases the image has no role to play (i.e. as that which we point to in order to explain our 
error). The idea of the image only emerges when capacities move beyond a mere responsiveness to 
features of the environment and a concern with justification emerges. As McDowell writes, “it 
would be hopeless to claim that sensations [in the sense of a visual image] are there for a mere 
animal in the way problems and opportunities thrown up by the environment are there for it” (1996, 
120). The ‘mere animal’ reacts to the presence of the tree as an obstacle, say, and is able to do so 
dynamically as it moves past it and as its sensory impressions of it change, but this is no reason to 
credit it with an awareness of a ‘perceptual image’ distinct from its disposition to react. The dog 
sees the tree and avoids it, there is no need to say it sees an image of one and avoids that. Rather 
such dynamic responsiveness is just what its disposition to avoid trees consists in.  
Dispositions are thus blind in a double sense: both in that such things occur outside of any 
rational control – an animal with a disposition to respond in accordance with a particular stimulus 
cannot but respond in the way it is disposed to (again, ceteris paribus) – but also in that they do not 
require crediting the object or organism in question with an awareness of a perceptual image as an 
 We could put this metaphorically by saying that it is such capacities ‘let the light in’ in the sense that they 68
first make possible the perceptual image, i.e. that it is only with such capacities that vision, properly 
speaking, is granted. In the final section of the next chapter it will be argued that it is just this that Heidegger 
means by his concept of Lichtung, with its dual sense of clearing and lighting.
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image. This could appear to cast animals as mere Cartesian automata in the way that it seems to 
deny that there is anything that it is like to be that animal. But as McDowell suggests, “[t]his is not 
to imply that features of the environment are nothing to the perceiving animal. On the contrary, they 
can be problems or opportunities for it... The point is that we must distinguish that from saying that 
the animal conceives the features as problems or opportunities” (1996, 116). The aim is not to show 
that the animal lacks any sentience at all, but rather to show that there is a distinct form to the kind 
of sentience it has. This form can be incredibly complex in the way it manifests itself – many 
animals are far more adaptive and responsive to changes in their environment than we are – but it is 
not something that manifests itself it terms of an awareness of things as things, and it is only in an 
animal with this kind of conceptual awareness that the idea of the perceptual image makes sense. As 
McDowell suggests, “if this seems like a denial of the subjectivity of cats and infants, that depends 
on missing the point that nothing is... given to us either. Our subjectivity is not a matter of this kind 
of thing plus the conceptual garb...” (1998, 295). The point, in other words, is that there is nothing 
‘given’ to us prior to the realisation of recognitional capacities that we could deny animals (or 
infants) even in principle. 
One problem with this account, however, is that it can make the emergence of rational 
capacities out of dispositions appear mysterious. One of the benefits of Ginsborg’s account is that it 
is at least partially reductive since both the psychological activity of the imagination and our 
dispositional responses to it can be – at least in principle – unproblematically captured in the 
language of natural science (see 2006c, 92-3).  That is, both are phenomena that can be understood 69
in terms of nomological relationships that hold between the subject and her environment. Yet, as we 
 The key exception to this is the idea of ‘appropriateness’ which is added to our dispositions in order to 69
make them understandable as normative actions. This exception, however, puts into question whether 
Ginsborg’s account really is any more attractive from a reductive naturalist standpoint. As Miller points out, 
her account seems to “[threaten] to collapse into either full-blown non-reductionism or reductive 
dispositionalism” (2019, 73). Ginsborg seems forced to choose between having ‘appropriateness’ explain the 
actions of rational subjects – and so introduce an element that is unable to be accounted for in law bound 
terms (in which case it is not obviously a reductive improvement on a fully sui generis account of rational 
capacities) – or cast it as a mere subjective effect that is not causally efficacious at all (in which case it is not 
an obvious improvement on a purely dispositional account).
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have seen, rational capacities are distinctive precisely in that they are not law-bound in this way. As 
McDowell writes, “being at home in the space of reasons involves not just a collection of 
propensities to shift one’s psychological stance in repose to this or that, but the standing potential 
for a reflective stance at which the question arises whether one ought to find this or that persuasive” 
(1996, 125). Being able to offer my recognitional capacity as a reason for belief requires me to 
recognise my capacity as representing a norm that I take to be fulfilled at the time at which I offer it 
as a reason for my belief. This is not possible if I think of my recognitional capacities 
dispositionally, since I could not but form the belief that it offers me. In other words it is because 
rational capacities are not law-bound that they are able to function as reasons for belief or action.  
The problem is that if we equate the natural world with the realm of law, then this ‘rational 
freedom’ can look supernatural, granting us a freedom contrary to the laws of physics (see ibid, 78). 
Indeed, this identification of the realm of law and the natural world can seem inescapable given the 
success of the natural sciences in describing and explaining the nomological relationships of an 
ever-increasing number of natural phenomena. As Sellars famously writes, it can seem “that in the 
dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is 
that it is, and of what is not that it is not” (1997, §42). If this is the case, then it would appear that 
the only way that we can make our conceptual capacities understandable as a part of nature is to 
reduce them somehow to relations within the realm of law. But as we have seen, this would amount 
to denying that they can provide reasons for belief or action. So if we do not want to “opt out of this 
area of philosophy altogether,” we need to explain how the rational freedom we are granted by the 
transformation of dispositions into rational capacities can fit into our conception of nature 
(McDowell 1996, 67). 
McDowell suggests that the way to see our way out of this is simply to deny this 
identification of nature with the realm of law (ibid, 109). Rather than a supernatural imposition on a 
law-bound nature, we can see the transformation of our pre-conceptual dispositions into rational 
Sam Matthews  of 151 200 19 September 2019
capacities as a case of the realisation of the potential that we have as the kind of animal we are. In 
Mind and World McDowell describes this process of rational transformation in terms of Bildung, or 
cultural upbringing, through which we are initiated into a shared linguistic practice. As he writes: 
Human beings are not [born into the space of reasons]: they are born mere animals, and they 
are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents in the course of coming to maturity. This 
transformation risks looking mysterious. But we can take it in our stride if, in our conception 
of the Bildung that is a central element in the normal maturation of human beings, we give 
pride of place to the learning of language.  
(1996, 125) 
Although rational capacities cannot be captured in terms of nomological relationships, they are 
nonetheless still natural, since, as Kant says, “we too belong to nature in the broadest sense” (Kant 
1987, 375).  
One way of thinking of this is in terms of the need for a different kind of vocabulary in order 
to describe this distinctive feature of human beings. This can be seen more clearly in certain kinds 
of cultural phenomena. For instance, Wellmer gives the example of two different descriptions of 
Picasso’s Guernica (2009, 213). On the first kind of description we describe the artistic and 
historical properties of the image: the distorted figures, the symbolism, the Spanish Civil War, the 
cubist movement, etc. On the second kind of description we describe the physical properties of the 
material object: the dimensions and weight of the canvas, the lead content of the paint used, the age 
of the materials. Both interpretations are necessary for a full description of the object in that they 
both capture something unique that cannot be explained in the vocabulary of the other. As Wellmer 
writes: 
The painting as as an object of art criticism as well as of the cultural sciences could not exist 
without its ‘embodiment’ in a material substratum which is a possible object of natural 
science. However, as an object of natural science it looses all those properties which make it a 
work of art; or, to put it another way, to make it an object of natural scientific research means 
to ignore all those properties which are constitutive of its being a work of art. 
(ibid, 214) 
 The ‘cultural’ description is not a mysterious or quaint hold over from a pre-scientific era. Rather it 
captures just what is distinctive about the work as a work of art. It explains why, for instance, the 
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painting is considered more important than some other paintings that use similar materials, a 
distinction that simply vanishes if we focus solely on a quantificational or nomological description 
of it as a material object.  
The same point applies to human beings themselves. As Wellmer writes, “[a]ctions, 
intentions, [and] meanings... demand a vocabulary for their description which cannot have a place 
in a science aiming at the discovery of nomological relationships in the world of material 
processes” (2009, 215). An account of human beings that fails to describe us at least partially in 
these terms would not be able to capture just what is distinctive about the kind of beings we are. 
The mistake is thinking that this description is in some sense unnatural, when it simply captures a 
different aspect of our animal selves. Just as with the work of art, this is obviously not to deny that 
we are physically embodied beings and that there is an important story to be told about the law-
bound processes that make our rational capacities possible; the point is that this is not the only story 
that matters. 
7. Conclusion 
The bootstrap problem threatened to ‘devastate’ the conceptualist account of perceptual experience 
that has been advocated in this thesis. For it seems impossible to understand how empirical 
concepts can be characterised as a condition of the possibility of perceptual experience if they also 
have to be drawn from that very same experience. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that any 
pre-conceptual form of perceptual experience that might have otherwise served to solve the problem 
was ruled out in chapter two. The benefit of the account advocated here is that it does not rely on 
any such form of pre-conceptual experience, instead finding the ‘causal antecedents’ of our initial 
conceptual capacities in the dispositions we acquire as children. This solves the bootstrap problem 
by denying the second premise. Rather than forming our recognitional capacities on the basis of 
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perceptual experience, they are formed on the basis of a gradual critical reflection on our own 
dispositions. 
This solves the major internal difficulty with the strongly conceptualist account advocated in 
this thesis. In the final chapter, two external critiques will be considered, both of which suggest that 
the phenomenology of perceptual experience speaks against a conceptualist account. The first of 
these suggests that the conceptualist account attributes too little content to perceptual experience, 
since what we see is too fine-grained to be described adequately in terms of concepts. It will be 
suggested that this critique results from a bad picture of concepts that models them after substances 
that serve as exemplars rather than in terms of rules that describe a function. On the latter model 
there need not be any aspect of the particular that is lost on its being recognised as falling under a 
particular concept. The second external critique, by contrast, suggests the reverse, i.e. that the 
conceptualist attributes too much content to our everyday dealings with the world. In this case it 
will be suggested that this worry results from a misunderstanding of the relationship between 
recognition and judgment. 
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5. Are Concepts Reductive? 
Fineness of Grain and Mindless Coping 
This final chapter will address two of the most common objections to conceptualism. Both are 
based on the phenomenology of perceptual experience, but they arrive at opposite conclusions. The 
first of these is the so-called ‘argument from fineness of grain’. The suggestion is that a 
conceptualist position ends up ascribing far too little content to perceptual experience since it is too 
complex and detailed to be adequately captured by our conceptual capacities. If this is true, then it 
would seem to give us independent grounds for ascribing a non-conceptual content to perceptual 
experience. The second argument, by contrast, suggests that conceptualism attributes far too much 
content to much of our perceptual experience. The thought is that, although conceptualism might be 
a perfectly fine description for when we are theoretically observing the things around us, much of 
our pragmatic dealing with the world is in fact ‘mindless’ and so does not involve our conceptual 
capacities. 
The chapter will be split into five sections. The first will present the phenomenological case 
for attributing a nonconceptual content to perceptual experience and link it to the abstractive picture 
of concept formation described at the start of the previous chapter. The second will use McDowell’s 
account of demonstratives to show how the particularity of experience can be accounted for in 
conceptualist terms. One key issue is that, by suggesting that demonstrative concepts are in some 
sense already at play in perceptual experience itself, we seem to upset the most obvious explanatory 
model of demonstratives as something grounded in experience rather than constitutive of it. It will 
be suggested that what this objection overlooks the fact that the realisation of a demonstrative 
conceptual capacity is part of what it is to recognise something as falling under a particular concept 
in perceptual experience. Rather than being a mere disjunctive classification, a capacity for 
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recognition also involves an awareness of the object as falling under the concept in a certain way, at 
a certain place in the series that the concept describes. 
The last three sections will then focus on the phenomenology of absorbed coping. The main 
proponent of this kind of objection is Dreyfus, via his reading of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and 
it is his account that is the focus of the first section. Essentially his suggestion is that the capacity 
for distanced deliberation that conceptual capacities grant us takes us ‘out of the flow’ and leaves us 
disconnected from our activities. Section four will then suggest that this objection relies on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of conceptual capacities. Distanced reflection should be seen as a 
‘standing capacity’ rather than a necessary part of the exercise of such capacities. Indeed, it will be 
further argued that seeing our conceptual capacities as involved in our pragmatic dealings with 
things better fits the phenomenology of absorbed coping. Although Dreyfus’s reading would seem 
to set the conceptualist picture in opposition to the phenomenological tradition, the final section will 
argue that Heidegger himself should be seen as a conceptualist. 
1. Fineness of Grain 
So far, this thesis has addressed problems that arise for conceptualism internal to the question of 
how it is that perceptual experience enables the world to bear rationally on what we are to think and 
do. That is, rather than starting with an assumption about the nature of perceptual experience as 
such, the argument has presupposed that perceptual experience is able to play this epistemological 
role and then looked for the conditions of the possibility of its doing so. As we have seen, the 
picture that emerges is one of perceptual experience constituted by conceptual capacities for 
recognition, but this conclusion is a result of that ‘regressive’ transcendental starting point rather 
than a starting assumption itself. A crucial test for this picture is, therefore, how well it matches our 
phenomenological intuitions about perceptual experience that arise external to the transcendental 
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problematic. For if the account results in a distortion or mischaracterisation of certain ‘common 
sense’ attributes of experience, then that would seem to give us independent grounds for either 
rejecting it outright, or at least reducing its scope. 
One of the most common objections on such grounds is the argument from the fineness of 
grain of perceptual experience, where it is suggested that the content of experience is too detailed or 
complex to be described adequately in conceptual terms (see e.g. Evans 1982, Heck 2000, Peacocke 
1998, Boyle unpublished b). This kind of account focuses on the apparent lack of concepts for much 
of the content of our experience. Heck gives a representative description of the thought: 
Before me now, for example, are arranged various objects with various shapes and colours, of 
which, it might seem, I have no concept. My desk exhibits a whole host of shades of brown, 
for which I have no names. The speakers to the sides of my computer are not quite flat, but 
have curved faces; I could not begin to describe their shape in anything like adequate terms. 
The leaves on the trees outside my window are fluttering back and forth, randomly, as it 
seems to me, as the wind passes over them. Yet my experience of these things represents them 
far more precisely than that, far more distinctively, it would seem, than any characterisation I 
could hope to formulate, for myself or for others, in terms of the concepts I presently possess. 
The problem is not lack of time, but lack of descriptive resources, that is, lack of the 
appropriate concepts. 
(2000, 489-90) 
There is so much rich – or particular – sensory detail in perceptual experience that it seems 
impossible to think that all that detail can be captured by concepts that are inherently general. 
Saying that the content of the experience of the desk, for instance, is partially captured by the 
proposition ‘that desk is brown’, seems anaemic when compared to the actual perceptual experience 
of it. Not only does it overlook the shades of brown that Heck mentions but a seemingly infinite 
array of other features – shadows, scratches, wood grain, shape etc. – that may have many features 
in their turn that are similarly ignored, presumably all the way down to the very smallest speck of 
dust that I am able to see with the naked eye, itself with a shape, shadow etc. 
The thought, therefore, is that we cannot possibly characterise perceptual experience as 
constituted by conceptual capacities “unless those concepts are assumed to be endlessly fine-
grained; and does this make sense? Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many 
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colour concepts as there are shades of colour that we can sensibly discriminate?” (Evans 1982, 
229). Clearly, the implied answer to this question is no: we do not have enough colour concepts to 
describe adequately the full content of even the most minimalistic of perceptual experiences. Any 
concept of colour or shape we have appears to be far too broad, allow for far too great of a range of 
phenomena, for it to adequately capture the minute differences that are commonplace in our 
perceptual experience. It can seem that we must picture the content of perceptual experience as 
nonconceptual if we are to do justice to the phenomenology of that experience. 
Indeed, if we understand concepts as arising solely from the process of abstraction that was 
outlined at the start of the previous chapter, then it can seem that concepts are not only too few, but 
unable in principle to capture the particularity of experience.  For if the method by which we arrive 70
at new concepts is by comparing individuals, reflecting on their shared ‘essential’ properties, and 
then abstracting away the rest, then it seems that, by definition, concepts are going to be poorer in 
content than what they compare. As Nietzsche writes in ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense’: 
[E]ach word immediately becomes a concept, not by virtue of the fact that it is intended to 
serve as a memory (say) of the unique, utterly individualised, primary experience to which it 
owes its existence, but because at the same time it must fit countless other, more or less 
similar cases, i.e. cases which, strictly speaking, are never equivalent, and thus nothing other 
than nonequivalent cases. Every concept comes into being by making equivalent that which is 
non-equivalent. Just as it is certain that no leaf is ever exactly the same as any other leaf, it is 
equally certain that the concept ‘leaf’ is formed by dropping these individual differences 
arbitrarily, by forgetting those features which differentiate one thing from another [...]. 
(1999, 145) 
If this picture of concepts is the only one available to us, then describing perceptual experience as 
constituted by capacities for recognition would leave us incapable of comprehending the particular, 
 These two possibilities correspond roughly to so-called ‘state’ and ‘content’ nonconceptualism (see Heck 70
2000, 484-5; also Speaks 2005, 359-60). The first suggests that, although we can be in a perceptual state for 
which we have no concept, perception nonetheless still shares the same conceptual form as thought. On this 
picture perception is thus non-conceptual in the sense of being a concept-independent state “as opposed to 
a... concept-dependent, state [like belief]” (Heck 2000, 485). The idea here is that the content of the subject’s 
experience could still be described as having the content ‘cardinal’, say, despite her lacking that concept. 
This kind of position is thus directly opposed to the conclusion of the argument of the A Deduction that 
suggested that perceptual awareness requires something in terms of which the subject is able to recognise the 
object as the same over time. The second kind of reading, by contrast, more straightforwardly takes the non-
conceptual contents of perceptual experience to have an entirely different form to the conceptual content of 
belief and judgment. 
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locking us into Nietzsche’s “land of... ghostly schemata and abstractions” (ibid, 152). No amount of 
passivity in the way we picture those capacities would then be able to prevent the feeling that we 
were merely making “moves in a self-contained game” (McDowell 1996, 5).  
2. Demonstratives 
In Mind and World, McDowell suggests one way that we might attempt to account for this 
particularity conceptually by drawing on the notion of demonstrative concepts (1996, §3.5). Say I 
see the cardinal at the end of the garden. Since I already have the concepts of colour and shade, 
McDowell’s thought is that I can linguistically express the particular shade of the colour of the 
cardinal by using a demonstrative phrase like ‘That shade of red’. The redness of the cardinal itself 
serves as a sample of the colour that the demonstrative refers to, enabling us to linguistically 
characterise perceptual experience in a way that is just as fine-grained as the experience itself. The 
same trick works for other kinds of phenomena as well (e.g. ‘that shape’, ‘that pitch’, ‘that pattern’, 
‘that melody’, etc.). Our lack of specific conceptual capacities need not push us in the direction of 
accepting non-conceptual content, since we can always utilise our demonstrative conceptual 
capacities whenever they are required. 
Of course, if such demonstrative concepts were only available to us in the presence of the 
object in question, then in would be questionable to what extent it could be considered a genuine 
conceptual capacity. For it could appear that, as Boyle argues, “[t]he idea that my perceptual 
experience presents the object as having an utterly specific colour, namely one designated by the 
phrase ‘that shade of colour’, spuriously represents this potential for classification as if it were itself 
a maximally specific classification,” when in fact it merely indicates where “we would need to look 
in order to make the classification” (unpublished b, 12-13). For this reason, McDowell suggests that 
“[w]e can ensure that what we have in view is genuinely recognisable as a conceptual capacity 
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[only] if we insist that the very same capacity to embrace a colour in mind can in principle persist 
beyond the duration of the experience itself” (1996, 57). Since we can use demonstrative concepts 
in this way (e.g. ‘This shirt is the same shade of red as that cardinal’), we can be sure that they are a 
genuine species of conceptual capacity. 
Nonetheless, it is still not immediately apparent how this is supposed to work. As Heck 
argues, it appears that McDowell fails to leave enough distance between the experience that 
supposedly grounds the demonstrative concept (by providing it with a sample) and the capacity to 
recognise things in terms of the concept: 
Demonstrative concepts of the sort he discusses are ones I have only because I am presently 
enjoying (or have recently enjoyed) an experience of a certain kind: Or again, what explains 
my having these concepts is my having (had) an experience with a certain sort of content. But, 
if that is right, it is hard to see how these demonstrative concepts could be part of the content 
of my experience. Suppose we say, with McDowell, that my having certain demonstrative 
concepts is partially constitutive of the world’s appearing to me in a particular way. How then 
can my having that concept be explained by my having such an experience? There would not 
seem to be sufficient distance between my having the experience and my possessing the 
concept for the former to explain the latter. 
(2000, 492) 
The objection is fairly straightforward: if the function of a demonstrative concept is to pick out a 
particular feature of what we see, then the concept is evidently dependent on us already having the 
perceptual experience of what it is that it picks out and so cannot itself be constitutive of the 
experience. Yet since the argument from the fineness of grain supposedly shows that our broader 
conceptual capacities are unable to capture the complex particularity of experience, whatever it is 
that demonstratives are picking out cannot be something that we are made aware of via our broader 
conceptual capacities either. Therefore, although demonstrative concepts may help give conceptual 
expression to features of our perceptual experience, that experience itself cannot be conceptual if 
we are to account for its fineness of grain. 
The only other option would appear to be, as Heck writes, to deny “the causal (or 
explanatory) intuitions upon which [the previous argument] rests” and argue that, rather than being 
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based on our experience, demonstrative concepts are already part of experience themselves (ibid, 
492-3). Yet if demonstrative concepts are taken as free-standing, independent capacities for 
recognition like any other, this can be difficult to understand, as it can appear that we have to pre-
emptively create, or already have a store of, all those demonstrative concepts ahead of time in order 
to be able to recognise objects as falling under them. The intuitive appeal of seeing our 
demonstrative concepts as being based on experience already had is that their origin is easy to 
account for. With this missing we seem to be owed an account of how it is possible for such 
concepts to be formed (ibid, 493). 
What this objection misses, however, is that having a ‘demonstrative conceptual capacity’ is 
part of what it is to have a more general capacity for recognition. To recognise something as falling 
under the concept red is not to only recognise it as falling within the set of all red things, but to 
recognise it as falling under the concept in a particular way (i.e. within that set in a particular 
position). That is, I never just recognise something as generically red, but rather as a particular 
shade of the spectrum that that concept marks out. Cassirer puts this in terms of concepts being not 
merely being disjunctive classifications that things either are or not (though they are that too), but 
functions that organise objects “into comprehensive totalities, into distinct groups and series” (1957, 
115). Using demonstratives to refer to particular instances of properties merely indicates that we 
recognise them as having a determinate place within that series (as having a certain hue and shade 
say). So to say that perceptual objects are ‘always already recognised as falling under a 
demonstrative concept’ is thus merely part and parcel of having a recognitional capacity, rather than 
something distinct from them that stands in need of independent explanation. 
This picture of concepts as functions that describe series or ordered sets rather than merely 
disjunctive classifications also helps mitigate Nietzsche’s concern about the reductive quality of 
concepts when seen as a result of a process of abstraction. By drawing on the idea of a function we 
can see concepts not only as sets of things that are grouped according to a common element, but as 
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a “series in which between each member and the succeeding member there prevails a certain degree 
of difference” (Cassirer 1953, 16). Concepts in this sense follow a ‘law of arrangement’ marking out 
all possible variations in advance (ibid, 19). Each of Nietzsche’s misshapen leaves, for instance, are 
in a certain way already described by the concept ‘leaf’; to recognise something as a leaf on such a 
picture is to recognise it as a way that a leaf ‘could so appear’, to borrow a phrase of Heidegger’s 
(1997, 67). 
Cassirer suggests that it is this picture of concepts as functions that underlies the process of 
abstraction itself (1953, 17). As we saw in the previous chapter, one of the problems with 
accounting for concept formation in terms of the process of abstraction was that it was unable to 
account for the selection of the objects that were to form the basis of the comparison. For instance, 
our selection of an oak, a linden, and a birch rather than some other group of objects for comparison 
seemed to presuppose that we already recognise them as trees, i.e. that we understand them as 
connected as an analytic unity in Kant’s sense according to the concept that we were supposedly 
forming. In other words, the process of abstraction “tacitly thinks [the particulars it compares] in the 
form of an ordered manifold from the first. The concept, however, is not deduced thereby, but 
presupposed; for when we ascribe to a manifold an order and connection of elements, we have 
already presupposed the concept, if not in its complete form, yet in its fundamental function” (ibid, 
17).  
Cassirer is thus able to expand upon Pippin’s suggestion that abstraction is better seen as a 
process of clarification of concepts that we already have, rather than as accounting for the origin of 
the concepts we have (see previous chapter). As he writes, “[t]he unity of the conceptual content can 
thus be ‘abstracted’ out of the particular elements of its extension only in the sense that it is in 
connection with them that we become conscious of the specific rule, according to which they are 
related; but not in the sense that we construct this rule out of them through either bare summation or 
neglect of parts” (ibid, 17). Through conceptual analysis, in other words, we can discover the form 
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of the rule that underlies our capacity for recognition. But rather than attempting to discover merely 
a list of properties that the object must display in order to be considered an instance of the kind, we 
can also think of this process as an attempt to discover the possible transformations that an object 
can undergo while still be considered to be an instance of the kind. However, our appeal to our 
capacity in justifying a claim to know need not make any claim to an explicit knowledge of any 
such rule beyond a demonstrative pointing out of our taking something to have a definitive place in 
that series (that this kind of thing ‘could so appear’). 
One of the benefits of this picture is that it can make better sense of the interconnected 
character of our recognitional capacities. As McDowell suggests, understanding the idea of 
something like a colour “includes, for instance, the concept of visible surfaces of objects and the 
concept of suitable conditions for telling what colour something is by looking at it” (1996, 12). 
Considerations of lighting, shadow, texture and the like, are part of what a capacity for recognising 
something as coloured entails. A picture of concepts in terms of functions allows us to understand 
these background conditions as variables internal to the concept – as part of what it is for something 
to be coloured – as opposed to merely being additional concepts under which anything coloured 
must fall. Yet as Verene writes, “[i]n principle each variable in a given series can also serve as a law 
of arrangement of a series of its own, and the law of arrangement of the originally given series can 
have the status of a variable in another order” (Verene 2011, 10). Each of the variables that forms 
part of the background of the concept of something’s being coloured, for instance, is also the ground 
for a further capacity for recognition. As Cassirer suggests, it is this interrelation of our conceptual 
capacities that “produces the diversity and cohesion, the richness, the continuity, and constancy, of 
consciousness” (Cassirer 1957, 202). 
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3. Absorbed Coping 
The previous sections have shown that we are actually able to account for the fineness of grain of 
the phenomenology of perceptual experience in terms of capacities for recognition. In a series of 
essays responding to McDowell’s work, however, Dreyfus has suggested that conceptualism is 
unable to account for an even more fundamental phenomenological phenomenon, what he calls 
‘mindless absorbed coping’ (2007a, 353). His suggestion is that in much of our everyday dealing 
with the world rationality is not at play, only coming into play when things go wrong or we 
explicitly stop and reflect on what we are doing. His worry is thus with the pervasiveness of 
rationality in the kind of transformative picture that this thesis has been defending. This is the direct 
opposite of the ‘fineness of grain’ argument, suggesting that conceptualism attributes far too much 
conceptual content to perceptual experience, rather than too little. 
Dreyfus takes this to be the same point that Heidegger makes when describing the 
phenomenology of interacting with objects as tools rather than as mere material objects. According 
to Heidegger’s account in Being and Time, in taking an object as a tool we understand the object in 
terms of its practical assignments relative to some particular end, a mode of meaningful presence 
that he calls ‘readiness to hand’ [Zuhandenheit] (1962, H69). Heidegger’s most famous example of 
this is of using a hammer, where instead of concerning ourselves with the physical or visual 
properties it has as a material object, we understand it primarily in terms of what it is for: 
[i]n such [practical] dealings an entity... is not grasped thematically as an occurring thing, nor 
is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering does not simply 
have knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment, but it has appropriated this 
equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable. In dealings such as this, where 
something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to’ which is 
constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time[.] 
(ibid, H69) 
In grasping the hammer as a hammer we may understand it primarily in terms of its in-order-to-
hammer-nails (e.g. relative to the end of building a shelter to protect ourselves from the rain). The 
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hammer is not understood as a tool independently in the way a merely observed object would be, 
but rather in relation to a ‘totality of involvements’ (ibid, H94). For instance, the hammer can only 
be understood as the tool that it is because there are things that need to be hammered, which itself 
can only be understood because there are things that need to be built and so on.  
Crucially, however, this kind of practical understanding of objects is all in the doing (it is only 
derivatively an object of philosophical reflection). Grasping the hammer as a hammer in this way is 
not a case of first thinking to oneself ‘there’s a hammer! I need that in order to hammer these nails’ 
and then acting on the thought, but rather a case of grabbing the hammer and starting to hammer 
with it. Heidegger puts this in terms of our ‘pressing into possibilities’ afforded by the tools and the 
environment in which we find ourselves (ibid, H145; also see Dreyfus 1995, 187ff). Instead of an 
explicit deliberation on the part of the subject about what to do, the subject simply acts on the 
practical possibilities for action as they are given, in accordance with a specific end. 
Dreyfus thinks that the conceptualist is unable to account for this kind of practical dealing 
with objects. On his account, by “tak[ing] as basic how in our perceiving, thinking, and acting we 
take up a distanced relation to an independent reality,” the conceptualist is forced to distort the 
phenomena of absorbed coping (2013, 21). When I open a door, for instance, I am not explicitly 
aware of the exact shape of the door handle, or even that what I am doing is a case of grasping a 
door handle – I simply go through the door, without any distanced reflection being required. Rather 
than rationality being pervasive throughout our activity, Dreyfus wants to insist that we are “only 
part time rational animals” (ibid, 354). Conceptual capacities only come on the scene when 
something goes wrong or we are forced to contemplate the objects that surround us in terms of 
substances with distinct properties (e.g. in scientific or philosophical reflection), otherwise “in their 
direct dealing with affordances, adults, infants, and animals respond alike” (2005, 12). On this 
picture, rationality is not only ‘additive’ in the sense of being alongside or on top of other more 
basic capacities, but also in the sense that it is often not on the scene at all. As Dreyfus writes, 
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“[w]hat makes us special, then, isn’t that, unlike animals, we can respond directly to the conceptual 
structure of our environment; it’s that, unlike animals, we can transform our [otherwise] unthinking 
nonconceptual engagement, and thereby encounter new, thinkable, structures” (2005, 18). 
Indeed, Dreyfus argues that the subject’s utilisation of conceptual capacities can actually 
hamper performance and prevent the subject from being able to deal with the situation effectively. 
The clearest example that Dreyfus offers of this phenomenon is an American Baseball player Chuck 
Knoblach’s losing his ability to throw to first base due to his over intellectualising the activity, i.e. 
his thinking in descriptive terms about the actions that he needed to perform: 
As second baseman for the New York Yankees, Knoblauch was so successful he was voted 
best infielder of the year, but one day, rather than simply fielding a hit and throwing the ball to 
first base, it seems he stepped back and took up a ‘free, distanced orientation’ towards the ball 
and how he was throwing it – to the mechanics of it, as he put it. After that, he couldn’t 
recover his former absorption and often – though not always – threw the ball to first base 
erratically... [I]n some replays of such easy throws one could actually see Knoblauch looking 
with puzzlement at his hand trying to figure out the mechanics of throwing the ball. 
(2007a, 354) 
Dreyfus sees this ‘transformation’ of Knoblauch from expert to novice as a case of the conceptualist 
thesis in action. By thinking in distanced, ‘conceptual’ terms about the mechanics of the throw 
instead of just throwing the ball instinctively, Knoblauch is taken out of the flow of absorbed coping 
and is unable to act at the expert level required. It thus seems that “the enemy of expertise is 
thought” (ibid, 354). Conceptual thought might be fine when someone is learning how to do 
something – put your left foot here, reach back like this etc. – but once the skill is acquired, it is no 
longer necessary. 
Dreyfus even goes as far as to claim that the subject disappears in such activity: “When one is 
bodily absorbed in responding to solicitations [e.g. for-hammering] there is no thinking subject and 
there are no features to be thought” (2007a, 358). Instead, “there are only attractive and repulsive 
forces drawing appropriate activity out of an active body” (2007b, 374). When one is ‘in the flow’, 
as Dreyfus puts it, absorption is total. There is no subjective experience as such: the body takes the 
Sam Matthews  of 166 200 19 September 2019
place of the subject and merely reacts to the way things are. Dreyfus cites Merleau-Ponty’s account 
of the experience of the football player in The Structure of Behaviour in support: 
For the player in action the football field is not an ‘object’... It is pervaded with lines of force 
(the ‘yard lines’; those which demarcate the ‘penalty area’) and articulated in sectors (for 
example, the ‘openings’ between the adversaries) which call for a certain mode of action and 
which initiate and guide the action as if the player were unaware of it. The field itself is not 
given to him, but present as the immanent term of his practical intentions; the player becomes 
one with it and feels the direction of the ‘goal’, for example, just as immediately as the 
vertical and the horizontal planes of his own body. At this moment consciousness is nothing 
other than the dialectic of milieu and action. 
(1963, 168-9; cited Dreyfus 2013, 17) 
Although this reference to consciousness could seem to reintroduce the supposedly absent 
subjectivity, according to Dreyfus, “[a]ll consciousness means in this minimum sense is being 
drawn to act... one does not have to be aware that one is being so drawn. Consciousness is simply 
our direct responsiveness to a shifting field of forces” (2013, 37n). The aim is thus to describe what 
it is like to be merely dispositionally responsive to the features of the environment. The reason that 
this is so difficult on Dreyfus’s account – that the phenomenon appears to “vanish[] when we try to 
think it” (ibid, 16) – is that in the very act of describing such coping we must employ concepts that 
are absent from the experience itself.  
Describing coping in such terms, however, could seem to place it in the realm of law in a way 
that strips it of any intentional content at all. Indeed, the way that McDowell sets up the two 
opposing ‘logical spaces’ in Mind and World, seems to invite such an approach as the only available 
option. However, Dreyfus suggests that McDowell’s focus on overcoming the ‘Myth of the Given’ – 
the idea that the given is able to play a justificatory role in our epistemic practices – blinds him to 
the possibility a third kind of logical space, namely that of the “meaningful normative forces” that 
attract and repulse us in absorbed coping (2013, 26). Such coping in other words “has a kind of 
intentional content; it just isn’t conceptual content. A ‘bare Given’ and the ‘thinkable’ are not our 
only alternatives. We must accept the possibility that our ground-level coping opens up the world by 
opening us to a meaningful Given – a Given that is nonconceptual but not bare” (2005, 11-12). 
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Once this space has been recognised we can be free to deny the pervasiveness of rationality – and so 
respect the phenomenology of absorbed coping – without falling prey to the myth. 
4. Perceptual Concepts in Action 
Dreyfus’s objection to conceptualism poses a particular problem for the account advocated in this 
thesis. For in denying subjectivity to absorbed coping he evades the regressive transcendental 
argument presented in chapter two by placing much of our everyday activity outside of the scope of 
perceptual experience proper. It is thus open for him to argue that, although the threefold synthesis 
of recognition may very well be necessary for perceptual awareness as such (i.e. of things as 
things), in ‘mindless’ absorbed coping perception simply does not share this form: instead of 
making us aware of things as things, it relates us directly to possibilities for action. Indeed, Dreyfus 
says something along these lines about McDowell’s account: 
McDowell’s account of the necessity of conceptuality to make possible our mind-to-world 
relation seems to me convincing. My objection to his view is that he assumes that his account 
of our concept-based, minded, rational relation to the totality of facts is the whole story as to 
how we, in general, relate to the world. I don’t question McDowell’s transcendental ‘must’, 
but I do question his überhaupt. 
(2013, 23) 
The account of the threefold synthesis is effective against Travis’s position as he starts from the 
assumption that perception grants us a visual awareness of things independently of our conceptual 
capacities, but Dreyfus simply denies that awareness is what perception grants in our absorbed 
coping. Thus if he is right about the phenomenology, it could question, if not the status of the 
argument of the A Deduction, certainly its scope. 
But is Dreyfus right about the phenomenology here? There are good reasons to question his 
picture (at least in part). Let us take Heidegger’s example of using the hammer. According to 
Dreyfus, as we saw, in taking the hammer in this way (i.e. as ready-to-hand) the subject disappears 
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and we are left with a body merely responding to a normative ‘field of forces’. From an external 
(and so non-phenomenological) perspective this might seem to describe the phenomenon fairly 
well. Certainly, if we watch somebody in the flow of hammering they may appear to be ‘running on 
autopilot’ – to use one of Dreyfus’s favourite examples (see e.g. 2007a, 358) – mindlessly 
responding to the pragmatic requirements of the situation. Metaphorically speaking, this may be a 
fine description of the feel of such coping too, for with enough practice I may be able to let my 
mind wonder and barely focus on the task at hand. It is easy to imagine someone performing such a 
monotonous task saying something like, ‘after a while it was like I wasn’t even there’.  
Yet if we reflect on our experience of any such activity, we see that this lack of subjective 
awareness cannot be literally true. Regardless of how deeply we are absorbed in our hammering 
activity, it seems that we would still be aware of what it is we are doing. For if interrupted in our 
absorbed activity and asked to explain our actions, it is not as if we would stare blankly at the 
hammer in our hands and say, ‘oh I’m not sure, everything has been a total blank since I picked up 
the hammer’. We are far more likely to say something like ‘I’m building a table’ or ‘I’m hammering 
these nails’. This is not a ‘retrospective’ rationalisation either, as Dreyfus initially suggests (see 
2005, 10): I do not survey the debris on the floor – the nails, the sawdust, the hammer – and then 
through a process of abduction think to myself ‘Ah, I must have been hammering again!’. Rather, 
the self conscious awareness of my activity is there all along in the activity itself. If it were not, as 
Sheehan suggests, “all [our] hammering and nailing and other practical activities could turn out to 
be quite a mess” (2014, 210). 
Indeed, Heidegger makes just this point when he suggests – in apparent anticipation of a 
dispositional reading of his description of our pragmatic dealings with tools – that “[t]his 
[pragmatic] activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight [Sicht],” namely ‘circumspection’ 
[Umsicht] (1962, H69). The point here is thus not to deny any level of subjectivity at all to the 
activity in question, but rather to suggest that such awareness has a distinct form. In circumspection, 
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Heidegger suggests, “the thing we encounter is uncovered [i.e. recognised] in terms of the end-for-
which of its serviceability. It is already posited in meaning – it already makes sense... [W]hat is first 
of all ‘given’... is the ‘for-writing’, the ‘for-entering-and- exiting’, the ‘for-illuminating’, the ‘for-
sitting’” (2010, 121). The objects are still recognised as being a certain way, just not in the same 
way that they are when we take a contemplative or theoretical view of them (see Gascoigne & 
Thornton 2013, 41).  71
But then Umsicht – as a species of our perceptual awareness of things – is not exempt from 
the argument of the A Deduction in the way Dreyfus’s account seems to imply. For even if in coping 
I am not aware of the hammer as a hammer, but rather merely as something ‘for-hammering’, this 
nonetheless still requires the awareness of it as in some way the same over time. As we saw in 
chapter two, a mere ‘mindless’ relation to the environment is not able to provide this by itself. 
Rather, for a subject to be aware of a unitary thing of any form, they require a self-conscious 
recognitional capacity in terms of which each moment of their perceptual relation to the object can 
be united.  Any such capacity, however, insofar as it must allow for an indefinite manifold of acts, 72
is necessarily inherently general – and thus has a conceptual structure. Indeed, this same point 
 Dreyfus notes that in this regard “McDowell may have Heidegger on his side” (2007b, 377n), citing 71
Heidegger’s suggestion that a “cognisance of itself... accompanies all Dasein’s [i.e. a rational animal’s] ways 
of behaving” (1962, H387). Dreyfus claims that in denying subjective awareness to absorbed coping he is 
“siding with Merleau-Ponty and current neurological models of skilled action... which claim that 
consciousness is only called into action once the brain has detected something going wrong” (2007b, 377n). 
Yet it seems that any phenomenological account – not just Heidegger’s – will ultimately rely on some kind of 
subjective awareness, for it is unclear that it is possible even to make sense of the idea of a phenomenon as a 
phenomenon (as that which shows itself) outside of such awareness. Dreyfus’s allusion to neuroscience does 
not lend his account any support either, for everything turns on what we mean by consciousness. That one 
kind of brain activity stops when we stop contemplating our surroundings and start coping with things can 
only lend the thesis support if we have already decided that whatever it is that stops in such cases must be the 
brain activity associated with conscious awareness.
 Heidegger makes this point himself in his discussion of the schematisation of the form of our 72
understanding of the ready to hand at the end of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: “Everything handy 
is, to be sure, ‘in time’, intratemporal; we can say of it that the handy ‘is now’, ‘was at the time’, or ‘will 
then be’ available. When we describe the handy as being intratemporal, we are already presupposing that we 
understand the handy as handy, understanding this being in the mode of being of handiness” (1982, 305). 
Understanding something as ‘intratemporal’ requires something in terms of which we can understand the 
distinct moments as united; the mere fact that in our pragmatic dealings with objects we see them as 
possibilities for action – and thus as having their own distinct form – does not alleviate this need for 
synthesis.
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applies to actions as much as affordances, since in order to be aware of what we are doing as an 
instance of the action it is, we need something in terms of which the movements we are making can 
be united. Contrary to Dreyfus’s suggestion (see 2005, 19) there is no great mystery about the 
emergence of conceptual capacities out of our absorbed coping skills, for such skills are themselves 
a species of conceptual capacity. 
The reason, of course, that Dreyfus feels compelled to deny that coping involves conceptual 
capacities is that he assumes rationality is something that is inherently detached from the situation 
at hand – a case of “[s]elf-conscious reflection and deliberation” (2013, 22). To act ‘rationally’ on 
this picture is to step back and think explicitly in terms of reasons for belief or action. The picture 
he takes himself to be opposing, in other words, is one where “we are basically minds distanced 
from the world, so that the mind has to be related to the world by mental activity [viz. conceptual 
capacities]” (2013, 36). If this really was the picture of rationality and conceptual capacities that 
was being advocated here, then Dreyfus’s critique would be on point. For it seems clear that in 
acting we do not always think explicitly in terms of reasons – I just pick up the hammer; I do not 
think about it before hand. If this were the only account available, then it would appear indisputable 
– if we are to match the phenomenology – “that concept[ual capacities] must precisely not be 
always operative” (2013, 23). 
Yet, as we saw in chapter one, this is not the picture of conceptual capacities that is being 
advocated in this thesis. That there is a logical gap between recognition and judgment does not 
mean that in every exercise of a conceptual capacity there must be an explicit process of 
deliberation before judgment or action occurs. Just as my judgment that there is a cardinal at the end 
of the garden need not come apart from the act of recognition itself, picking up a hammer and 
starting to use it need not come apart from my recognition of it as ‘for-hammering’ either. The point 
is merely, as McDowell puts it, that there must be a “standing capacity for a reflective 
stance” (1996, 125; emphasis added). As we have seen, having such an ability to stand back from 
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(and potentially reject) the way that we ostensibly recognise things as being, is a result of our 
having a self-conscious understanding our recognitional capacities as representing norms that may 
or may not be realised on any particular occasion. But, as McDowell says, “that is not to say that the 
capacity for distance is actualised whenever conceptual capacities are in play. Exactly not: the 
capacity for distance is not actualised in unreflective perceptual experience or in unreflective 
intentional agency, but conceptual capacities are operative in both” (2013, 53).  73
To say that a subject is unreflectively realising a conceptual capacity, however, does not mean 
that a subject needs even an implicit understanding of all (or even a majority) of what would fall 
under a complete description of the affordance or act in question. In recognising something as for-
hammering, for instance, I need not have a clear idea of just what it is about the object that makes it 
fit for this purpose (e.g. the fact that the weight of the head helps increase the kinetic energy 
delivered in the blow, the fact that the metal is at least as hard as the nails to be struck etc.). What 
makes a case of a conceptual capacity in action is merely that I have the capacity to recognise it as 
for-hammering, such that I could cite that capacity if asked about why I picked up the object in that 
way (‘Why are you picking that up?’ ‘Oh it looked like something I could use to hammer these 
nails’). Similarly, for the act of hammering itself to count as a realisation of a conceptual capacity, I 
do not need a clear grasp of the minute alterations my hand makes in grasping the handle. Rather I 
can “leave that determination to [my] ingrained bodily habits,” as McDowell says (2007b, 368). We 
 Nonetheless, we use this ‘standing capacity’ to question the way that we ostensibly recognise things as 73
being all the time in our pragmatic dealings with things. Take, for instance, the three ways that Heidegger 
says that tools can fail to be ready-to-hand; viz. obtrusiveness, where the tool we expect to find is missing; 
obstinacy, where the tool breaks or fails to function as it is supposed to; and conspicuousness, where the tool 
is not fit for purpose (1962, H74-76). If we think that any of these circumstances obtain, then we need not 
accept the way that we (pragmatically) recognise things as being. Say I am about to go to open the door, 
when I remember that I locked it last night (anticipated obstinacy). I stop myself and pick up the keys on the 
side, only to see that they are too big to fit in the lock (anticipated conspicuousness). I go to get my set from 
my pocket, only to remember that they are not there but next to my bed (anticipated obtrusiveness). Of 
course all of this might be wrong – maybe the door was not locked, the keys were the right size, and my set 
were actually in my pocket – but the point is that I have the standing capacity to reject the ways that I 
pragmatically recognise things as being (‘for-going-out’, ‘for-unlocking’). Dreyfus’s account, by contrast, 
does not appear to be able to make any sense of this kind of pragmatic, anticipatory rejection of the way 
things are (ostensibly) recognised as being. On his picture, a subject is only able to step in and alter the 
general drift of her pragmatic coping “if the brain, which is comparing current performance with how things 
went in the past, sends an alarm signal that something is going wrong” (2007b, 374).
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need not be able to describe the act in question “otherwise than under specifications like ‘whatever 
is needed to [hammer nails] efficiently’” (ibid, 368). We saw Kant make just this distinction in 
chapter three, with his division between the sensible and intellectual use of concepts. In the first 
case all that matters is that we have the capacity to recognise whatever it is that falls under the 
concept in question, while in the latter case what is important is the specific determinations or 
marks that make something a case of the concept in question. 
Of course, it is open to us to give an analytic description of specific features that characterise 
the act or affordance in question, even if this is not possible – or even desirable – while we are 
utilising the practical capacities themselves. Indeed, this was just the problem that Knoblauch faced 
when he lost his ability to throw in a way compatible with professional baseball (at least on 
Dreyfus’s description of the situation). For instead of simply exercising his capacity for throwing 
the ball – in the self-aware way that rational animals do – he became obsessed with the mechanical 
content of that capacity. As McDowell writes, “Knoblauch exemplifies a specific way in which 
practical intelligence can lose its grip on activity. That can happen when someone with a skill whose 
exercises belong to a basic action type tries to bring the limb movements that contribute to doing 
the thing in question within the scope of [the] intention[...]” (2007b, 367-8). Conceptual analysis is 
a valuable tool in certain situations. It might help us get clear about the mechanics of a good 
baseball throw for instance; applied to a training regime, this might be very useful information. But 
the time to analyse the concept is not while one is playing a game of baseball. The fact that 
Knoblauch may have begun thinking in these terms while on the field is unfortunate for him, but 
does not provide grounds for rejecting the idea that concepts are in operation even when things are 
going well. Indeed, as we have seen, it is only because a subject has such a conceptual capacity that 
they can be aware of what they are doing while they are doing it (i.e. it is the reason that they do not 
just respond with ‘Did I do that?’ but rather ‘Throwing the ball, what does it look like?’ when asked 
what it is they are doing). 
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5. Heidegger’s Conceptualism 
Given how closely Dreyfus aligns his picture with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological accounts of our perceptual experience, this criticism might appear to set the 
recognitional picture advocated in this thesis against these core continental thinkers in a way that 
would seem to entrench rather than dissolve what Dreyfus calls “the outmoded opposition between 
analytic and continental philosophy” (2005, 19-20). This is certainly what Dreyfus seems to think 
when he suggests the way to overcome this divide is for continental and analytic philosophers to 
“begin the challenging collaborative task of showing how our conceptual capacities grow out of our 
nonconceptual ones – how the ground floor of pure perception and receptive coping supports the 
conceptual upper stories of the edifice of knowledge” (2005, 19-20). Since the argument of the last 
section has been that there is no such question to answer – that our absorbed coping skills are 
instances of conceptual capacities in operation – this could seem to put in jeopardy the possibility of 
a reconciliation of the two schools. 
Yet there are good reasons for thinking that this is not the case. We have already seen that 
Heidegger’s own account of absorbed coping is compatible with a conceptualist account (at least in 
the sense outlined in this thesis). As we saw, the fact that Heidegger does not deny awareness to 
absorbed coping but rather gives such awareness a distinct form with the concept of Umsicht or 
circumspection, brings his account within the scope of the argument of the A Deduction. For the 
only way that awareness of any form is possible is if we have something general in terms of which 
we can unite a manifold of acts – something that can only be provided by a conceptual capacity. By 
itself this might imply only that Heidegger’s picture is tacitly conceptualist, i.e. he falls prey to the 
argument of the A Deduction, rather than it being a position that he actively holds. However, 
Heidegger’s own account is not only compatible with, but can be seen as a species of 
conceptualism.  
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Take, for instance, this passage from the lecture course The History of the Concept of Time 
which – other than its distinctively Heideggerian idiolect – could almost have been written by 
McDowell: 
[O]ur comportments are in actual fact pervaded through and through by assertions, that they 
are always performed in some form of expressness. It is also a matter of fact that our simplest 
perceptions and constitutive states are already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a 
certain way. What is primary and original here? It is not so much that we see the objects and 
things but rather that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we 
see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter.  
(1985, 56; emphasis added to final sentence)  
It is hard to see how this can be taken as anything other than a form of conceptualism. Heidegger 
even introduces it in a similar way to McDowell, positioning it in opposition to a “mythological 
account of evidence as psychic feeling or psychic datum” (ibid, 59). Of course, the context is 
different – Heidegger is not directly interested in the epistemological status of the myth, but rather 
the phenomenological emptiness of the claim – however the position reached is nonetheless the 
same. This is no superficial connection either, for conceptualism is at the heart of Heidegger’s 
account. This is particularly clear in his notion of ‘discourse’, namely the totality of meanings in 
terms of which we always already understand the world (1962, H162). He suggests that such 
meaning “must be conceived as the formal-existential [i.e. transcendental] framework of the 
disclosedness [awareness of things as things] which belongs to understanding” (1962, H151). This 
is just the position that was reached in chapter two: empirical concepts are a necessary condition for 
the possibility of our perceptual awareness of things as things. It is as a phenomenological result of 
this necessity that “[all] our comportments, lived experiences taken in the broadest sense [i.e. 
including the ready-to-hand], are through and through expressed experiences; even if they are not 
uttered in words...” (1985, 48). 
As Golob writes, in presenting Heidegger as a conceptualist in this way, we are at risk of 
“missing what is distinctive about Heidegger’s position – if his position really is so close to [an 
account like] McDowell’s, then why is the whole baroque apparatus of texts like [Being and Time] 
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necessary?” (2014a, 73). But we need not consider this classification of Heidegger’s position as 
conceptualist as one of equivalency or usurpation. In fact, presenting Heidegger as a conceptualist 
in the specific sense outlined in this thesis can help clarify key aspects of his account that can 
otherwise remain obscured by the ‘baroque apparatus’. The point of such a redescription is not to 
show that what Heidegger says is already contained in a picture like McDowell’s, but to help us 
understand just what it is that is distinctive about Heidegger’s account in the first place. 
Indeed, as Heidegger himself suggests, by suggesting that his main aim was to reveal the 
phenomenon of absorbed coping, we are at risk of missing the key issue: 
I attempted in Being and Time to provide a preliminary characterisation of the phenomenon of 
world by interpreting the way in which we at first and for the most part move about in our 
everyday world... In and through this initial characterisation of the phenomenon of world the 
task is to press on and point out the phenomenon of world as a problem. It never occurred to 
me, however, to try and claim or prove with this interpretation that the essence of man 
consists in the fact that he know how to handle knives and forks or use the tram.  
(1995, 177) 
The structure of absorbed coping is supposed to be a guiding thread to help us recognise a more 
fundamental issue, namely that we find ourselves always already in a meaningful world. As 
Sheehan argues, Heidegger’s main interest is in articulating the conditions of the possibility of this 
phenomenon (i.e. meaningful presence as such), rather than asserting the priority of one form of 
such meaningful presence (2014, passim). It is true that Heidegger suggests that explicit 
propositional judgment is a derivative mode of comportment or intentionality (see 1962, §33), but 
that qualification is not supposed to suggest that such activity is somehow phenomenologically 
‘inferior’. His point is rather that pragmatic coping is in a better position to reveal the phenomenon 
of ‘world’ than judgment as such. 
Heidegger’s worry is that if we take judgment as our model for the way in which we relate to 
the world, we can overlook the way in which the world already shows up as meaningful. That is, if 
we take judgment as the locus of meaning, as the point as which meaning first emerges, then we 
risk obscuring the way in which it is based on a prior ‘disclosure’ (or recognition) or things as 
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already meaningfully present. Heidegger makes this argument several places (see e.g. 1985, §6; 
2010, §§12-3), but the following passage from Being and Time provides a fairly succinct summary: 
All [explicit] interpretation is grounded on [prior] understanding. That which has been 
articulated as such in interpretation and sketched out beforehand in the understanding in 
general as something articulable, is the meaning. In so far as assertion (‘judgment’) is 
grounded on understanding and presents us with a derivative form in which an interpretation 
has been carried out, it too ‘has’ a meaning. Yet this meaning cannot be defined as something 
which occurs ‘in’ a judgment along with the judging itself. 
(ibid, H154) 
Rather than the moment at which meaning emerges, judgment involves the mere “‘taking of a stand’ 
(whether by acceptance or rejection)” on something already meaningfully ‘disclosed’ or recognised 
(ibid, H32). This disclosure of meaning, in other words, is already there in our experience of the 
world rather than something that emerges through the generation of a belief.  
The reason for Heidegger’s focus on the ‘ready to hand’ is that when things break this 
background of passive recognition “is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality 
constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection” (ibid, H75). That is, the malfunction of the tool 
makes the way in which it was passively being recognised explicit. A false judgment, by contrast, 
does not light up the background of prior recognition in the same way (since by definition I am 
going to be unaware that it is false). The point of the pragmatic focus, in other words, is to make 
clear that things are already meaningful, to bring to our attention their prior disclosure. The details 
of such coping are only of interest to the extent that they bear on this primary concern. Once we 
have this phenomenon of ‘world’ in view, we are in a position to ask after the conditions of its 
possibility and ‘trace the river back to its source’ (see 2008, 21). 
To this extent, however, nothing that McDowell says in Mind and World – or indeed anything 
that I have argued in this thesis – is in opposition to what Heidegger describes in Being and Time. It 
is a key part of the conceptualist position that the world always already shows up as meaningful, i.e. 
that our recognitional capacities are passively drawn into operation. Of course, Heidegger’s and 
McDowell’s respective motives in pointing this out are different. McDowell’s focus is on helping us 
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to get over an epistemological worry about the world’s rationally bearing on thought, a problem that 
Heidegger is happy to dismiss as the result of a misunderstanding (see 1962, H217). Heidegger, by 
contrast, is interested in the conditions of the possibility of such meaningful presence, a topic which 
is not McDowell’s focus (perhaps he would see this as a case of not knowing when to stop digging 
(see e.g. 1998, 249-250)). But to the extent that both are interested in the ‘a priori’ passivity of 
meaning, they are on the same page. 
Indeed, it is important to recognise the extent to which Heidegger’s aim in Being and Time, 
particularly in the first part of division one, is heuristic.  The aim is to get the reader see the 74
fundamental phenomenon of world – i.e. that meaning always already is – in order to put them in a 
position to think about the conditions of its possibility. Thus, the important part of the text is not the 
‘baroque terminology’, but the phenomenon being pointed to. The terminology is supposed to be 
helpful to the reader in seeing what Heidegger is talking about, not a labyrinth-like structure that is 
of value in itself.  Of course something’s being helpful is relative to the audience in question. For a 75
philosophical culture used to Neo-Kantian and phenomenological system building, Heidegger’s 
neologisms and transcendental structures may have offered a way to overcome philosophical 
prejudices while still being written in a partially familiar style. But if the text becomes a barrier to 
seeing the phenomenon in question then it is not serving its purpose.  
But if this is the case – and Heidegger’s remark above about ‘handling forks and riding the 
tram’ suggests it is – then it is possible that McDowell’s quietist, non-system building, account of 
the same phenomenon (i.e. the passive, a priori quality of meaning), is better placed to serve as a 
starting point for contemporary readers interested in addressing Heidegger’s question of the 
conditions of the possibility of this phenomenon, than part one of Being and Time itself. The irony 
 As Weising suggests, phenomenology in general is like this in the sense that the aim is for the reader to 74
confirm in their own experience what the phenomenologist is describing (2014, chapter two).
 As Kisiel points out, Heidegger shifts the terminology he uses constantly in the years leading up to the 75
publication of Being and Time (1995).
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is that in creating the baroque structure he does, Heidegger ends up covering over rather than 
revealing the a priori character of meaning for contemporary readers. In the context of a dominant 
reductive scientism and neuroscientific accounts of the physiology of our pragmatic dealings with 
things, absorbed coping becomes a case of ‘mindless’ bodies and brains acting on our behalf (see 
e.g. Dreyfus 2007b, 374). And so the phenomenon of meaningful presence vanishes, lost in a 
complex of synapses and nerve endings.  76
However, once we have this phenomenon firmly in our sights with an account of prior and 
passive acts of recognition, we are in a good position to ask how such meaningful presence is 
possible. There is not the space here to answer to this question in anything approaching a satisfying 
way. However, some direction is provided by the suggestion, in chapter one, that the reason that 
beliefs are not merely generated in perceptual experience is our self-conscious awareness of the 
fallibility of our capacities. For it is precisely this self-conscious awareness that generates the 
logical or intentional distance between recognition and judgment. Heidegger calls our constant 
awareness of the potential for such a gap die Lichtung or ‘the clearing’ (1963, H133). As he writes: 
When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the lumen naturale in man, we have in mind 
nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it is in such a way 
as to be its ‘there’ [in the sense that we are responsible for things being meaningfully 
present]. To say that it is ‘illuminated’ means that as Being-in-the-world [the human being] is 
cleared in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. 
Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-
hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. 
(ibid, H133) 
In the last chapter it was suggested that this metaphor of ‘lighting’ could be taken almost literally: 
the image was a product of our recognition of the fallibility of our capacities. It is only because we 
are aware that things might not be as they appear to be that the idea of a perpetual image is 
 This is why, in his later work, Heidegger has a particular interest in topics like ‘cybernetics’ and ‘the 76
framework’ or technological understanding of the world, since it threatens to eliminate the possibility of our 
thinking of meaningful presence as anything other than reactions in the brain (see e.g. ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’ and ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, both collected in Basic 
Writings (1993). Again, this is not to suggest that such reactions are inessential to such awareness, but rather 
that the vocabulary they are described in is not going to be able to capture the phenomenon of meaning as 
such. On this point see the previous chapter, §6.
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meaningful. But in that case the reason we experience things as visually ‘lit up’ before us, is 
precisely because we are aware of our own fallibility; what Heidegger calls the “finitude of 
temporality” (ibid, H386). 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed two common ‘external’ critiques that are based on the phenomenology 
of perceptual experience. Both, if successful, would have threatened to provide independent 
grounds for at least partially rejecting the conceptualist picture. Yet in each case it has been 
suggested that we can accommodate the phenomenology they describe within a conceptualist 
framework. It was argued in the first case that the complexity of perceptual experience can be 
explained via the use of demonstratives and the picture of concepts as functions that they imply. 
Rather than seeing concepts merely in terms of disjunctive classifications that an object falls under 
or not, it was suggested that they link the objects that fall under them in terms of a functional ‘law 
of arrangement’. It is this feature of our conceptual capacities that demonstratives exploit. This also 
allowed us to account for the interrelated character of our conceptual capacities, since each concept 
could potentially operate as a variable within another function.   
In the second case it was suggested that, contrary to Dreyfus’s suggestion, the 
phenomenology of absorbed coping could be captured more effectively when described as a case of 
conceptual capacities in operation. Rather than being mindless, our practical dealings with the world 
are characterised by a self-conscious awareness of what it is we are doing. Dreyfus’s error resulted 
from his assumption that “being direct and unreflective... [is] the same as being nonconceptual and 
nonminded” (Dreyfus 2007a, 355). But we need not see our conceptual capacities in this way. Most 
of the time recognition and judgment need not come apart: There need only be a standing capacity 
for a reflective stance where we actively reflect on the rational credentials of what it is we 
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ostensibly recognise. Indeed, as we saw, Heidegger himself is best understood as a conceptualist 
since his main interest is not in promoting a picture of human beings as ‘absorbed copers’, but in 
answering the question of how it is that such conceptual meaning (taking something as something) 
is possible in the first place. 
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6. Conclusion 
This concluding chapter will be split into three sections. The first will offer an overview of the 
thesis as a whole, the second will present its original contributions, and the final section will then 
offer some potential directions for future research. 
1. Summary 
The central argument of this thesis has been that perceptual experience is constituted by conceptual 
capacities for recognition. The consequence of this account is that empirical meaning is a priori: 
things are always perceived as being some determinate way according to some set of empirical 
concepts. We see the reflection of the light on the floor, the rustling in the tree, the cat in the garden; 
hear “the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling” (Heidegger 1962, H163). The key 
benefit of framing perceptual experience in terms of capacities for recognition is that it makes clear 
the way in which the objects of such experience are always the things we find in the environment 
around us. To take the by now familiar example: what is recognised as falling under the concept 
‘cardinal’ is simply the cardinal itself. There is no conceptual shaping of sensory consciousness 
mediating between the bird and my act of recognition. Rather, when things go well, such a capacity 
does not stop short of the object itself. 
In the first chapter, recognition also served to clarify the relationship between McDowell’s 
and Travis’s pictures of perceptual experience. By casting McDowell’s account of conceptual 
capacities being passively being drawn into operation in terms of passive acts of recognition, it was 
possible to clarify the comparison between his picture and Travis’s account of recognition. The key 
difference between the two was that, for Travis, recognition implied judgment, while for McDowell, 
it did not. The difficulty for Travis was that such a picture of recognition rendered the subject 
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unaware of the grounds of her perceptual beliefs, with the result that they appear to be merely 
generated in the subject in a law-bound way. It was thus hard to see how the subject could 
recognise her perceptual beliefs as something that ought to be believed, rather than something that 
she could simply not help believing. On such a model, an appeal to perceptual experience would not 
be able to stand as a justification for a belief: it would be a mere ‘exculpation’ as McDowell says.  
Instead, it was suggested that we should follow McDowell and see recognition as passive, 
such that the subject need not judge that things are the way she ostensibly recognises them as being. 
This logical gap between recognition and judgment is made possible by the subject’s self-conscious 
awareness of the fallibility of her recognitional capacities. Such an awareness belongs exclusively 
to rational capacities, since only they are understood by their possessors as representing a norm. 
This means that, in a situation where the subject thinks that conditions are not favourable for a 
realisation of the capacity in question, they can withhold their judgment that things are as the 
capacity presents them as being. Conversely, if the subject thinks that conditions are favourable, 
then they can cite their capacity as a reason for their belief. Since she understands herself to have 
such a capacity and takes conditions to be good, she understands her judgment not only to be 
something that she cannot help but believe, but something that one ought to believe. Indeed, in 
cases where the act of recognition is a genuine exercise of the capacity, then such a judgment is able 
to stand as a truth-guaranteeing ground for belief, since, by definition, it represents things as they 
really are. 
Chapter two suggested that Travis would be unlikely to accept this reading of his account. 
Instead of conceiving of his picture of recognition as a rationally groundless process of belief 
generation, Travis argues that it is based on a pre-conceptual form of visual awareness. The 
argument of the first chapter can seem to dismiss this possibility out of hand, appearing to assume 
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that whatever perceptual judgment is based on must have truth to transmit.  In order to demonstrate 77
that this was not the case, the chapter used Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A version 
of the Deduction to show that any form of perceptual awareness will have a conceptual form. 
Essentially, the argument suggests that in order to be aware of an object in perceptual experience, 
the subject requires something in terms of which she can recognise it as the same over time. Insofar 
as it must unite a manifold of acts, any such self-consciously held capacity is going to be 
conceptual. 
This reading of the A Deduction constitutes the chief contribution of this thesis. It shows how 
we can read Kant as providing us with a conceptualist account of perceptual experience that avoids 
presenting the activity of conceptual capacities in perception as shapings of sensory consciousness. 
Rather than sense data, what are united (or synthesised) on this reading are the individual acts of 
recognition themselves, where the objects of such acts are simply those objects that we are 
perceptually related to in the environment before us. This clearly distinguishes the account of 
perceptual experience given here clearly from other readings that describe the activity of the 
productive imagination in terms of functions for synthesis that join bits of intuitional sense data 
together, such that those bits of data themselves form the material substrate of that awareness. The 
problem with any such reading is that it results in a picture of conceptual capacities that makes it 
appear impossible for us to know about the ‘external world’. 
Nonetheless, as we saw, this argument for the necessity of conceptual capacities for 
perceptual awareness still left open the possibility that perceptual experience could be constituted 
by a base level of such capacities. This was the position not only of the ‘categorical minimalists’ 
who suggested that perceptual experience was a product of the schematisation of the categories, but 
McDowell himself in some of his more recent work. Instead of seeing the content of perceptual 
 To be clear, this misunderstands the nature of rational capacities: what justifies my forming a belief on the 77
basis of a particular instance of the realisation of my recognitional capacity is that capacity itself (i.e. that I 
have a general capacity for recognising that kind of thing), not a particular bit of experiential content with 
‘truth to transmit’.
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experience as containing everything that it allows the subject to know non-inferentially, he now 
suggests that perceptual experience proper is constituted only by ‘non-discursive’ common and 
proper sensibles. As was shown, it is difficult to underestimate just how drastic of a shift this is in 
McDowell’s position. Such a change not only upends the whole structure of Mind and World (the 
two premises that McDowell gives up constitute the core thesis of that work), but seems to 
eliminate its therapeutic appeal. In place of comments about unproblematic openness to reality, we 
are left with descriptions of discursive carvings of non-discursive intuitions. Instead of showing us 
the way out of Wittgenstein’s fly bottle, such comments would seem to leave us trapped inside 
(2009, §309; also see chapter one, §1).  
The key concern of chapter three was therefore to demonstrate that McDowell was wrong to 
make these concessions. As argued, one of the key issues for any version of perceptual minimalism 
is that there does not seem to be any guaranteed base level of content for us to draw on. McDowell’s 
suggestion that the base level of contents should be seen in terms of what we see of what we see 
was particularly problematic in this regard. For just what we see of what we see will in part depend 
on what we (ostensibly) recognise as forming the second part of that formulation. Properties like 
colour and shape are not independent of our richer conceptual capacities. If I incorrectly ‘recognise’ 
the patch on the path ahead as spilled lime rather than light filtering down from the canopy, then I 
will see it as shaded white rather than lit up brown as I should. It was thus argued that, instead of 
independent layers, perceptual experience forms a complex totality of interrelated conceptual 
capacities, a phenomenon that Cassirer called the ‘symbolic pregnance’ of perceptual experience. 
As he writes, this fact forms the “true pulse of consciousness, whose secret is precisely that every 
beat strikes a thousand connections” (1957, 203). 
The failure of the categorical minimalist account at the end of chapter three, however, left us 
with a problem in accounting for the origin of our empirical conceptual capacities. The argument 
showed that the pure concepts of the understanding are not constitutive of perceptual experience, 
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but rather mark out the form of our recognitional capacities. The consequence of this is that 
empirical concepts are shown to be a necessary part of perceptual experience, rather than something 
that can be based on a prior ‘pure’ conceptualisation of intuition. It is this circumstance that 
generates what chapter four called ‘the bootstrap problem’, for placing empirical concepts in a 
transcendental position seems to result in the paradoxical situation that empirical concepts are a 
condition of the possibility of the very same experience they are drawn from. We were left with two 
options: we could either drop the first claim – that empirical conceptual capacities are a condition of 
the possibility of perceptual experience – or the second – that our initial empirical conceptual 
capacities are drawn from experience.  
Ginsborg took the first path, suggesting that in forming our initial empirical conceptual 
capacities we take the otherwise merely psychological synthetic activity of the imagination as 
exemplary. The problem with this kind of approach, however, is that it falls prey to the argument of 
the A Deduction and is unable to explain how it is that the subject can be aware of her psychological 
activity as the same over time. As an alternative, it was suggested that we drop the claim that all our 
empirical capacities are drawn from perceptual experience. Although this might seem to imply that 
we have an innate set of empirical conceptual capacities (i.e. capacities that could have been 
otherwise but that we nonetheless have innately by means of a contingent process of evolution or 
design), instead it was argued that we should see our initial conceptual capacities as emerging from 
dispositions that we obtain as children by mimicking those with fully-fledged rational capacities. It 
was suggested that through practice we could gradually come to evaluate our own dispositions in 
the light of the norm that the capacity represents. This had the double benefit of making it clear how 
the capacities could rightly be said to be empirical, since they are obtained through exposure to 
other language users, while also showing how the capacities did not rely on the same experience 
they were a condition of the possibility of, since the dispositions were formed at a stage of 
development prior to perceptual experience. 
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With the main internal obstacle out of the way, the final chapter addressed two external, 
phenomenological objections. The first argued that perceptual experience was too fine-grained to be 
captured by conceptual capacities. There is simply too much detail in perceptual experience to be 
expressed linguistically. McDowell’s account of demonstrative concepts gave us a way to avoid 
these nonconceptual implications, however. His suggestion was that demonstrative concepts like 
‘this shade’ should be seen as partially constitutive of that experience itself. Although this seemed to 
go against the most obvious explanatory picture of demonstratives, it was argued that recognising 
things in terms of demonstrative concepts was in fact part of what it is to have a recognitional 
capacity. Drawing on Cassirer’s account of concepts as functions, it was suggested that to recognise 
something as falling under a concept is not to only to recognise it as falling within the set that the 
concept marks out disjunctively, but to recognise it as falling under the concept in a particular way 
(i.e. as having a particular position within that set).  
The second phenomenological objection, by contrast, made the opposite claim, suggesting 
that a conceptualist picture attributes too much content to perceptual experience rather than too 
little. The argument was that the phenomenology of absorbed coping means that concepts are not 
only absent from our pragmatic dealings with things much of the time, but that they actively disrupt 
the flow of our activity when they are. The problem with this objection was twofold. First, it failed 
to capture the phenomenology accurately. The account suggests that our pragmatic coping is 
mindless, but seems clear that even while we are absorbed in our activity we are nonetheless aware 
of what it is that we are doing. Such awareness, however, insofar as it requires the self-conscious 
awareness of a unified manifold of acts, can only have a conceptual structure. Second, it 
misrepresented conceptual capacities as solely reflective and distanced. Although it is true that 
conceptual capacities grant us the capacity to step back and evaluate the rational credentials of 
something, this is only a standing capacity. Most of the time recognition and judgment need not 
come apart. 
Sam Matthews  of 187 200 19 September 2019
The final section then argued that, contrary to Dreyfus’s suggestion, Heidegger himself is best 
seen as a conceptualist. His concern is not primarily the phenomenology of absorbed coping, but 
rather the phenomenon of ‘world’, namely the a priori quality of empirical meaning. The focus on 
the ready to hand in Being and Time was shown to be primarily a way get us to consider that 
phenomenon. In this regard, Heidegger’s account need not be understood as opposed to the account 
given in this thesis. Indeed, it was argued that the logical gap between recognition and judgment 
was at least partially equivalent to what Heidegger calls die Lichtung or the clearing, as a condition 
of the possibility of our awareness of the meaningful presence of things. 
2. Originality 
Although this account takes Mind and World as its starting point, it moves beyond that work in 
three key ways. First, by specifying the kind of conceptual capacities involved in perceptual 
experience as capacities for recognition, it removes any ambiguity as to how we should see these 
capacities as operating in perceptual experience. To say that our conceptual capacities are passively 
drawn into operation is only to say that things in the environment in front of us are recognised 
passively as being a certain way; it is not to say that such capacities passively ‘mould’, ‘shape’, or 
‘carve’ that which we receive in sensibility. McDowell does make this point in Mind and World 
when he says that we should see “capacities that belong to spontaneity [as] already operative in 
receptivity, rather than working on something independently supplied to them by receptivity” (1996, 
61). But the fact that in more recent work he appears partially to rescind this claim demonstrates 
just how nebulous the idea of ‘conceptual capacities being passively drawn into operation’ threatens 
to be if we are not clear about the specific form it takes. 
Second, the reading of the A Deduction presents a novel defence of the conceptualist thesis, 
which eliminates its vulnerability to relationalist critique. Rather than relying solely on the ‘Myth of 
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the Given’ – where conceptualism is shown to be a condition of the possibility for perceptual 
experience to play a justificatory role in our epistemic practices – the argument from the A 
Deduction shows that perceptual awareness itself requires conceptual capacities to be operative. 
This denies a relationalist appeal to a pre-conceptual visual awareness in order to provide the 
subject with grounds for their perceptual judgement, thus revealing the relationalist picture to be a 
case of the myth. If the possibility of a pre-conceptual form of awareness is left open, by contrast, 
then it can appear that the conceptualist is simply presupposing that the grounds of perceptual 
judgement must be conceptual in the way that Travis suggests (2018, 39). 
Third, the thesis gives an account of and attempts to answer the ‘Bootstrap Problem’. This is a 
fundamental problem for any richly contentful version of conceptualism, but it is at best 
tangentially addressed in Mind and World. Although some commentators take McDowell’s account 
of ‘Second Nature’ to be his official response to this problem (see especially Ginsborg 2006c), in 
reality that concept targets a reductive conception of what counts as natural rather than accounting 
for concept acquisition as such (even if this is the form that Second Nature takes in rational 
animals). His appeal to the notion of Bildung comes closer to offering a reply, but the concept 
presented in Mind and World is in a fairly nascent state and does little to remove the air of paradox 
that emerges from placing empirical concepts in a transcendental position. The account given here, 
by contrast, addresses the challenge head on, providing a way to drop the claim that our initial 
conceptual capacities must be drawn from the very same experience that they make possible. 
Beyond Mind and World, the account also contributes to Kant scholarship, not only in its 
reading of the A Deduction, but in arguing against the idea that Kant advocates a form of 
‘categorical minimalism’. The suggestion that Kant takes the categories as capable of constituting 
constitutive of perceptual experience in the absence of any other empirical concepts is more or less 
the received reading for conceptualist accounts of the Critique (see for example Wolff 1963, 118ff; 
Allison 1968, 180ff; Makkreel 1990, 30ff; Griffith 2010, 332ff; Connolly 2014, 332ff). It is clear 
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from both Wolff’s (1963, 118) and Allison’s (1968, 180n) account that concern about the bootstrap 
problem is a key reason behind this, but a worry about being unable to account for the origin of 
conceptual capacities does not lend the picture any support if the categories are incapable of playing 
that role. While this thesis is not original in arguing against categorical minimalism (see for 
example Ginsborg 2006c; Bauer 2012), it is unique both in the way it supports this claim – via the 
reading of the A Deduction – and in the way that it places empirical concepts in an explicitly 
transcendental role. 
Finally, the thesis also makes a unique claim to the kinship between McDowell’s and 
Heidegger’s accounts of perceptual experience. Although it is far from the first account to make 
such a connection (see especially Dennis 2012; Schear 2013b; Golob 2014a, 30-33), the specific 
connection it draws between Heidegger’s notion of the clearing and the gap between recognition 
and judgment (produced by the subject’s self-conscious awareness of the fallibility of their 
capacities) is new. Such a conclusion suggests that there are grounds for comprehending a deeper 
connection between the two thinkers beyond a similarity in the way that they talk about the contents 
of perceptual experience. 
3. Future Research 
The link with Heidegger that this thesis concludes with offers perhaps the most obvious direction 
for future research. There are a number of directions that this could take. The first is to identify 
further, more specific connections between McDowell and Heidegger. For instance, Heidegger’s 
account of attunement potentially offers a way of expanding on the structure of recognition. 
Although this was discussed in this thesis itself, it seems clear that the way we recognise things as 
being is not merely arbitrary, but occurs – as Heidegger suggest – according to the specific interests 
and concerns we have. As I walk down the street, I do not recognise everything that there is to 
recognise, as most of what there is to see is not relevant to my activity. Thus, although recognitional 
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capacities are passive, they are nonetheless realised according to a specific structure. This kind of 
feature of our perceptual experience can only emerge phenomenologically, and accounting for it in 
terms of capacities for recognition has potentially ‘therapeutic’ benefits for those who are resistant 
to the idea that conceptual capacities can be at play in absorbed coping. 
The second way in which the links between McDowell and Heidegger might be developed is 
through a broader comparison between the respective ways in which they resist a reductive 
scientism. Both are concerned with giving us a way of placing meaning back into nature and 
resisting the idea that a nomological description of the world in terms of interacting particles is the 
only one that matters. In McDowell’s case, this takes the form of a quietist expansion of the idea of 
something’s being natural, while Heidegger places human existence in an explicitly transcendental 
or ‘ontologically grounding’ role with regards to the natural sciences (in the sense that it is only 
because the world is meaningfully present that natural science is possible). There is a question to be 
asked about just how compatible these two approaches are and to what degree they can be said to 
complement each other. 
Another possible route for further research is via the argument that this thesis finds in the A 
Deduction. The argument was used here in a primarily ‘outward looking’ way, towards our 
awareness of things. But the argument applies inwardly as well, towards the empirical 
understanding that we have of ourselves as in some way the same over time. It is therefore possible 
that this argument has implications for discussions of agency. For instance, the apparent circularity 
involved in self-conscious awareness – as explored in Henrich’s essay ‘Fichte’s Original 
Insight’ (1982) – is very similar in structure to the Bootstrap Problem, in the sense that something is 
posited which appears to be the condition of the possibility of itself. It is possible that the solution 
to the Bootstrap Problem presented by this thesis might offer some direction in addressing that 
issue. 
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